Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



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A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate may be used verbatim or in a modified form; they are designated "author's abstract," "author's summary," etc.

Library of Congress Location Symbols

(Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials)

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Nr East	Near East Section
P&GP RR	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

492
Bagramov, Eduard A. [THE CRISIS OF BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY: CHAUVINISM AND NATIONAL NIHILISM IN THE IDEOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM] Krizis burzhuaznoi ideologii: shovinizm i natsional'nyi nigilizm v ideologii imperializma. Kommunist, v. 43, Sept. 1966: 105-116.
HX8. K56, v. 43

People's natural tendencies to embrace the concurrent operation of nationalism and internationalism are disrupted by imperialists who draw nations together to infringe on their rights and their political and economic independence. The rise of the Soviet Union and the humane essence of socialism and the working class influences world forums to oppose imperialist-fomented wars and protect the real interests of nations as contrasted with the mercenary interests of exploiters. But capitalists, led by the Fascist-minded groups in the United States and West Germany, fight the new order in international relations with chauvinist strategy and nihilist propaganda (as exemplified by Barry Goldwater's call for total anti-communism, world hegemony of Western culture, neo-colonialism, and rejection of the United Nations). David Lawrence asserted unabashedly that the United States "has the right not only to defend its own territory but its own interests everywhere." Was he referring to actions like Vietnam, where America's ardent support of a handful of monopolists is in blatant contradiction of U.S. interests? This situation caused Senator Fulbright to wince. "Some of our super-patriots," he wrote in the Progressive of July 1966, "regard any war waged by the United States as a just war, if not a crusade. It seems to me logical and appropriate to doubt the wisdom of our present military invasion of Asia." Today's antiprogressive, anti-revolutionary bourgeoisie stands in marked distinction to America's founding ideologists who considered the defense of the ideals of the American Revolution the essence of American nationalism. Contrary to chauvinist brainwashing domestically, U.S. propaganda overseas advances nihilist ideas and urges anti-nationalist steps. While denying rights to the majority of nations it reserves for itself the right to speak in the name of every country in which an American soldier has set foot or where U.S. capitalists seek new markets or investment opportunities. Unlike the contradiction-fostering bourgeois ideology, Socialist ideology unifies the national and the international aspects of human relations. It helps the working people of all nations to unite for a more successful struggle for world peace and national progress.

493
Bartsch, Günter. [WORLD COMMUNISM AND NATIONAL COMMUNISM] Weltkommunismus und Nationalkommunismus. Politische Welt, no. 100, Dec. 1966: 3-5. D839. P65, 1966

Holds national communism to be the main form of the Communist movement that evolved after Stalin's death. The movement, increasingly deprived of its international solidarity and given to diverse national ambitions and needs, is now at a crossroads where it can either become more liberal or can as in China combine nationalism with re-Stalinization. In the latter case communism's form and policy might be even stricter than those under Stalin.

494
Boffa, Giuseppe. ITALIAN CP COMMENTS ON POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN CHINA TODAY. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on international Communist developments, no. 879, Sept. 9, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,513) p. 52-55.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 3801-D."
"Translation of an article . . . titled 'The Political Struggle in China today--Is War with America Considered Inevitable?' in the Italian-language daily organ of the Italian CP, l'Unita (Unity), Rome, 18 August 1966, page 3."

Examines the causes of the Chinese cultural revolution in the light of Edgar Snow and Robert Guillain's assertion that the event appears to be the result of a new theory which foresees China's inevitable involvement in an escalated Vietnamese War. Presumably in order to meet this eventuality Mao Tse-tung decided to eliminate all opponents of this theory, no matter who they were, and standardize Chinese thought under a series of simple and clear political concepts presented to the masses. The author wonders why China, if it considers a war inevitable, does not cooperate with the other Communist countries, and seems purposely to deepen the split, while undoubtedly being aware of the fact that the split encourages American escalation of the Vietnamese War.

495
Bondar', V. IA. [NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT] Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie. [Moskva] Izd-vo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1965. 34 p.
HC59. 7. B57

Maintains that the national liberation movement in our epoch is one of the most important parts of the world revolutionary process. Each national revolution leads to the weakening of imperialism and advances the realization of mankind's dream to end once and for all the shameful system of some countries enslaving others and man exploiting man. Each revolution advances the construction of a new, more progressive social order. Bondar' also treats the principal problems in the current stage of the national liberation movement, and views the world Socialist system as a "dependable defender of freedom and independence of liberated nations."

496
Boserup, Anders, and Claus Iversen. DEMONSTRATIONS AS A SOURCE OF CHANGE: A STUDY OF

BRITISH AND DANISH EASTER MARCHERS. Journal of peace research, v. 3, no. 4, 1966: 328-348.
AS9.J6, v. 3

The article is a partial report of a study of Danish and British Easter marchers (marching against nuclear weapons), carried out in cooperation between the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Peace Research Centre, Lancaster and Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen. It is assumed that the marchers' perceptions of the functions of a demonstration in generating change to a large extent determine their view of society. This assumption leads to the hypothesis that demonstrators demonstrating on issues of foreign policy will favor a two-level model of social organization with clearly differentiated national and international levels, and with minimum interaction between units at a given level. Change is then the result of moral conversion and--to a lesser extent--of coercion through a show of strength. A number of consequences of this model are verified in the sense that the attitudes of the marchers conform more closely with the model than do those of a reference population and further, that the more a marcher engages in demonstrations, the more closely do his attitudes conform with the model. It is shown how most of the differences found between British and Danish marchers can be explained by the model, if the difference in international status between Britain and Denmark is taken into account. Finally, consequences of the model in terms of the marchers' image of peace and of the road to peace are spelt out. It is shown that the preferred state of peace within the model, the world state, cannot be reached without serious violation of the model. (Authors' summary)

497
Buss, Arnold H. THE EFFECT OF HARM ON SUBSEQUENT AGGRESSION. Journal of experimental research in personality, v. 1, Dec. 1966: 249-255.
BF1.J62, v. 1

Subjects (aggressors) were given the opportunity to shock two successive "learners" (victims). In the experimental group the first victim indicated that he had been harmed by the shock. In the control group there were no indications of harm to the first victim. The overall effect of harming a victim was a drop in aggression intensity to the second victim. This effect varied slightly with the gender of the aggressor and considerably with the gender of the victim, but it was unrelated to verbal reports of being concerned. (Abstract supplied)

498
[THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION] Est & ouest, n.s., v. 18, Dec. 1, 1966: 1-28.
D839.A822, n.s., v. 18

Articles on the Chinese cultural revolution: its relation to the Vietnamese War, the Sino-Soviet conflict and the International Communist Movement; the exactions of the Red Guards; and the effect of the revolution on the Chinese press. Included also are biographies of Lin Piao and Kang Cheng, "the Chinese Zinov'ev."

499
[DOCUMENTS ON THE CHINESE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"] Documents sur la "révolution culturelle" chinoise. Révolution prolétarienne, no. 522, Dec. 1966: 17. HX821.R4, 1966

Two documents on the "cultural revolution" in China. The first, excerpted from an article by Felix Cesselin published in the daily newspaper Nice-Matin on November 13, 1966, states the purposes of the revolution as follows: destruction of the growing internal opposition, curbing of bourgeois trends (reactionary Khrushchevism), and mobilization of the masses for the creation of a new type of Chinese Marxist man. The second document, an abreviated resolution from a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, August 8-12, 1966, was published in a special issue of the Chinese illustrated magazine La Chine. It deals with various phenomena of the "cultural revolution" and declares the revolutionization of human thought to be the goal of the revolution. The resolution affirms that the fight led presently against the thought, culture, and manners inherited from the exploiting classes that ruled the county for millenia will necessarily last a very long time.

500
Elms, Alan C., and Stanley Milgram. PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH OBEDIENCE AND DEFIANCE TOWARD AUTHORITATIVE COMMAND. Journal of experimental research in personality, v. 1, Dec. 1966: 282-289.
BF1.J62, v. 1

Forty adult males, half having obeyed and half having defied authoritative commands to give high-voltage shocks to a fellow volunteer in a realistic experimental situation, were administered personality tests and questionnaires several months later. Obedient and defiant Ss showed little differentiation on the MMPI, but differed significantly on the California F Scale ($p < .003$). Significant attitudinal differences were displayed toward own father, experimenter, experimental confederate, sponsoring university, willingness to shoot at men in wartime, and other concepts, in patterns somewhat similar to "authoritarian personalities." Experimental validation of personality differences previously reported in association with measures of authoritarianism was thus tentatively demonstrated. Exceptions to authoritarian patterns were noted. (Abstract supplied)

501
Embree, Ainslie T., and others, comps. ASIA: A GUIDE TO BASIC BOOKS. [New York] Asia Society, 1966. 57 p. Z3001.E48

Identifies and annotates basic books on Asia, arranged by country, which cover history, religion, literature, the arts, and political, social, and economic developments. For advanced research the authors provide a list of specialized bibliographies. Introductory essays before each major section discuss books of particular importance.

502
Emel'ianov, Vasilii. REFLECTIONS ON WAR, PEACE AND REVANCHISM. New times, no. 51, Dec. 21, 1966: 4-6. D839.N483, 1966

Cites the statement of "an eminent Western scientist" at an international meeting to the effect that the following myths have been harbored over past years: (1) the "Soviet menace," (2) the nonexistence of the German Democratic Republic, and (3) the insignificance of West German revanchism. The scientist dismissed the first two myths, the author reports, with the claims that no right-minded person believes in the first and no realist can close his eyes to the international diplomatic, consular, and economic relations

of the second. Emel'ianov then cites first- and second-hand evidence for his thesis that unregenerate West Germany's tendency for revanchism is a continuing danger.

503
Gasteyger, Curt. THE AMERICAN DILEMMA: BIPOLARITY OR ALLIANCE COHESION. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966. 11 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 24) P&GP RR

Analyzes the United States perception of its international policy alternatives in terms of the choice between Soviet-American bilateralism and alliance cohesion. According to Gasteyger the misconception that an "either-or" choice must be made exhibits U.S. failure to distinguish between the effects of a mainly military Soviet-American bipolarity and a politically differentiated international system and to understand the actual causes of East-West détente. He questions whether the common interest of the two powers in avoiding a major war or promoting greater security will necessarily lead to agreement on other issues when, until now, there have been virtually no signs of such a develpment. The present military duopoly does not necessarily lead to political détente nor dispense with the need for diplomatic pluralism. Although agreements on some questions such as arms control still require active Soviet-American participation, the increasing number of conflicts arising outside direct Soviet-American confrontation make such agreement less and less relevant. Gasteyger concludes that the present stability secured by Soviet-American military superiority is sufficiently strong to allow a broader system of military and political cooperation to develop--one which leaves the middle powers greater responsibility in fields such as regional conflict management, nuclear planning, disarmament, and peacekeeping operations.

504
Gorer, Geoffrey. MAN HAS NO "KILLER" INSTINCT. New York times magazine, Nov. 27, 1966: 47, 82, 86, 92, 94, 98, 103-104, 107, 109. AP2.N6575, 1966

Many men of good will throughout the world persistently believe that human beings are by nature gentle, peaceful, considerate of their fellow human beings, and unwilling to kill or hurt except in war. Others maintain that a "killer instinct" is man's hereditary endowment. Probably the most important statement on this aspect of human nature appears in the recent book, On Aggression, by Konrad Lorenz (New York, 1966). Lorenz shows that all the carnivores that kill other species for their food have innate inhibitions against killing members of their own species. There are but two exceptions--rats and men. For all carnivores, including man, killing other species for food is different from killing members of the same species for rivalry, jealousy, or pleasure. Both human beings and rats live in packs, inside which killing other members is always forbidden (except under carefully defined rules). The nation-state is the widest successful human invention for extending the size of the pack. No religion, for example, has developed wider application. To admit that man has no inhibitions against killing men of a different pack (and even gaining intense pleasure and pride from doing so) does not necessarily imply an inherited "killer instinct." Societies exist where men find no pleasure in dominating, hurting, or killing members of other societies. These small, weak, and relatively inaccessable communities manifest a number of common traits, most importantly an enormous gusto for concrete physical pleasures and small variation between the ideal male and female characteristics (as opposed to the ideal of brave, aggressive masculinity). Apparently mankind is safer while seeking pleasure than while seeking power and glory.

505
Groth, Alexander. REVOLUTION AND ELITE ACCESS: SOME HYPOTHESES ON ASPECTS OF POLITICAL CHANGE. Davis, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California, 1966. 72 p. (University of California, Davis. Institute of Governmental Affairs. Comparative development series, no. 1) JC491.G75
"References": p. 53-72.

Studies the extent of revolutionary leaders' access to ruling or privileged groups as a factor determining the means of government takeover. Means of takeover range from coup d'etat, which leaves the social and governmental structures relatively intact, to a takeover requiring total transformation. Groth focuses on Russian communism ("the elite isolated revolution of the left") and German nazism ("the elite affiliated revolution of the right") and summarizes the radical structural differences between the two movements. He analyzes the disorganization brought upon constitutional government by external challenge, the role of neutral power, the unwillingness of loyal opposition to take over the government, and the exploitation of the resultant power vacuum by disloyal elements. Although the two major totalitarian movements differ in means of seizing and holding power, the final results, he finds, are equally unfortuante for the populace.

506
Heck, Bruno. [GERMANS WITHOUT THEIR MOTHER COUNTRY?] Deutsche ohne Vaterland? Der Europäische Osten, v. 12, Nov. 1966: 624-629. DR1.E83, v. 12

A brief history of the German concept of nationalism and the nation-state and the national consciousness in general. Heck contends that democracy offers Germans their best chance for cultivation of the healthy aspects of their national consciousness as opposed to their traditionally antidemocratic nationalism.

507
Hinsley, Francis H. SOVEREIGNTY. New York, Basic Books [1966] 255 p. JC327.H5, 1966a

Contents.--Sovereignty, society and the state.--The concept of sovereignty in the ancient world.--The emergence of the modern theory of sovereignty.--The modern history of the concept of sovereignty within the community.--The concept of sovereignty in the history of relations between states.--The concept of sovereignty in the modern world.

Contends that no single thesis about the contemporary state and its sovereignty can answer the problems posed by the complexity of modern political societies or the differences between nations.

508
Huemer, Oskar. ACTIVE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Nov. 20, 1966: 16-17. D839.R4, v. 17

The question of whether United Nations membership is compatible with the status of permanent neutrality was investigated in 1955 when Austria became a full-fledged U.N. member. Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Charter requires member-states to give full support to all Organization actions and to withhold assistance from any state against which action is taken. However the Security Council may exempt individual members from such action. Austria's policy of "active neutrality" permitted participation in the U.N. peacekeeping activities in the Congo and Cyprus. Austria favors efforts to establish a permanent U.N. peacekeeping force. It has amended its constitution to provide for sending troops abroad on peacekeeping assignments and keeping one special unit of the Army in readiness. In its endeavor to support all U.N. action Austria recently refused an extremely profitable arms transaction with the Republic of South Africa. Austria's first goal is to relax tensions and eliminate mistrust among European nations with different political and social systems. It hopes to conclude an arrangement with the European Common Market--not full membership, which would violate its permanent neutrality, but participation strictly limited to the economic field. Austria favors a U.N. convention regulating the duties and rights of permanently neutral countries and making it compulsory for others to offer them military aid in the event of external aggression. It feels, however, that as long as neutral states are compelled to defend themselves, they cannot renounce the possibility of using modern weapons.

509
Klein, Robert A. THE IDEA OF EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE TENSION BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF GREAT-POWER PRIMACY AND THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY. Ambilly, Impr. "Les Presses de Savoie," 1966. 264 p.
JX1395.K55

Bibliographical footnotes.
Bibliography: p. 247-257.

Contents.--From Vienna to Verona.--Conflicting concepts in the Western hemisphere and in Europe: 1881-1913.--The idea of equality during the administration of Woodrow Wilson: 1913-1919.--Changing concepts in inter-American relations: 1928-1943; Part I 1928-1933.--Changing concepts in inter-American relations 1928-1943; Part II 1933-1943.--The idea of equality in regional and international organization.

A comprehensive presentation of the legal, political, and moral dilemma of reconciling the nominal world of equal, sovereign states with the inequality inherent in international relations and the dominant voice of great powers.

510
Kolkowicz, Roman. SOVIET PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS: CONTAINED CONFLICT. [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.] 1966. 48 p. ([Rand Corporation. Paper] P-3371) AS36.R28, no. 3371

Investigates the pressures and demands brought to bear upon leaders of the Soviet Communist Party by the military's striving for greater autonomy. Kolkowicz attempts to discern how the ruling elite of the Party reconciles competing demands for resources and status among several institutions, particularly when meeting such demands could overburden the nation's economy, jeopardize political objectives, and even threaten the entire internal political balance. Finally the study attempts to illuminate the complex and somewhat precarious relationship between maintenance of hegemony within the state and a strong military-political posture internationally.

511
Laloy, Jean. [PROSPECTS AND LIMITS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS] Perspectives et limites des rapports Est-Ouest. Politique étrangère, v. 31, no. 5/6, 1966: 451-472. JX3.P6, v. 31

Asserts that East-West relations, which have seemed petrified since 1945, are currently undergoing a change. The world is less irrational, technological progress has opened new horizons, and problems are so vast that they cannot be handled by mere brute force. If the world can overcome enormous obstacles and an inherent inertia, it may, instead of insisting on complete freedom, accept a world order restraining the sovereignty of states. Then present institutions may be used and present efforts continued until certain basic phenomena are modified, and a progressive evolution of manners, ideas, and structures will cause a change. Between pure pragmatism and views inspired by ideology there is a middle way, close to reality and open to influence of ideas. This way may lead from the two only alternatives today--the preservation of the present status quo or triumph of one camp or another--to other solutions.

512
Lechat, Jacques. [POTENTIAL EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FROM THE PRESENT TO 1980] Les évolutions possibles de la dissuasion nucléaire d'ici 1980. Stratégie, no. 9, July/Sept. 1966: 41-84. U162.S78, 1966

How will the evolution of deterrence influence nuclear stability during the forthcoming 15 years? The first aspect that should be examined is technological progress and its effect on the evolution of the deterrence capacity of both the great and the small nuclear powers. Most probably the first product of technological development will be the orbital bomb. It will be closely followed by progress in detection, discrimination, and destruction of airplanes and missiles in flight. This progress depends on the improvement of antimissile missiles, on more effective discrimination methods, and on development of laser techniques. The first and last are likely to be achieved soon. Even so it remains questionable if 100% efficiency rates of interception can be achieved before 1980, or if they can be achieved at all. As far as the superpowers are concerned, technological progress will not greatly influence their mutual nuclear balance; on the other hand technological progress will affect the small nuclear powers unfavorably. The second aspect of the evolution of deterrence which must be studied is the influence of various groupings of powers on the future nuclear environment. Examination shows there is a good chance that no potential grouping of powers will influence the present nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Only a case of Soviet de jure neutrality in a Sino-American conflict could create an unstable situation--one that would act to the detriment of China if China did not possess nuclear weapons able to attack the United States. Finally consideration must be given to the influence of proliferation and arms control and disarmament measures on the future of deterrence. Proliferation among the allies of the great nuclear powers will have a tendency to reinforce nuclear deterrence. Actually it is erroneous to think that a nuclear conflict between two small nuclear powers must necessarily unleash a worldwide nuclear war.

Mutual deterrence between the two "greats" will probably not allow them to seek such drastic solutions. In sum, proliferation is not likely to lead to nuclear instability. The only destabilizing element lies in the possible use of nuclear weapons by subversive forces, or in disarmament agreements which, while abolishing fear and deterrence, will make possible the return to classical conventional wars.

513
MAJOR CENTERS INVOLVED IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF GAMES WITH SIMULATED ENVIRONMENTS. American behavioral scientists, v. 10, Nov. 1966: 35-36.
HI. A472, v. 10

Lists and gives short descriptions of corporations, centers, and projects working on simulation games.

514
Marjolin, Robert. [THE BRAIN DRAIN] La fuite des cerveaux. Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 68, Dec. 1966: 7-12. H3. R4, v. 68

Today everybody speaks about research and deplores the retardation of Europe in science and technology. But few are aware of the ties between scientific research and economic development. Presently if a nation wants to keep its place as a leader it must not only possess the equipment for mass production but keep up à rapid rhythm of product and technique development, which can be accelerated any time. As scientific and technological research is indispensable for this development, research policy becomes a part of economic policy. Mainly economic reasons are responsible for Europe's retardation. In 1963 the United States spent $12 1/2 billion on research, whereas the European Community spent only $2 billion, 800 million; clearly Europe is not likely to catch up with the United States. And while the brain drain does not seem too catastrophic, because it demonstrates that Europe, if it wants to redress itself, is able to do so the penetration of U.S. goods produced by advanced technology into European markets poses a real problem. Moreover in the United States a unique cooperation exists between the Government and universities, as well as institutions and industry, which permits multiplication of the effects of the original expenditure and attainment of optimal efficiency. In contrast Europe has a different industrial climate, structure, and function. The return on industrial investments is too low to permit industries to put aside amounts for research and development. If Europe decides to eliminate its retardation it must raise the quality of research at the university and institutional level, augment the governments' contribution to applied scientific research and development jointly financed by government and industry, abolish monopolies, and spend intelligently favoring and supporting only the most active, enterprising, and dynamic efforts.

515
Pao, Chin-an. AN ANALYSIS OF THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN MAO TSE-TUNG AND LIU SHAO-CHI. Chinese Communist affairs, v. 3, Dec. 1966: 5-13.
DS777.55.C4495, v. 3

The Mao Tse-tung--Liu Shao-chi power struggle has reached the point of no return--life or death. History records this drama of comradeship, conflict and split. Mao joined hands with Liu 1921-34 in the fledgling Communist Party of China [CPC]. He grasped control of the CPC during the Long March to Shensi, making Liu his right-hand-man in troubleshooting and subjugating competitors for Party leadership. Their comradeship reached its highest peak in 1945 when Liu arranged for the incorporation of the phrase "the ideas of Mao Tse-tung" in the Party's new Constitution. By 1953 Liu was arguing against Mao's removal of pro-Russian personalities from the Party. In 1955 they quarreled over agrarian reform when Mao decided on his own to organize agricultural cooperatives, flying in the face of Liu's foreboding of consequences like those suffered by the Russians in a comparable scheme. Mao responded by setting up a parallel secretariat in the CPC Central Committee to take the wind out of Liu's power as chief of the authentic Secretariat and kicking him upstairs to Party vice-chairmanship. Mao's fanatical Great Leap Forward movement, incorporating such absurdities as "Ideology can break the sky" and "One day can be made equal to 20 years," infuriated Liu, who cautioned that "A leader must be able to combine revolutionary zeal with the spirit of practice" rather than "empty words and hollow exaggerations." With the economy plunging into crisis as the result of Mao's backyard steel furnaces and the people's communes, the Party's 6th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee nominated Liu in place of Mao for the presidency of the nation, which office he assumed in April 1959 by authority of the Second People's Congress. Although retaining Party chairmanship, Mao was hamstrung in political maneuvering. Meanwhile Mao's old comrade-in-arms Lin Piao, by dint of personnel manipulation and expanding personal influence (the result of assigning his own cadres to important military posts, arranging for district commanders to hold concurrent posts in provincial Party organizations, and using his own people in various government agencies) had become the number two man in Peking and Mao's heir apparent. With Lin Piao's support Mao burst out of isolation like a "tiger with wings" and launched a counterattack against Liu, his protegés, and intellectuals. "Although the bloc headed by Mao and Lin Piao seems to have won . . . the first round . . . it is too early to say that Liu has been defeated." Liu has headed Party organizations for almost 30 years and as the nation's president enjoys broad influence in the central and local governments. "Moreover . . . not all Communist troops are controlled by Lin Piao."

516
Peyret, Henry. [EUROPE BETWEEN INDIFFERENCE AND CONCEIT] L'Europe entre indifférence et l'orgeuil [editorial] Économie; informations industrielles, financières, agricoles & scientifiques du monde entier, v. 22, Dec. 2, 1966: 2-3.
HC10. E42, v. 22

Despite the international community's lack of attention, European unification continues to develop slowly under the patient guidance of the Brussels Commission of the European Economic Community. Although Robert Marjolin, Vice-President of the Commission, asserts that sufficient progress has been made in the economic field, he definitely feels that the political will needed to achieve a European federation or confederation is lacking. Not only General de Gaulle, who does not conceal his feelings, but also many others who dare not speak openly are trying to gain time while opportunities that will never return are slipping away. If the European countries continue to practice the policy of "each for himself" they will soon find out that the only choice left for them is to become satellites of either the United States or Russia. Marjolin fears

that the European peoples are too indifferent and the governments too conceited to realize the imperative need for uniting their forces.

517
Radlow, Robert, and Marianna F. Weidner. UNENFORCED COMMITMENTS IN "COOPERATIVE" AND "NONCOOPERATIVE" NON-CONSTANT-SUM GAMES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, Dec. 1966: 497-505. graphs, tables.
JX1901.J6, v. 10

Investigates, through Prisoner's Dilemma games, the effect of making unenforced commitments. As a result of these laboratory experiments the authors concluded that "negotiations with unenforceable commitments provide almost as much security as negotiations with enforceable commitments, and that the opportunity to make unenforceable commitments results in substantially more cooperative play than when no communication is permitted."

518
Rand, Ayn. THE ROOTS OF WAR. Freeman, v. 16, Nov. 1966: 24-32. AP2.F9155, v. 16

The overwhelming majority of mankind does not want war, yet wars keep erupting. Man has not rejected the doctrine that causes wars--belief that men must achieve their goals by physical force and that some sort of "good" can justify it. Both frantic war preparations and hysterical peace propaganda stem from a single source--the political philosophy of statism. Statism (or collectivism) is the tribal premise of primordial savages who believe the tribe is omnipotent, owning the lives of its members and sacrificing them at will for the general good. The fact that this primitive ideology now rules nations armed with nuclear weapons threatens mankind's survival. Statism is a system of institutionalized violence and perpetual civil war; it is not a system conducive to brotherhood, security, cooperation, and peace. Statism needs war; a free country does not. Statism survives by looting; a free country survives by production. Laissez-faire capitalism is the only system based on recognition of individual rights and therefore the only system that bans force from social relationships. Men who are free to produce have no incentive to loot and nothing to gain from war. In a statist economy, where wealth is publicly owned, a citizen has no economic interests to protect by preserving peace, while war gives him the fallacious hope of larger handouts from his masters. If men want to oppose war, they must oppose statism. So long as they retain the notion that the individual is sacrificial fodder for the collective, there can be no peace within a nation and no peace among nations.

519
Roucek, Joseph S. THE STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF ANTARCTICA. Social studies, v. 57, Dec. 1966: 297-303. D16.3.S65
Bibliographical footnotes.

Antarctica, which is both removed from and at the same time of central concern in international politics, lay neglected and ignored until quite recently. The most isolated of all the continents, this "home of blizzards" has been claimed by no less than eight nations. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty placed a 30-year moratorium on territorial claims, established the continent as an area to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, prohibited nuclear explosions and the dumping of radioactive wastes, and set up a mutual inspection system to prevent military activities. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are signatories and have cooperated fully in Antarctica. The United States itself has several Antarctic bases, prominent among which is the McMurdo Station, the headquarters of Operation Deep Freeze. Although U.S. activities are supported from Christchurch, New Zealand, long-distance flights have shown that "any United States station in the Antarctic could be supported by air from Africa or Australia." The southern continent's geopolitical and strategic importance should not be minimized. Drake Passage, the channel between Cape Horn and the Antarctic coast's South Shetland Islands, would be of utmost significance if the Panama Canal were closed or destroyed. Antarctic bases could play havoc with shipping in southern waters, and Soviet bases near the South Pole "could be interpreted as the possible beginning of a double flanking of Australia and New Zealand by the USSR." Commercial and military aviation will use the South Pole routes increasingly. Palmer Peninsula stretches north almost to South America. Along with the Falkland Islands, which are now administered by Great Britain but claimed also by Argentina, Palmer could play a major role in guarding Drake Passage. The geopolitical importance of the Antarctic region has been proven in two world wars; it can only increase.

520
Rutherford, Brent M. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, DECISION-MAKING, AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, Dec. 1966: 387-407. JX1901.J6, v. 10

Rationality--the maximization of expected utilities--is assumed in decisionmaking theory. This represents one of the theory's chief weak points, since "in a situation where an individual is acting in a role for the political unit, his utility may not always coincide with the utility of the collectivity." Harold Lasswell suggests that the political man displaces his private motives onto public objects and rationalizes this displacement in terms of the public interest. Refuting this concept Robert E. Lane contends that the intrapsychic conflicts of such a person would effectively and naturally exclude him from the political realm by consuming his surplus energy. As measurement of psychopathology "at different levels of activity in democratic situations" is extremely difficult, a study of the Lane hypothesis was undertaken through examining the political participation of subjects acknowledged to be mentally ill. The population sampled was drawn from Elgin State Hospital, Elgin, Ill., in which inmates' participation in quasipolitical democratic institutions and structures is encouraged. Patients' prehospitalization political attitudes and participation were measured along with their level of ward council participation and levels of mental health. Patients were also categorized in terms of diagnoses. In terms of the Lane hypothesis, the Elgin findings are remarkable. There appeared to be "little difference in political interest between individuals in society and individuals with severe mental illness." Likewise the overtly mentally ill showed patterns of political participation and identification with extremist groups that were consonant with those of the general population. Those with paranoid characteristics "tended to be selected as leaders of proximate democratic groups more often than other diagnostic types." Thus paranoia--an illness characterized by delusional structures that not only leave personality and intellect intact but may

even strengthen the organization of the personality (at the price of rigidity)--could provide the link between the Lasswell and Lane depictions of homo politicus. Paranoids are far from anxiety-ridden; rather they externalize their conflicts, one of Lasswell's key requirements for entering the political arena. Studies of mental health on a community-wide basis have produced some indication that psychopathology in American society is widespread. It may well be that "substantial elements of paranoid behavior and belief" prevail at upper levels of political participation. If this is so, then the attendant rigidity of belief, suspicion, and sensitivity to criticism of themselves may curtail these decisionmakers' "ability to adopt creative and innovative perspectives" and their organization's ability "to enter into trustful relations with other organizations... The peculiar rhetoric of disarmament is a possible case in point."

521
Schumann, Maurice. EUROPE'S ROLE IN A NEW WORLD: A FRENCH VIEWPOINT. NATO letter, v. 15, Nov. 1966: 2-7. D845.2.A44, v. 15

Since 1950, when the Western systems of diplomatic and military security were erected, three events have changed the face of the world. The first is the end of America's territorial invulnerability, brought about not so much by the explosive power of modern weapons as by the missiles that deliver them. The second is the emergence of "the Third World," which means the Afro-Asian countries hold an absolute majority in the U.N. General Assembly--"a majority that is perhaps more virtual than effective, since the Afro-Asian countries are far from casting their votes en bloc." The third event, the decline of the monolithic Communist world, is characterized by the "Russo-Chinese divorce." When China addresses the world's Communist Parties Russia is accused of "some tacit or secret complicity" with Western imperialism. And when speaking to the Afro-Asian countries China says that Russia is not an Asian country--Asian Russia "is a fruit of conquest, and the territory of which it is composed is due for independence." The competition between Russia and China allowed Rumania, for example, to play one against the other and gain economic independence in 1964 from the Russian dominated "Council of Mutual Assistance." All three major changes in the world mean that Europe must count more on her own efforts. The American doctrine of escalation makes an effort to delay massive destruction, but at the expense of German and French territory. Europe cannot refrain from equipping herself with her own deterrent, yet arming Germany with atomic weapons would ruin all efforts at a détente. Thus England and France, "today separately, tomorrow perhaps in common," must assume the responsibility for Europe's defense. The Atlantic alliance should not be repudiated but extended.

522
Schwartz, Barbara. THE GRINDSTONE "INVASION": AN EXPERIMENT IN NONVIOLENCE. War/peace report, v. 6, Dec. 1966: 16.
P&GP RR

In August 1965 a mock invasion of Grindstone Island was staged as part of a sociodrama designed to test the techniques and strategies of nonviolence and civil defense. The 31-hour exercise, sponsored by the American and Canadian Friends Service Committees, tested alternatives to the military techniques of defense. Occupation forces sought to maintain custody and order on the island; the pacifists attempted to defend and preserve the characteristic institutions of their society through nonviolent tactics. By the end of the experiment violence had erupted and 13 people were (hypothetically) murdered. While neither group accomplished its goals, most participants agreed the test ended in a defeat for nonviolence. Failure of the pacifists was attributed to many factors, including lack of flexibility and communication within their community and insufficient preparation and education in civilian defense and nonviolent strategy. When applied in the context of society at large these problems seriously challenge the concept of nonviolent civilian defense. Perhaps nonviolence and civilian defense are incompatible means of survival. Nevertheless the experiment does shed light on the study of social interaction and human nature and may produce more realistic alternatives to military defense techniques. Theodore Olson and Gordon Christiansen, in their book The Grindstone Experiment: Thirty-one Hours (Canadian Friends Service Committee), give additional details on the exercise.

523
SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SIMULATION GAMES AS LEARNING DEVICES. American behavioral scientist, v. 10, Nov. 1966: 34-35.
H1.A472, v. 10

Lists materials "relating to simulation games designed or used primarily for educational purposes." The bibliography excludes games that were developed for theoretical or predictive purposes or that are not based on game theory. Works relating to games in general, their function in learning, their testing, and particular games are included.

524
Seleznev, Georgii K. TRADE: A KEY TO PEACE AND PROGRESS. [Translated from the Russian] Moscow, Progress Publishers [1966] 134 p.
HF1411.S3313

Problems of international trade in the 1960's. Seleznev believes international commerce contributes to advancement of living standards, national prosperity, and maintenance of peace. He considers how to increase the export receipts of developing countries and encourage the development of equal and mutually advantageous trade. In this context he discusses the impediments placed on international trade by the Common Market and the connection between international trade and prevention of war.

525
Sidorov, Mikhail I. [IRRECONCILABILITY OF SOCIALIST AND BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY] O neprimirimosti sotsialisticheskoi i burzhuaznoi ideologii. Moskva, Mysl', 1966. 108 p.
HX518.S8S48

Describes the issues of today's uneven ideological struggle between the Socialist and bourgeois ideologies and asserts that the latter's crises and opportunistic approach to problems doom it to inevitable oblivion. The modern world is ripe for transition to a higher social-economic structure. Its economic development, technological revolution, and contemporary stage of culture demand such a change. The bourgeois ideology is the chief obstacle to the spiritual uplift of the working class. But of the hundreds of political parties in the

world in which hundreds of millions of people in varying degrees take part the most massive and influential are the Communist Parties, totaling tens of millions of members.

526
Steinbacher, Franz. [SOCIAL HARMONY AND PROGRESS] Soziale Harmonie und Fortschritt. Studium generale, v. 19, no. 9, 1966: 568-576.
AP30.576, v. 19

Variance of opinion exists among sociologists as to the meaning of social harmony and its relationship to progress. Historically social disharmony, in the form of wars, revolutions, and strikes, has often been considered a means to "better social harmony." Assuming that harmony in general is a manifestation "of contra-rotating forces" in a state of mutual adjustment to one another, and making necessary allowances for the character of sociological laws, one must see in social harmony only imperfect adjustment of social discrepancies and antinomies. In the light of Adolf Weber's concepts of progress (neutral progress means changes within the society; positive progress means the advance of the civilization) no particular affinity exists between social harmony and progress. Conflict, especially in the crisis phase, has proven to give far greater stimulus to progress, both neutral and positive, than social harmony.

527
U.S.-EUROPE GAP IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WIDENING. European community, no. 98, 1966: 10-13. HD9525.A2.E52, 1966

Europe's concern over its "technological gap" was the focus of a debate on the role of the European Community in promoting scientific and technological research held in the European Parliament on October 11, 1966. The loss of researchers to the United States, and the "deficit in the technological balance of payments" were blamed for the gap. The European States, although possessing sizable talent, money, and institutions, cannot afford the steadily rising cost of modern scientific research, even if the governments are willing to participate in private companies' expenditures. The only solution seems to be a pooling of resources. Up to now the Community was assigned only limited responsibility for high-level research in the nuclear and coal and steel industries. Because "scientific and technological research has become a part of economic policy," it was suggested the Community should extend its responsibility to include all areas of research, select a few highly important projects, and facilitate the freedom of the research workers' movement among universities and institutions of the member countries. The suggestion also stressed the importance of instituting clearing houses for scientific and technological information and of encouraging joint research projects in collaboration with Great Britain (as a prospective member) and with the more technologically advanced countries outside the Community.

528
Vermont, René. [BEHIND THE "GREAT WALL": CHINA OF THE RED GUARDS] Derrière la "Grande Muraille": La Chine des gardes rouges. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Dec. 1966: 1925-1941.
D410.R45, v. 22

Asserts that the cultural revolution in China, led by the Red Guards, was originated by Mao Tse-tung in order to deprive the forthcoming generation of power and leadership because he feels it is obsessed by revisionism and bureaucracy. Mao wants to put the revolutionary heritage in the hands of the young. Credulous and fanatical they are capable of inspiring anew the nation tired by the Communist experience. While wanting to replace the Soviet Union in world Communist leadership and defend his people from contagious revisionist influence Mao coins a Chinese version of Marxism and isolates China from the world. He overlooks the fact that the more Marxism becomes Chinese the less attractive it is outside of China. Thus Mao, although in desperate need of economic and technological assistance, alienates the two Great Powers able to help and tries to realize under the protection of his developing nuclear power his Communist utopia.

529
White, Ralph K. MISPERCEPTION AND THE VIETNAM WAR. Journal of social issues, v. 22, July 1966: 1-164. HN51.J6, v. 22
Bibliography: p. 156-164.

Misperception or cognitive distortion--a variegated psychological process that is accentuated in the psychotic but that pervades normal living as well--is a clue that may help resolve the paradox of continuing war in a world that desperately wants to avoid it. There is first a brief examination of the background of World Wars I and II, with an effort to discover and to clarify the role that misperception played in making possible the actions that were most important in bringing about those two wars. There is then a much more detailed examination of the background of the conflict in Vietnam, again with a primary focus on the possibility of misperception on both sides. A central hypothesis, which the evidence does seem to justify in all three of these conflicts, is that each side is highly unrealistic in perceiving--empathizing with--what is in the minds of those on the other side. (Abstract supplied)

530
Zamoshkin, IU. A., and L. N. Mitrokhin. [SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS OF ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE U.S.A.] Sotsial'no-psikhologicheskie korni antikommunizma v SSHA. Voprosy filosofii, v. 20, no. 10, 1966: 80-91. B8.R9V6, v. 20

The authors make an attempt to trace the connection of anti-communist ideology with certain tendencies in American social psychology, notably with Right extremism inevitably engendered by the contradictions of contemporary state-monopoly organization. The entire spiritual life of contemporary America is keynoted by the sharp conflict between traditional individualism and the new system of norms and values engendered by the development of the bureaucratic and centralist organization. Differently expressed manifestations of dissatisfied individualism can be encountered today in most diverse sections of American society. It is precisely the anarchist revolt of an unsuccessful individualist, a kind of Lumpen-bourgeois, that provides, in the authors' opinion, the nutritive psychological soil for the anti-communist propaganda of ultra-Right, most reactionary organizations operating in the U.S.A. The authors also dwell on another typical feature in the development of American anti-communism--the conceptions concocted by overt monopoly ideologists and based on contraposing the social discipline of state-monopoly capitalism to the social discipline founded on public ownership of the means of production (these conceptions are elaborated along the lines of the Industrial Society Theory).

Hysterical individualism and bureaucratic substitute for collectivism represent two closely interconnected and interdependent tendencies. (Abstract supplied)

531
Zawodny, Janusz K. GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. San Francisco, Chandler Pub. Co. [1965, c1966] 151 p. (Chandler publications in political science) Z6461.Z3

In the field of international relations and collateral fields, lists numerous sources of the following general types: abstracts, U.S. Government archives, atlases, relevant sources in the behavioral sciences, bibliographies, biographies, book reviews, collections of holdings in international relations and international law, dictionaries, dissertation lists, documents, encyclopedias, film guides, literature guides, institutions, international conferences, international organizations, interviews and oral histories, newspapers, periodicals, research in progress, statistics and quantitative data, surveys of world events, treaty collections, and yearbooks.

B. FOREIGN POLICIES

532
Aleksandrov, R. [WHAT IS CONCEALED BEHIND THE AMERICAN POLICY OF "BRIDGEBUILDING" TO EASTERN EUROPE] CHto skryvaetsia za amerikanskoi politikoi "stroitel'stva mostov" v Vostochnuiu Evropu. Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie, v. 10, no. 9, 1966: 111-113. HX8.V22, v. 10

As early as the mid-1950's all hopes for the policy of directly exporting counter-revolution to the European people's democracies and subverting their legally constituted governments had collapsed. The idea of building bridges over the chasm in East-West relations was called forth by the bankruptcy that resulted from the growing power and influence of the Socialist camp, the success of its peaceful coexistence policy, and various other economic and political considerations. In July 1961 the American quarterly Foreign Affairs called on the U.S. Government to cast off the broken-down policy of "liberation" in favor of the more flexible "peaceful penetration" of Eastern European countries with the aim of "stimulating" the conversion of their regimes to "Western type social democracies," splitting them away from the Soviet Union, and forming them into a "neutral belt of states." The ruling circles hoped to tie in their old strategic objectives with the program of expanding contacts with the Socialist countries. The "bridgebuilding" policy is a device of U.S. rulers to conceal their aim of shaking apart the Warsaw Pact, rekindling nationalist tendencies among the people, tearing countries away from the U.S.S.R., and restoring within them a capitalist system. The Socialist countries participate in international efforts toward equal rights, respect for sovereignty, and noninterference in the internal affairs of one another. In response to the crafty imperialist "bridgebuilding" plan they are unified.

533
[AMERICAN VIEWS ON U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS: AN INQUIRY] Le point de vue américain sur les rapports Etats-Unis-Europe; une enquête. Entreprise, no. 586, Dec. 1, 1966: 70-79.
HC271.E5, 1966

Results of an inquiry conducted by Entreprise in the Washington circles responsible for U.S. foreign policy. Questions concerned the U.S. policy toward Europe, its motivation, stages, and present justifications and objectives. The policy of support for West European reconstruction and approval of its unification, which was first adopted in 1946, never changed substantially. Generally successful except for European unification, the policy was continued through the past 20 years. Recent French opposition necessitated a reconsideration, but the steady adherence of other European states to the policy, and the mutual need for European-United States cooperation, induced America to a new effort to put the policy into action in spite of the difficulties of the Vietnamese War.

534
Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [KIESINGER AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY] Kiesinger und die deutsche Aussenpolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Dec. 1966: 705-708. D839.A885, v. 17

Contends that the strong orientation of French and American foreign policy toward reaching rapprochement with the Soviet Union has isolated West German foreign policy and limited its potentialities in Europe, particularly in East Europe. Although the German reunification problem has lost its political priority, the German question has not. Bechtoldt hopes that the foreign policy of the new West German coalition government headed by Chancellor Kurt G. Kiesinger will successfully attune itself to the trend toward East-West détente, for this will not of necessity adversely affect Germany's national interests.

535
Beliaev, I. [ARAB UNITY] Ob arabskom edinstve. Aziia i Afrika segodniia, v. 10, Dec. 1966: 10-12.
DS1.S7, v. 10

Examines the Arab unification problem. Arab leaders have long envisioned a single state encompassing the Arab people. Yet the first modern attempt at unifying the Arabs of Egypt and Syria fell apart after only 3 1/2 years. The author relates that the experiment failed because the rightist leaders of the Baath Party deceived Nasser, arrested the partisans of unity, and prevented the 1963 referendum for unity of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq from taking place. He believes that the requisites for survival of a united Arab state are political freedoms that serve the interests of all workers, united effort of all genuine patriots to bring about revolutionary reforms, and a domestic policy within each component state that would facilitate pan-Arab unity.

536
Bloemer, Klaus. [EUROPEAN POLICY TOWARD THE EAST AND REUNIFICATION] Politique européenne à l'Est et réunification. Politique étrangère, v. 31, no. 5/6, 1966: 473-481.
JX3.P6, v. 31

Undoubtedly direct negotiations between West Germany and the Soviet Union would be abortive at present, because of the Russian fears concerning their defense. Therefore West Germans should try another method and include German reunification in the broader program of European unification. By his visit to Moscow General de Gaulle has already prepared the ground, assuring the Russians that Germany, if included in a united Europe, would be no menace, and that a united Europe itself would be a stabilizing element in Europe and a contribution toward world peace. The Russians must realize that there are other solutions for Europe than the American-Russian

dialog on German reunification, which would leave the status quo intact. A united Europe could be built in stages starting with a confederation and working toward a federation with supranational institutions. Even in the first stage an independent European defense community would be highly important. It is difficult to imagine, however, how the defense community could function without a common united decisionmaking body. Germany should enter any unified European community only under the condition that it will be the sole representative of the German people at least as long as East Germany does not have a democratic government. If handled on the European level reunification would not appear as a restoration of the old German national state. This again would facilitate the establishment of close relations with the East European countries, which still have a legitimate fear of Germany. These countries are expecting Western Europe to initiate the unification they all consider necessary for their future defense. Later on West Germany should recognize the Oder-Neisse boundary and include East Germany in its declaration of nonagression in Europe. Thus without recognizing the present East German Government, West Germany could advance toward reunification and assure for Germany, the role of a political, economic and cultural center of East-West relations. This role would be especially appropriate for West Berlin, which should be included in the united Europe as a member with special status.

537
Boffa, Giuseppe. L'UNITA DISCUSSES SINO-SOVIET SPLIT OVER VIETNAM. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on international Communist developments, no. 878, Sept. 7, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,474) p. 39-41. P&GP RR
"CSO: 3801-D."
"Translation of an editorial . . . entitled, 'China and Vietnam,' in the Italian-language daily organ of the Italian CP [Communist Party], L'Unita (Unity), Rome, 17 August 1966, page 1."

The Chinese Communist Party (according to a communique issued at the conclusion of its Central Committee meeting on Aug. 12, 1966) has chosen Vietnam as the focal point around which to launch a drastic declaration of a break from the rest of the Communist and workers movement, and most of all from the Soviet Union. The Chinese have categorically refused other nations' efforts at mediation by accusing Soviet leaders of wanting to "safeguard imperialist and colonialist domination of the world and restore capitalism to the socialist world." Soviet aid to Vietnam, they say, is the result of "a counterrevolutionary policy of false support and real betrayal." The Chinese document gives little indication of what should be done to defeat American aggression. Although they proclaim the need for an "international unitary front," they demand the exclusion of the Soviet Union and many other Socialist countries. Today, when U.S. leaders have so little support for their foreign policies, a great international front against the United States is genuinely possible, but China is unwilling to participate. President Johnson has been using this division among the Socialist nations to his advantage. The Chinese leaders are seriously weakening anti-imperialist forces at a critical moment in the worldwide political struggle.

538
Conde, D. W. W. JAPAN'S JANUS FOREIGN POLICY. Canadian forum, v. 46, Jan. 1967: 223-224. AP5.C125, v. 46

Japan's 1966 refusal to take part in the Manila Summit Conference was based on its foreign policy principle of maintaining friendly relations with all countries regardless of ideological differences. Japan also deemphasized groups such as the Asian Pacific Council of Ministers, formed in Seoul last June, and refused to receive on its territory the Vietnamese political leader General Ky, declaring that since it wants to achieve wide cooperation among Asian countries, it therefore cannot participate in any endeavor "aimed at nakedly anti-Communist or military activities." Japan's whole behavior looks as if it has achieved an almost neutral and independent position. But hardline Japan-watchers are suspicious of its activities and see in the Tokyo practice traces of a two-level foreign policy. While the Foreign Office breathes sweetness, Nobosuke Kishi, brother of the Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, prepares behind the scenes a reestablishment of the Japanese empire, calling it by the more acceptable name of "anti-imperialist economic collaboration zone." Exploiting China's present weakness, Japan is trying to unite Asian countries into a Japanese anti-Communist bloc and thus to renew the wartime Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In this "free" zone the right-wing military rulers will presumably be supported. All revolts will be suppressed as Communist aggression by an anticipated Peacemaking Force, which will be used by Japan to achieve its goal of becoming again a great military power.

539
Couve de Murville, Maurice. [MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE EXPLAINS FRANCE'S FOREIGN POLICY] Maurice Couve de Murville expose: la politique étrangère de la France. Entreprise, no. 584, Nov. 17, 1966: 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51. HC271.E5, 1966
Answers to questions from business executives and economists by the French Foreign Minister in which, following his detailed analysis of the financial aspects, the Minister interprets the motives and states the objectives of French foreign policy.

Establishment of equilibrium in Europe constitutes the main goal of French foreign policy. If Western Europe can be unified the task will be much easier, but unification is not presently possible because the European States cannot agree on its organization. France does not expect a fast resolution of this matter, although it feels that the evolution of European equilibrium has started and should be oriented in the proper direction. Since the unification of Germany cannot be achieved as long as East and West are divided, France is trying to achieve a détente now while the Soviet Union is deeply worried about its split with China and hence does not menace Europe. France hopes that present cooperation may lead in the long run to an entente with the Eastern world. For the purpose of free negotiation France wants to be independent, although remaining a member of the Atlantic alliance which it considers to be an essential element of the East-West balance of power. In contrast NATO seems to be unnecessary, puts a useless burden on France, and is poorly adjusted to present world realities. This of course does not mean, as some insinuate, that France wants to escape its European defense obligations. France also is ready to help in the regulation of the Vietnamese question. While France continues to think that there is no military solution, political negotiations and a return to the 1954 agreement might solve the situation if the two adversaries could agree on that objective. If General de Gaulle asked, in Pnompenh, for a withdrawal of

American forces from Vietnam, he strictly followed this policy, for the obligation not to interfere is written into the 1954 agreements. Turning to Franco-American relations, differences arise from the fact that France, defending its own national interests, must often take other positions than those espoused by the United States, but in actuality anti-American feelings expressed in the French newspapers appear mild if compared with the invectives of the American press.

540

Dapcevic-Orescanin, Sonja. YUGOSLAV NOTES ON CHINA'S POLICY IN ASIA. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on international Communist developments, no. 904, Nov. 7, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 38,496) p. 9-33.

P&GP RR

"CSO: 3801-S."

"Translation of an article . . . in the Serbo-Croatian-language publication, Medjunarodni problemi (International Problems), No. 1, Belgrade, January-March, 1966, pages 37-56."

Asserts that it is imperative to know the Chinese Asian policy to understand the Chinese People's Republic's position in international relations. The author traces China's post-Korean War contacts with the liberated countries of Asia, with which China shared a common colonial heritage, and then discusses China's dispute with the U.S.S.R. and the projected long-term struggle with the United States over influence in Asia. China tried and failed in 1957 to induce the Soviets to pit their joint power against the West for a "showdown with imperialism," then suddenly shifted its relations with Asia's noncommitted countries from friendship and "goodneighborliness" to "exacerbation and provocation of conflicts," leaving itself "fairly isolated" with oscillating prestige and waning influence. In the 1960's China turned to reestablish its neighborhood influence. The United States helped. "The USA policy in Asia, the main preoccupation of which is presumably the curbing of Chinese aspirations, is itself, in practice, opening the gates to Chinese influence." The U.S.S.R., however, challenges China, although it is only a de facto Asian country. Soviet initiatives, despite the anti-Soviet actions of the Chinese People's Republic, appear to "open the way for a still more active USSR policy in that part of the world, all the more because both American and Chinese policy impose the necessity for more constructive initiatives by the progressive forces." Nevertheless China will continue to play a significant role in Asia and throughout the world regardless of the short-term setbacks resulting from its present policy.

541

DE GAULLE'S HEIR APPARENT AND THREE POTENTIAL CHALLENGERS. Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 192, Nov. 1966: 38-47. ports.

AP4.R2164, 1966

The views of Georges Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, François Mitterrand, and Jean Lecanuet as interviewed by Pierre Viansson-Ponté on government and politics in France, French defenses, and the French economy. Speaking specifically to defense and nuclear matters, only Mitterrand deemphasizes national defense, indicating instead French interest in a system of collective security, possibly within existing alliances, on grounds that antagonistic national defenses are not compatible with the nuclear era. Pompidou favors the French force de frappe, Giscard d'Estaing does so conditionally (if projects are carefully selected), while Mitterrand and Lecanuet question its desirability and usefulness for France. The future course of French nuclear forces cannot be predicted as yet. Whether France will rejoin NATO was left for the opposition to answer, although Lecanuet feels that European unity will bring U.S. nuclear weapons to Europe and a revision of NATO. He feels that General de Gaulle had an opportunity to initiate such negotiations and failed to do so.

542

Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. International journal, v. 21, autumn 1966: 421-446. D839.I5, v. 21

Atlantic unity is too often invoked as the universal panacea for all the world's ills. In reality the word unity contains a whole spectrum of meanings, the difference between them being one of degree: unity through domination, through absorption and assimilation, through federation, through confederation, through leadership, through consultation, or through stylistic sameness. In any form enormous obstacles stand in the way of unity because of national temperaments, the tremendous power of the United States, and the inequality within the alliance. Independence is as much a myth as is Western unity. It is possessed only by those with enormous deterrent power or by those so downtrodden they are willing to risk or to endure any hardship. Those who are neither strong nor miserable lack independence, as they cannot use force without authorization by one of the two great powers upon whom they depend for their protection. At the zenith of Atlantic unity elements existed which have since disappeared: awareness of a common danger and interdependence, acceptance of American leadership, and a sense of sharing in a vast enterprise. Disintegration of the alliance will continue until these feelings are recaptured, or until new elements of cohesion are found. The threat of Russia has receded and agreement is lacking about the present adversary. The Atlantic alliance must no longer exist as the free world's stand against communism, but must seek out and cultivate an East-West rapprochement. It must reevaluate relationships between its nations and intensify contacts between members of its elites. Economically a new solution might lie in invention of common "vast enterprises" such as Atlantic aid programs to underdeveloped countries and organization of Europe to catch up with American technology. On the military side NATO must be reorganized to counter more than conventional attack against Western territory; it must take account of the British and French deterrents and arrange for collaboration between different existing nuclear forces. Establishment of a cooperative Atlantic center for military nuclear research might provide Germany with the opportunity it wants to master the techniques of producing atomic weapons should it ever need to produce them quickly, without putting the actual weapons in German hands.

543

Elïutin, IU. ["ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS"--MYTH AND REALITY] "Soiuz radi progressa"--mify i deistvitel'nost'. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 12, 1966: 15-26.

HC10.M5357, 1966

The article surveys the results of five years of activity by the "Alliance for Progress". The author

demonstrates by hard facts and figures how far the widely advertised aims of the Alliance, proclaimed in 1961 in the Charter of Punta-del-Este, are astray from the actual situation. He analyses the difficulties besetting the path of economic development of Latin American countries and exposes the attempts of the ruling circles of the United States to utilise the "Alliance for Progress" in the interests of American imperialism. The five year experience of financing the "Alliance"--it is said in the article--has vividly demonstrated, that Washington is by no means guided by considerations of the economic and social development of Latin American countries, but first of all pursues its own foreign policy and economic aims. The United States puts up as a condition for aid the adoption of an anti-Cuban policy, its attempts to patch together an inter-American reactionary police force, supports reactionary regimes, etc. The author reaches the conclusion that the program of introducing bourgeois reforms from above without damage to the interests of United States imperialism, envisaged by the "Alliance for Progress", has proved a failure. The "Alliance for Progress" is experiencing a crisis, which reflects the depth of the economic and political contradictions between the countries of Latin America and the United States. In the last five years these contradictions have not lessened but increased. (Abstract supplied)

544
Fairbank, John K. CHINA'S WORLD ORDER: THE TRADITION OF CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS. Encounter, v. 27, Dec. 1966: 14-20.
AP4. E44, v. 27

The pattern of ideas and practices that forms the Chinese view of world order has developed gradually over several millennia. The relations of the Chinese with surrounding areas and with non-Chinese people generally have traditionally been influenced by "Sinocentrism" and an assumption of Chinese superiority. Historically, Chinese foreign relations tended to express externally the same principles of social order manifested internally within the Chinese state and society. Therefore China's foreign relations were hierarchial and antiegalitarian like the Chinese society itself and eventually evolved into an international network that one might term the "Chinese World Order." It extended beyond China's borders and included all human kind. Because China's external order was so closely related to its internal order that one could not survive without the other, each Chinese regime was under pressure to confirm its claim to rule over China by making the facts of its foreign relations fit the theory. For example, if outside countries desired contact with China at all, they were expected to maintain it as tributaries. Nationalist and Communist China have thus inherited a set of institutionalized attitudes and precedents not easily conformable to the European tradition of international relations among equal and sovereign nations. Although the Chinese revolution has created a great gulf of discontinuity, nothing occuring today in China is without some echo of the past. Peking's foreign-policy makers may show great flexibility on some issues, but they will always find ways to stress the old theme of China's superiority.

545
Garthe, Wulf. [GREAT BRITAIN AND ITS EASTERN POLICY] England und seine Ostpolitik. Europäische Begegnung, v. 6, Oct. 1966: 558-561.
P&GP RR

The past, the present, and the future of British policy toward the European continent and Asia. For all the changes in world power status since the World War I, Great Britain behaves--both in Europe and in Asia--as if she hopes to regain her traditional role as the great equalizer of the world balance of power. Despite strong ties with the United States and general support, albeit not without reservations, for American policies in Europe and Asia, Britain has persistently aspired to play a mediator's role between East and West. Britain's eventual goal is "to fill, together with the European continent," a vacuum in the world balance of power in order "to survive and to win the worldwide contest against communism. Time will show if she has enough strength for that purpose."

546
Gaulle, Charles de, Pres. France. [GENERAL DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 28, 1966: FULL TEXT] La conférence de presse du Général de Gaulle, 28 Octobre 1966; texte integral. Documents politiques, diplomatiques et financiers, v. 47, Nov. 1966: 32-58.
D1. D6, v. 47

The views of General de Gaulle on French foreign policy and its action abroad, the Vietnamese War, problems of European unification, French economic relations with the East European countries, and other questions pertaining to French domestic and economic policy. The President devoted special attention to the problems of defense policy in the light of France's withdrawal from NATO and its strategic position as a nuclear power.

547
Gellner, John. PARIS LETTER: THE LOGICAL CLARITY OF GAULLISM. Saturday night, v. 81, Dec. 1966: 19-21.
AP5. S27, v. 81

Canadians are wrong to accept the American view of Charles de Gaulle as a "crotchety 76-year-old . . . on a Quixotic quest to re-establish the grandeur of France." Although De Gaulle's popularity is high, he has not mesmerized his fellow countrymen into following him like sheep. Polls taken last summer show that Gaullism is even more popular than De Gaulle himself. Particularly favored is his foreign policy, especially the way he has stood up to the United States. France was content to rest under the American nuclear shield for the first 11 years after World War II; disenchantment came not with De Gaulle but with Suez. It was then France decided to arm herself with her own nuclear shield. U.S. inflexibility over a European settlement and "adventurous" world policies heightened French uneasiness. To De Gaulle German reunification is not the precondition to peace and stability, but the other way around. To the underdeveloped world De Gaulle speaks for the great majority of Europeans who are concerned about the excessive exercise of U.S. military power and its possible consequences. In sum the outlines of De Gaulle's foreign policy are as follows: peace for France without foreign entanglements and backed by an independent nuclear deterrent; peace for Europe free of both American and Soviet domination; continental cooperation among all European states including removal of the Iron Curtain through intensive economic, political, and cultural contacts; inclusion of the United States if that nation doesn't jeopardize European security by its world policies; and, above all, French initiative and French freedom of action.

548
GERMANY'S PROBLEMS: 1. SHOULD WE RECOGNIZE GERMANY? by Peggy Crane; 2. GERMANY AND EUROPE, by Stanley Henig. Socialist commentary, Jan. 1967: 21-24. HX3.S74, 1967

Crane: For the foreseeable future German reunification is a myth: the West is no more prepared to accept a Communist Germany than the Soviet Union a non-Communist one. Many favor recognition of East and West Germany as separate states having representation in the United Nations along with confirmation of the Oder-Neisse boundary. Berlin is the principal obstacle to this solution. A possible answer is to make Berlin an international city under U.N. administration, but East Germany insists that the Eastern sector of the city remain its own. While recognition of East Germany is not politically feasible now, the Labour government should support certain interim measures including: abolition of present travel restrictions in NATO countries; recognition of the Oder-Neisse line; reconsideration of the Gomulka proposal for a freeze of troops and weapons in the two Germanies; and encouragement of trade links, cultural exchanges, and efforts to persuade East and West Germany to engage in a meaningful dialogue about their future. Henig: The cold war presented West Germany with a choice of two routes toward reunification: accommodation with the East or closer ties with Western Europe. While the first alternative after 20 years is little more attractive than it was originally, the present East-West détente and recent crises in the European community have caused questioning and a "crisis of conscience" in West Germany. Some Socialists want to further contacts with the East; the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democrats wants to revert to moderate nationalism. The best solution to the problem of divided Germany is to solve the problem of divided Europe. Peace must be a condition for, not the result of, German reunification. The Rapacki and Gomulka Plans are inadequate because they envision special status for Germany. The European community should be enlarged, particularly through British entry, to give more political balance and stability to Western Europe. Great Britain should not undertake independent initiatives but should work through the European community. Only in this context can the most important problems affecting Germany be solved.

549
Haekkerup, Per. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF DENMARK. American-Scandinavian review, v. 54, Dec. 1966: 341-350. AP2.A457, v. 54

Since the Second World War the Danish Government has felt that its foreign policy objectives, namely peace, freedom, democracy, and individual rights and welfare, could not be achieved by its traditional policy of neutrality. Denmark is a member of the United Nations and NATO and closely cooperates with other European countries. In the United Nations Denmark participates in all peacekeeping operations and supports disarmament efforts, prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, and a complete nuclear test ban. It favors the seating of Communist China in the United Nations and viewed the recent events in China as an illustration of the danger involved in excluding one-fourth of the world's population from the community of nations. Denmark also sees the Vietnamese War problem as insolvable militarily and finds intolerable the North Vietnamese rejection of negotiations on the apparent expectation that American public opinion will force the U.S. Government to discontinue the war. For the purpose of its own security Denmark joined NATO. It hopes that the Organization will not confine itself to defense but will be active in promoting peaceful development in Europe. In order to facilitate abolition of the cold war Denmark established contacts with the Eastern European countries. It expects that these contacts will lighten the climate in Europe and in due time lead to the solution of major problems including that of divided Germany. In the economic field Denmark wants to join the Common Market simultaneously with its colleagues of the European Free Trade Organization and hopes that the Kennedy Round will play an important role in the relationship between the United States and Europe. Lastly, Nordic cooperation is a vital factor in Denmark's foreign policy. Although the policies of the Scandinavian countries often differ, the fact that the Nordic area is nonnuclear undoubtedly has served to stabilize the situation in Northern Europe.

550
Hayter, Sir William. NEED THE WEST STILL "CONTAIN" COMMUNISM? Pax et libertas, v. 31, Oct./Dec. 1966: 39. P&GP RR

President Johnson's recent activities in Southeast Asia indicate that he wants to apply to that area the doctrine of containment, i.e. the policy of holding back the spread of communism or confining it to the countries it already rules. The West's reason for containment was not that it objected to Communist governments, but that it thought every Communist government was controlled by Moscow, which was considered a menace to the West. This view was perfectly valid when containment was invented by George Kennan in the 1950's. But is it valid now? There are today, of course, two centers of Communist power, but neither of them controls all the world's Communists. Why then should the West mind if the power in a country is in the hands of Communists? The West does not protest other regimes that are objectionable and has accepted nationalism without feeling that it endangered its security. Why then should communism do just that? Undoubtedly some Communist-ruled countries endanger security; Cuba is a clear example. In contrast some countries cooperating with Russia, e.g. Pakistan, do not constitute a danger. By now the Communist bloc is nonexistent, and polycentrism has prevailed. In view of this situation it seems that the security of the Western World today justifies intervention only if the Communist takeover is imposed from without on a reluctant populace and the resulting regime would be a puppet of Moscow or Peking, willing to serve the strategic needs of either. Is this the case in South Vietnam? Of course not. The West still fears that a united and neutralized Vietnam will be controlled by Communists, because it is stuck in old ways of thought. If the West would look around it would discover that today fewer Communist governments are controlled by Moscow or Peking than in the past. The same applies to the famous "domino theory." Will the Communist regimes of all Southeast Asia become instruments of Chinese expansion? Probably not. The days when the non-Communist world was engaged in a crusade because it was menaced at home by an expanding, centrally controlled communism are over.

551
Hedley, John H. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF RUSSIA'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH FRANCE. Foreign service journal, v. 44, Jan. 1967: 18-20, 50-51. JX1.A53, v. 44

The recent Russo-French rapprochement remains more a matter of form than substance. The Russians are cautiously weighing the risks of involvement with France and are keeping close watch on Washington's and Bonn's reactions to these events. De Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO and his decision to renegotiate the question of American military facilities in France please Moscow by highlighting disagreements within the Western alliance. The prime motive in the rapprochement between the two nations, however, is fear of Germany, but to date both have evaded the fundamental issue of bringing combined pressure to bear on Germany. Both nations accept the Oder-Neisse boundary, oppose West German nuclear armament, and fear a Washington-Bonn alliance. However Moscow insists that reunification must be left to the two German states, and De Gaulle refuses to recognize East Germany as a state; Moscow supports the status quo in Europe, and De Gaulle envisions elimination of postwar divisions there. In addition the Soviet Union recognizes that reducing American influence in Europe will eliminate an important check on German power, and Soviet leaders fear De Gaulle may so isolate France that he will lose the ability to exert influence in the Western alliance. The nebulous Soviet proposal for a pan-European security conference is designed to test De Gaulle's influence in Western Europe and to propagandize West Germany's probable resistance to the conference as "militarist and revanchist" in contrast to its own respectable and responsive attitude. While Russian leaders have been receptive to De Gaulle's efforts to reduce NATO's influence and initiate a series of bilateral agreements between NATO and non-NATO countries, they are not likely to trust him too much until he proves himself on a subject of prime interest to them--recognition of East Germany. They do not overestimate De Gaulle's value: they recognize that America is the real power, but that as long as Vietnam and other situations hamper East-West communications, De Gaulle can serve as mediator in Moscow's dialogue with the West.

552
Heyke, Hans-Eberhard. [THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT] Die Prinzipien der friedlichen Koexistenz. Zu ihrem Ursprung und ihrer Entwicklung. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, v. 7, Dec. 1966: 574-630.
JA14. P63, v. 7

Bibliographical footnotes.

The principles governing Red China's official relations with non-Communist states were outlined by Mao Tse-tung in 1949, but did not appear in an international document until used in 1954 in the Chinese-Indian treaty on Tibet. Also in 1954 the Prime Ministers of both governments signed a joint declaration stressing: (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereighty; (2) abstention from aggression against one another; (3) nonintervention in each other's internal affairs; (4) the equality of both nations and the beneficial character for both sides of their mutual relations; and (5) "peaceful coexistence," providing for tolerance of different social and political systems in the world, on the grounds that they do not necessarily lead to conflicts that disturb the peace. The principles became increasingly popular with governments of uncommitted nations, and were later echoed by the declaration of the Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung, 1955) on the preservation of peace and international cooperation. But shortly thereafter Moscow launched its own peaceful coexistence offensive in Asia and Africa--an offensive around which developed the Sino-Soviet dispute as to which version, the Soviet or the Chinese, reflected the true Leninist spirit. The following years have proved Peking right, a circumstance that harms the Soviet position in the current ideological conflict within the Communist world. The conflict itself will have far-reaching consequences for all the earth.

553
[IN CASE CIVIL WAR BREAKS OUT IN CHINA] Wenn in China Bürgerkrieg ausbricht, von Go. Der Europäische Osten, v. 12, Nov. 1966: 609-610.
DR1. E83, v. 12

Suggests that the state of permanent revolution will probably endure in China for a long time. Right now the nation faces imminent civil war, which is likely to eliminate China as a world power, but not as a danger center for the world and especially for the Soviet Union. Moscow may have to move the bulk of its military forces from Europe to Asia to protect its Far Eastern interests. Such a change would offer Europe an opportunity for establishing "a reasonable economic and political order, which has hitherto been frustrated by the Soviet veto."

554
INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND CHINA: EARLY PHASE. Pakistan quarterly, v. 14, autumn 1966: 33-40.
DS376. P343, v. 14

The emergence of a strong China had its greatest impact on the Soviet Union and on India. Indian leaders were particularly concerned for two reasons: first they realized that India and China had an equivalent interest in Southeast Asia; and second they feared China would aline itself with the Soviet Union against India. India therefore decided to attempt to lure China from Moscow into an alinement with India, one which might perhaps bridge the gap between Washington and Moscow. Nehru encouraged closer relations with China through recognition of the Communist regime, demands for its admission to the United Nations, and similar friendly acts. India's refusal to accept the U. N. resolution branding China an aggressor in Korea, while straining relations with the United States, gained her the support of Soviet leaders in the Kashmir disputes of the early 1950's. Pakistani leaders took this opportunity to develop closer relations with the Western powers, culminating in two military alliances and a military aid agreement. India reacted by seeking closer ties with the two Communist nations. At an Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in April 1955 India attempted to discredit and isolate Pakistan for joining SEATO and thereby bringing the cold war to Asia. However Pakistan convinced most participants that it had the right, as all nations do, to safeguard its own security and provide for its defense. Although India sought leadership of the "ex-colonials" at the conference, "Chinese leaders were able to steal the show at Bandung at the expense of India." Nehru realized it was unrealistic to strive for Afro-Asian solidarity, and Indian policy from that point sought a solidarity of nonalined countries, a move obviously designed to exclude China and Pakistan.

555
[IS GERMANY AN AUXILIARY OF THE UNITED STATES? NOT ANY MORE . . .] L'Allemagne filiale des Etats-Unis? en tout cas plus maintenant . . . [editorial] Enterprise, no. 583, Nov. 10, 1966: 15-17.
HC271. E5, 1966

Why did General de Gaulle recently describe West German policy as devoid of inspiration and substance?

Apparently he used the essentially Gaullist political method of pushing advantages and striking while the iron is hot. In Bonn the situation could not be more favorable for striking. The failure of Chancellor Erhard's visit in Washington and President Johnson's answers to questions on paying expenses of the U.S. military forces in West Germany and on West German participation in a multilateral nuclear force left the Germans deeply worried. Certainly even the Germans realize that aggression in Europe is not probable today, and therefore two or three out of the five U.S. Army divisions may be withdrawn in the near future. And they must know that the United States, to deter aggression, can easily return to its massive retaliation policy. In reality the Germans' anxiety is focused on a potential U.S. plan for a Soviet-American entente, cemented by the Chinese threat, and grounded on the status quo, which would mean a perpetuation of the division of Germany. Evidently in this situation Germany can choose only one of two alternatives. Either it will make a direct agreement with Russia, or it will try to improve Franco-German relations. The first alternative depends on Russian consent, which the Soviet Union would not be willing to give while it sought an entente with the United States and preservation of a separate East Germany. Better relations with France thus seem to be the only acceptable solution. Such a policy may improve cooperation among The Six, and later may lead to a détente in Europe and improved East-West relations. The final issue may then be a reunified Germany in a United Europe. If General de Gaulle wants to press for this solution he does not have to push the Germans to the wall, because the White House has done that already.

556
Jaksch, Wenzel. GERMANY AND RUSSIA'S EUROPEAN POLICY. Central Europe journal, v. 15, Jan. 1967: 3-12. DB200.7.S74, v. 15

Dr. Wenzel Jaksch stresses the need for understanding, in light of world events, the structural problems of the European Continent, and working toward their solution. The paper summarizes the trends on the Continent for the past century, the vital nerve center of the Elbe-Danube-Moldavia Rivers, at present a vacuum, "which must be filled if the US is to be relieved of its burdens in Europe." Dr. Jaksch outlines aims, attitudes and achievements so far, both of Soviet Russia, and the West, including the role of the West German expellees. He diagnoses the German problem and its "corollaries affecting Central Europe". He reminds that the East Bloc's price for a peace treaty with the Federal Republic is the acceptance of a split Germany and a divided Europe, with plans for a military vacuum in Central Europe between Soviet and French atomic forces. Economic and trade measures with the East Bloc States bear out a drive for Soviet hegemony. Believing that an "unpatriotic" Germany would be easy prey to the Kremlin, "without war", Jaksch points out in conclusion that government views in Eastern Europe are not always the views of the people, who are still in the Communist noose, but there is traditional sympathy among them, for the European Center to build on. Europe must reach "full stature between the giants in East and West", and must hold the door open to those peoples behind the Iron Curtain. (Abstract supplied)

557
Kani, Kazuo. [PEACE DOES NOT MEAN JUSTICE] Frieden heisst nicht Gerechtigkeit. Epoca, no. 12, Dec. 1966: 10. P&GP RR

Contends that international peace and justice are two entirely different qualities, often mutually exclusive. Rather it is in pursuit of justice, differently perceived by the opposing parties, that wars are staged. Kani, Bonn correspondent of "the large Japanese daily 'Asahi Shimbun,'" believes that, given the realities of international life, objective justice is in most cases impossible to ascertain. Germany's postwar loss of its former eastern territories to Poland has been resented by Germans, who want them back. For the new Polish generation these territories represent the homeland, from which no force short of physical violence can expel them. The Japanese understand quite well that peace requires sacrifice, especially from a nation that lost the war. They reconciled themselves to the loss of almost half of their national territory after the Second World War. Incomprehensible to most Japanese is West Germany's refusal to recognize East Germany as a state. It is true the latter's political system was imposed by a foreign power, but so was Japan's postwar constitution. Governments resting on violence--as the East German one does--abound in the world. Hence making recognition a prize for democracy is grossly unrealistic. Despite growing sentiments in West Germany for opening relations with the East, the German Federal Republic should also reinforce and broaden its Western ties for the sake of its own, and the West's security. It will be well advised not to rely solely on the United States in these matters.

558
Karunakaran, K. P. NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION. United Asia, v. 18, Sept./Oct. 1966: 224-227. DS1.U55, v. 18

By definition a nonalined nation is at least "not a party to a military pact and . . . not committed in advance to join one side or other in the event of an armed conflict." In today's world even this irreducible definition does not apply to just nonalined states. France, for example, will no longer automatically side with the United States in time of war, nor China with the Soviet Union. The foreign policies of Indonesia and Ghana will almost certainly change as a result of internal political developments. Even India has altered emphases in various aspects of its foreign policy as a result of conflicts with China and Pakistan. And Pakistan is less alined than previously. A striking feature of the contemporary world is the disintegration of the power blocs. Concomitantly nations pursue different policies toward the nonalined, who themselves have responded in differing ways to the altered world. The distinction between "peace areas" and "cold war areas" has blurred. Bearing in mind the fact that few governments see India as totally blameless in the recent wars with Pakistan and China, nonalined nations can no longer be viewed as more devoted to peace than the aiined. Within the nonalined there is a good deal of resistance toward "facing the new facts of international life." The concept of nonalinement is obsolete; as such the self-styled nonalined nations have neither more nor less to contribute to international problem-solving than any other nations.

559
Khalosha, B. [NATO: THE CRISIS DEEPENS, THE MENACE REMAINS] NATO: Kriziz uglubliaetsia, ugroza ostaetsia. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 10, 1966: 3-16. HC10.M5357, 1966

This article unfolds the essential political, economic and military factors back of the present crisis

of NATO and having a bearing on its further deepening. Special attention is devoted to such issues, as: the nuclear problem in NATO; the relations between France and NATO and how they affect the further deepening of the crisis in the North Atlantic Alliance; the problem of the growing influence of the Federal German Republic in that alliance and of the nuclear claims of Bonn. The article points out the persistent serious menace to the cause of peace contained in the activities of NATO, but it also shows how among the NATO members there is growing an opposition to the existing line of American policy in Europe, how the tendency toward getting rid of American domination and the search for an all-European system of collective security are on the increase. (Abstract supplied, modified)

560
Kirsch, Friedrich A. [IDEOLOGICAL RUDIMENTS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY] Ideologische Grundlagen der chinesischen Aussenpolitik. Politische Studien, v. 17, July/Aug. 1966: 433-441.
H35.P66, v. 17
Bibliographical footnotes. Bibliography: p. 441.

Peking's policy toward the non-Communist world has been largely influenced by its rationale of "peaceful coexistence," which is basically different from the new Soviet line on the matter. Moscow underscores the essential value of coexistence policy for world peace and the preservation of mankind. Peking believes in peaceful coexistence as a matter of expediency that never must be incorporated into the Communist Party's, or State's, ideological stance. But this is precisely what, in China's opinion, the Soviet Communist leaders have done. The resulting Soviet-American cooperation, the Red Chinese charge, leads to secret diplomacy, deceiving the peoples of the world about the main goals of Soviet policy. Thus the Soviets' professed struggle for socialism has been reduced to verbalism, a circumstance conducive to the contemporary replacement of colonialism by neo-colonialism. Yet, Peking points out, "the fundamental contradictions" associated with the existence of capitalism have quite naturally sharpened and must continue to do so. The imperialist phase of capitalism assures--in China's opinion--increasingly tough competition for markets, spheres of influence, and profits drawn from armaments: the danger of war is thus constant until the final end of imperialism. In Peking's view the embodiment of Lenin's definition of "finance-capitalism" is the imperialism of the United States, whose ultimate goal is world domination. This America plans to achieve by: (1) control over the "First Interzone," that is over all other capitalist countries; (2) rule over the "Second Interzone," consisting of all semi-independent nations and former colonies; and (3) abolition of Socialist States throughout the world. The Chinese think U.S. imperialism is now most vulnerable in the areas where contradictions associated with capitalism come most sharply into focus, that is in semi-independent states and former colonies. All this notwithstanding the Chinese see the probability of world war as gradually diminishing, due to the power of the Socialist camp, to national liberation wars, and to the growing popular sentiment for world peace. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party--Peking contends--has always been world peace, but it must fight the illusion that total disarmament is possible in a world that has not finally done away with imperialism. Since preventive war is incompatible with socialism, China will never launch such war; neither will it try to spread socialism by means of international war. Aware of the dangers of nuclear war, Peking is for complete prohibition of all such arms in the world. Since this is, for the time being, unattainable, all Socialist countries should have a common system of nuclear-arms sharing to successfully face the imperialist nuclear threat.

561
Kulski, W. W. THE U.S.S.R.--FRANCE--GERMANY. Russian review, v. 25, Oct. 1966: 343-356.
DK1.R82, v. 25

"Soviet attitudes toward the Western powers fluctuate principally, though not exclusively, according to these powers' policies regarding Germany." The Soviet stand amounts to an absolute veto on the question of German reunification under any conditions but the Soviet. Yet the Kremlin wants to know whether the individual Western powers tacitly recognize the two German States and Central Europe's present frontiers and, above all, whether they are inclined to further West German access to nuclear weapons--the Soviet nightmare. Thus the mid-1963 Soviet shift in attitude toward De Gaulle is understandable once his hopes for a Europe free of American entanglements were so dashed by the Bundestag's damaging preamble to the 1963 French-German Treaty of Friendship. Since that time France has eschewed Bonn's consultation, and the Soviet press approved French policy as "reasonable," dubbing France "one of the two great European powers" (the other being Russia). France agrees with the Soviet Union on almost all important aspects of the German question, and the Russians are satisfied that De Gaulle's denunciation of hegemony is directed against the United States. French and Soviet policies are so close on many issues that Brezhnev could tell the 23d Congress "Our relations with France have significantly improved . . . founded on coincidence of interests of both States regarding several important international problems and on the old tradition of friendship between our peoples." Brezhnev evidently expected the rapprochement with France to help with the German problem, but De Gaulle has not modified his relations with East Germany.

562
Leverenz, Bernhard. [BASIC QUESTIONS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION] Grundfragen der deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Mitarbeit, v. 15, Sept./Oct. 1966: 385-394. P&GP RR

Bonn's position on the question of European security has long been that the problem can be settled only after German reunification becomes a fact, and that any restriction of the reunited Germany's choice of military alliances before unification would contravene the principle of German sovereignty and violate the self-determination of the German people. Due mostly to Bonn's position the Western allies rejected in 1952-55 the Soviet proposals on German reunification. Since then the view of West Germany's NATO partners has come close to the Soviet position that a European security settlement takes priority over German reunification. However the allies have never gone so far as to offer to limit beforehand the reunited Germany's freedom of alliance, and Moscow has never renewed its offer. Since the ratification of the Paris agreements in May 1955 radically changed the bargaining conditions, the Soviet Union has insisted that the German reunification problem belongs primarily to the two German states. On the basis of Communist ideology it is easy to prove the Soviets' aggressive goals

and dismiss altogether their foreign-policy efforts toward détente, but the relationship between policy and ideology is not as rigid as some believe. The Communist threat is not now essentially military, but political. Paramount economic reasons prompt the Soviet Union toward peace and disarmament. Also in the West the tendencies toward East-West détente are growing. Yet a radical cure for tensions simply does not exist. The idea of bringing about relaxation by removing the deepest causes of tensions, desirable as it may be, is politically unrealizable, at least for now. One should start with gradual elimination of symptoms rather than causes: withdrawal of the American and the Soviet forces from Germany, renouncement by Bonn of nuclear weapons "for and in Germany," dropping the Hallstein Doctrine, and seeking better relations with East European countries. Another step would be recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary. Only a Germany integrated in an all-European security system will be both manageable and controllable and therefore able to meet the Soviet Union's security requirements.

563
Majonica, Ernst. [GERMANY'S EASTERN POLICY] Deutsche Ostpolitik. Europäische Begegnung, v. 6, Oct. 1966: 544-547. P&GP RR

Argues that in East-West relations only the facts that seriously discredit Communist doctrine can weaken Communist ideology so that it no longer hinders a desirable settlement of the problems of Europe, Germany, and German reunification. De Gaulle's policy, counterproductive with regard to its proclaimed goal of European coalescence, gives new stimulus to this ideology by reasserting the long-standing Communist thesis about the progressive disintegration of the West. The German Federal Republic's Eastern policy has succeeded in securing all the Western powers' support for its Hallstein Doctrine and in causing the entire Free World to observe that doctrine. Foreign Minister Schröder has not been without success in improving West German relations, especially economic ones, with the East European nations. The United States continued presence in Europe is of utmost importance to the future settlement of the German question as is nuclear-arms sharing by the German Federal Republic. The latter is an open question rather than an actual fact, for it would understandably raise the Soviet fears of Germany. The unforeclosed possibility of nuclear-arms sharing would be a valuable bargaining asset in future East-West negotiations on the settlement of the German question. Hence Bonn must never become a party to a nuclear nonproliferation treaty that would bar it from nuclear-arms sharing.

564
Marchand, Jean. [THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND THE MYTH OF BLACK AFRICA] La République Arabe Unie et le mythe de l'Afrique noire. Révue de défense nationale, v. 22, Dec. 1966: 2001-2013. D410.R45, v. 22

In 1960 President Nasser, who regards himself as leader of the Arab world, encountered almost unsurmountable obstacles in his effort to unify that world. The majority of the African rulers refused to accept his political predominance and the Egypt-Syria axis, which was supposed to constitute the nucleus of the Arab Union, began to show signs of disintegration. In order not to lose prestige Nasser had to seek success somewhere else and thus turned to the African scene. There he tried to fill the political vacuum left by the former colonial powers over which Russia, China, and America were fighting. But Nasser's efforts to liberate Africa from Western influence and pressure ended with meager results, and in the meantime he encountered a dangerous enemy in Israel, which he tried in vain to eliminate. Also his attempts to penetrate the African states were abortive, because he was not able to overcome even with the help of Islam the profound antagonisms that have existed between the two races for centuries. Today the United Arab Republic is confronted with new problems, because the Arab world itself is in disaccord. The pan-Islamic movement started by Saudi Arabia in order to check Nasser's revolutionary doctrines, the Yemen war, the Israelite danger, and Great Britain's reluctance to give Nasser access to the Persian Gulf oil have forced him to concentrate exclusively on Arab problems. And if his international regime seems to be more consolidated, his financial situation has not improved. Moreover in the international sphere new problems have appeared. Now, when the United States and the Soviet Union have decided to prevent any conflict in the explosive Middle Eastern zone, Nasser's maneuvers in pitting the two great powers against each other become impossible. Thus the President, too occupied by the Arab problems and too weak to engage in the enormous problems of Black Africa, is forced in spite of his dreams of grandeur to remain in his "Egyptian shell."

565
Melchior de Molènes, Charles. [GREAT BRITAIN AND THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD AS SEEN FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE] La Grande-Bretagne et le monde actuel vus du Foreign Office. Revue politique des idées et des institutions, v. 55, Nov. 1966: 432-440. H3.R38, v. 55

Commentary on Michael Stewart's book The British Approach to Politics, tracing the author's political positions, personal ideas about the fundamental principles of public life, and concepts of British foreign policy. In world organization the British Foreign Secretary seems not to be afraid of limiting the state's sovereignty in favor of supranational world government. In this he stands near the European communities, to which he feels Britain belongs. Stewart feels that, as wars and revolutions are always aimed at the replacement of obsolete systems, the United Nations should offer pacific means for achieving these ends in order to prevent their resolution by violence. He sees a role for Great Britain in the present world that is much like the role De Gaulle sees for France. Stewart feels Great Britain should become neither a Soviet Republic nor a dependent military sentry of the United States. While the British population hates communism and nazism equally, it also dislikes the social inequities that exist in the United States. Although Britain cooperates with the United States for defense purposes in NATO, it does not want that defense to turn into a crusade against the Soviet Union and China and prefers seeking peaceful solutions for international problems. In cooperation with the other European States Great Britain wants to exercise a moderating influence on both the United States and the Soviet Union.

566
Mertens, Pierre, and Paul-F. Smets. [PEKING'S AFRICA; A CONTRIBUTION TO SINO-AFRICAN STUDIES, 1964-1966] L'Afrique de Pékin; contribution à l'étude des relations sino-africaines (1964-1966). [Bruxelles, Impr. Amibel, 1966] 116 p. DT38.9.C5M44

Contents. --Preface, by Paul-Henri Spaak. --The evolution of Sino-Soviet relations after the recognition of the Chinese People's Republic by France. --China's African mission. --The Chinese reflux from Africa.

Recognition of the Chinese Communist Government by France has not had the expected repercussion in Africa. The francophone states did not feel that they had to follow France's example and generally the African states insisted on making decisions in accordance with their national interests. China's "mission" began when it assumed leadership of the Afro-Asian world at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Following that milestone China established multiple relationships with the African countries, offering the Chinese model of economic development, economic assistance without neocolonialist claims, and support of national liberation movements and agrarian reform in the fight against imperialism and capitalism. After the Sino-Soviet split China committed serious errors in Africa, wanting to divide the Africans in a double fight against Western imperialism and Soviet influence. The Africans became confused and turned away from China. The reflux, which appeared clearly at the Manila Conference in 1966, was due mainly to the Sino-Soviet split, fear of Chinese demographic invasion, China's isolation in the Communist bloc, and the cultural revolution in China. The Africans feel that the Chinese model of development does not apply to them and Chinese communism is not their choice. Although they still lack coherence and suffer from ideological uncertainty, some indication can be perceived that they consider an "African socialism" to be the best political solution for their continent.

567

Mruck, Armin E. [AMERICA'S EASTERN POLICY: A SEARCH FOR AN EXPLANATION] Die amerikanische Ostpolitik. Versuch einer Erklärung. Europäische Begegnung, v. 6, Oct. 1966: 550-553.
P&GP RR

Traces the history of America's East European policy, including the German problem, from 1943. Since the war's end the United States has held a disproportionately disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with regard to influencing developments in East Europe. Hence Germany's reunification as well as an East-West détente depend above all on Moscow.

568

Murarka, Dev. RUSSIA'S EASTERN QUESTION. Spectator, no. 7220, Nov. 11, 1966: 605-606.
AP4.S7, 1966

Given the present state of Sino-Soviet relations, the fact that Soviet cities are within easy range of Chinese guided missiles is cause for considerable concern in the Soviet Union. One of the major Russian objectives in Asia has been to limit Chinese influence. Now the U.S.S.R. must prevent the growth of a new Asian alinement toward Washington or Peking stemming from fear of China or fear of offending China. Another major problem in Soviet foreign policy is the Chinese cultural revolution. Lest China retreat from its current path, the Communist world does not want to close the door; on the other hand, if China is going "to persist on the road to ultra-revolutionary ruin" the Communist world "can do no better than to disown her." Many argue that the quarrel between Moscow and Peking allows room for maneuvering by other Communist nations and shows them disinclined to take sides. However the problem is deeper than pursuit of hegemony in the Communist world, a goal which both nations have long since abandoned. Today even Rumania, determined to remain independent of Moscow, has been forced to take sides against China. Short of additional aid should Hanoi ask for it, the Communist nations can do little to change the Vietnam situation. China remains their most serious problem.

569

Nelson, Bryce. U.S. CHINA POLICY: CONCILIATION OR "COLLISION COURSE"? Science, v. 154, Oct. 14, 1966: 245-248. Q1.S35, v. 154

The "iceberg of U.S. policy toward Communist China" has begun a slow thaw. What is surprising is not that the change is occurring but that it has taken so long to come about. Two recent international events reflect the need for a more flexible China policy: the rapidly dwindling support for Communist China's exclusion from the United Nations, and the somber prospect of Sino-American conflict in Vietnam. Many see the changed China policy "as a sop" for liberals' discontent with administration policy in Vietnam. Nonetheless Congressional support for a more conciliatory attitude was clearly evident in recent hearings and speeches. As fear of a hostile Congress and populace has hampered changing the U.S. China policy, the administration can now move ahead more boldly. In addition to the new tone of statements by U.S. leaders, the State Department has liberalized travel restrictions to China and other Communist nations. The Government is willing to let private citizens communicate with the Chinese, and a number of efforts to increase peaceful contacts are taking place in the nongovernmental sector. China, however, seems unwilling to permit travel of its citizens to America and travel of American citizens to China. Recently the Peking government ousted the few foreign students studying in China, including those from Albania and North Vietnam. Current internal problems will make communication even more difficult. U.S. officials are beginning to emphasize keeping Nationalist China in the United Nations rather than keeping Peking out. They are unwilling, however, to move much further in changing current policy until Peking shows some signs of reciprocating. Undoubtedly the Vietnamese conflict has done much to aggravate the situation. Washington holds little hope that the old revolutionary cadre will change its ideas about the United States, but is optimistic that the post-Mao generation of Chinese leaders may relax its attitudes and change its policies.

570

Petković, Ranko. DIALOGUE ON NON-ALIGNMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Nov. 20, 1966: 13-16. D839.R4, v. 17

Answers allegations made following tripartite meetings of India, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab Republic in New Delhi that the concept of nonalinement is obsolete in present world conditions. Petković asserts that when the cold war was at its height nonalinement mitigated many antagonisms that could have led to war, supported the liberation struggles of colonial nations, and contributed to the removal of bloc barriers. Fulfillment of these aims to a certain degree gives nonalinement different tasks but does not deprive it of its raison d'être. In the present struggle for a new balance of power, where old alliances are breaking up and new ones forming, nonalinement is a "consistent

factor of peace and progress." Its continued effectiveness will depend on its ability to adjust to new situations.

571
Philip, André. [WITH DE GAULLE--AGAINST THE CLUB OF THE RICH] Mit de Gaulle--gegen den Klub der Reichen. Dokumente, v. 22, Oct. 1966: 345-350. H5. D65, v. 22

Explains why the author, a European and a Socialist, has come to support "certain aspects of De Gaulle's foreign policy, especially France's withdrawal from NATO." Philip (a former member of the French Cabinet and President of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe) considers America's supreme authority over European security matters unacceptable, especially when it involves nuclear strategy and tactics for or in Europe itself. He fears this outside leadership could bring about unnecessary loss of human lives and a devastation of the Continent similar to Vietnam's. Such leadership may draw Europe into totally unnecessary war without giving it a chance to opt for neutrality. Due to its persistent policy of protecting the free enterprise system and the interests of "a small group of American capitalists"--particularly with regard to the Third World--the United States has become the international center of reaction and counter-revolution, comparable to Metternich's Austria or Czarist Russia. Europe's true mission is not to become the third greatest world power but "the third way" between free enterprise and collectivism. To be sure De Gaulle's leadership is not the best possible, but under the circumstances it is the best available to pave the road to that goal. Hopes for a policy change "after De Gaulle" are futile. His policy's popular support will certainly endure the departure of the "grand méchant Loup" [the big bad Wolf].

572
Plat, Wolfgang. [MUST THE GERMANS REUNITE?] Müssen die Deutschen sich wieder vereinigen? Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 11, Nov. 1966: 991-1005. D839. B57, v. 11

For 15 years West Germany has looked to other capitals, from Washington to Moscow, for an answer to the problem of Germany's partition, unaware of the fact that Bonn itself had the key to the problem's solution. By joining NATO, by aspiring toward nuclear armaments, by passing emergency legislation to be used in case of war, by insisting on its sole representation of the whole German people, and by claiming the German boundaries of 1937, the German Federal Republic has effectively contributed to the perpetuation of the nation's partition. Even so, disaster is not inevitable, provided the two German states do not absolutely contradict each other. The present status quo in Europe can well serve as "a point of departure" for the European security system. Efforts for its present revision postpone rather than enhance the realization of that system. A careful analysis of the wording of the German Federal Republic's Constitution leaves no doubt that it was intended temporarily, to stand only until German reunification. "Constitutional" arguments against détente therefore have no legal basis whatsoever.

573
Pletnev, Erik P., ed. [DIPLOMACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT] Diplomatiia i ekonomicheskoe razvitie. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1965. 262 p. HC59. 7. P55

Contents. --Diplomacy, economics, progress, by E. P. Pletnev. --"World village" in a world economy, by I. Dmitriev and I. I. Diumulen. --"International mobility" and economic progress, by E. P. Pletnev. --International liquidity and developing countries, by S. M. Borisov. --The Leninist policy of aid to rising nations as it is in action, by V. D. Shtetinin. --The developing world at the round table, by V. S. Zorin. --Paths of development and display windows of "aid," by E. E. Obminskii. --Imperialist diplomacy's preservation of the "world village," by S. A. Mikoian. --From Dumbarton Oaks to Geneva, by V. A. IUlin. --The struggle for MTO [International Trade Organization] continues, by V. A. IUlin. --New source of international law, by V. M. Gevorgian.

A collection of essays illuminating the actual and possible role of diplomacy in advancing international trade, understanding, and peace.

574
[THE PROBLEM OF EUROPE: SICKNESS OF THE ECSC; GERMAN UNEASINESS; GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET] Le problème de l'Europe: maladie de la C.E.C.A.; le malaise allemand; la Grande Bretagne et le Marché Commun, par J. G. Perspectives, v. 22, Nov. 19, 1966: 1-4. HC10. P4, v. 22

Following shortly after General de Gaulle, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville toured the capitals of the East European peoples' democracies. Apparently France is sounding the ground for its project of a Europe united from the Atlantic to the Urals, functioning as a confederation of nations including Great Britain. If it later develops into a federation with a common army and supranational institutions, it might play the role of an indispensable third force and put an end to the dangerous American-Russian diarchy. This could be achieved only with U.S. assistance, Russian consent, and European will to do so. Although Europeans naturally have a vital interest in unification, just now support for the idea is in crisis. Neither Washington nor Moscow wants to see a third force in Europe. Washington fears competition, and Russia is afraid of a German Europe. The original idealistic Schumann Plan for political unity has deteriorated into a vision of a Europe in which each country would pursue its own interests. West Germany, abandoned by the United States in the alliance from which it expected great profit, feels disappointed and faces a national crisis. It hopes for a détente in Central Europe and dreams again of a United Europe. Meanwhile Great Britain is trying hard to join the Common Market. British prosperity has been based on a balance of relations with the Commonwealth, the United States, and Western Europe. With the virtual disappearance of the Commonwealth, Britain now might easily become a satellite of the United States; thus it sees no other solution than a rapprochement with continental Europe. But it also wants to avoid European rejection, as this would not only push Great Britain into the arms of the United States but would impel France, threatened by the growing strength of West Germany, to seek a rapprochement with Russia. Finally failure of the attempt to establish a West European community might bring about a world conflict, or contribute to the reunification of Germany in a united Europe ruled by the Communists.

575
Rettig, Richard A. BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS. Prepared for the Foreign Service

Institute, U.S. Dept. of State [Washington, U.S. Dept. of State] 1964 [i.e. 1965] 179 p.
Z7401.R4

Attempts to develop a framework capable of supporting the vast amount of writing relating to science and foreign policy. Organization of the material is suggested by the chapter headings: Science, society, and the polity; Science and world affairs; National security: World War II and aftermath, the peaceful atom, systems and strategies in nuclear war, arms control and disarmament; Outer space; Foreign aid; Cultural relations; International organization; International scientific cooperation; Comparative systems.

576

Rochegonde, Guy de. [THE RUSSIAN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA] La politique soviétique dans le Sud-Est asiatique. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Nov. 1966: 1811-1822. D410.R45, v. 22

The concepts of Communist penetration into colonies are based on the Marxist-Leninist principle of provoking colonial wars in order finally to establish Communist regimes in the liberated colonies. This principle still governs the actions of Communist China, whereas the Russians replaced it in 1956 by the more flexible principle of ideological and economic penetration in line with Khrushchev's new concept of peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, although the methods changed, the objective of establishing Communist regimes in former colonies remained the same. Actually Southeast Asia became an area of tension only after the Second World War when the disappearance of the colonial empires created a political vacuum. Since then the filling of this vacuum, or at least preventing the United States and China from filling it, apparently has become the principal objective of Russian policy. The most important aspect of the situation and the one that facilitates the Russian activities is the absence of nuclear deterrence in this part of the world. But these activities are limited by the Sino-Russian competition for the leadership of the international Communist movement. Thus Russia must make substantial economic sacrifice to support its Communist brother North Vietnam, because any other behavior would be interpreted as "collusion with imperialism." Russia also cannot become a mediator, because then China would appear to be the only orthodox opponent of colonialism. And it cannot support U.N. mediation, because of its concept of the United Nations as a slave of the United States. In this complex situation it is not easy to predict the future behavior of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless three fundamental trends can clearly be discerned. First there is not much hope for U.S.-Soviet reconciliation because their antipodal objectives will definitely continue to prevent cooperation. Secondly Moscow will always avoid a direct confrontation with the United States for the simple reason that China would welcome a conflict. Finally the Soviets are not likely to end their dispute with China. A reconciliation would be possible only if the leading elites in both countries were to change. Presently the grand design of the Soviet Union is the development of agriculture and raising the Soviet people's living standards. This program demands the reestablishment and maintenance of world peace. Consequently the Soviets will probably seek compromise solutions in Southeast Asia.

577

Rothstein, Robert L. ALIGNMENT, NONALIGNMENT, AND SMALL POWERS: 1945-1965. International organization, v. 20, summer 1966: 397-418.
JX1901.I55, v. 20

Although the contemporary international scene is essentially bipolar at the nuclear level and likely to remain so for a number of years, on the political level and on the level of conventional warfare multipolarity exists both in the actual capabilities of the smaller states and, primarily, in the ways the states behave. Small powers are potential victims in the event of war between the great powers and lack bargaining leverage in times of cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Under the present international system nonalinement is most advantageous in periods of cold war, when the great powers are competing for small powers' favor. The viability of nonalinement is directly related to the power balance between the great powers and exists only so long as a great power does not directly threaten a small power. Once a small power is threatened, alinement with another great power is difficult to avoid. Among the many advantages of nonalinement is its psychological attractiveness. It emphasizes the independence and status previously denied the small nation in international society. The publicity engendered by the state's new international role may compensate for domestic failures or at least silence critics. Although nonalinement could be a force for world stability, most nations have used it in an egocentric manner to extract concessions and extort minimal gains. The pressures great powers formerly placed on smaller powers to aline is beginning to diminish as the "blocs" lose their cohesiveness. The decline in the military importance of the smaller nations, the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fading of the colonial issue, and the proliferation of new states (simultaneously detracting from their individual importance) have all accentuated this trend. The emergence of Communist China might create a whole new pattern of relationships, increasing the need for military security and forcing the smaller states into alinement. Many cogent arguements favor an alliance composed solely of small powers. "In a period when the primary conflict is carried on by political means and for symbolic victories, the military weakness of small-power alliances is less important and their political strength more important." The main obstacle to such an alliance today is the inability of the small nations to agree among themselves.

578

Samhaber, Ernst. [BETWEEN EUROPE AND CHINA] Zwischen Europa und China. Der Europäische Osten, v. 12, Nov. 1966: 614-620.
DR1.E83, v. 12

Seeks to explain that Red China's policy in Asia and toward the Soviet Union forces the latter to ease its relations with the West in Europe, because it is otherwise impossible for Moscow, pulled by tensions on both fronts, to secure its Far Eastern interests. Thus the Soviet Union will eventually have to come to terms with Germany on revision of European boundaries that were once fixed in Yalta. Samhaber discusses the possible implications for each side (the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China) of escalating the Vietnamese War into either an American-Soviet or Chinese-American War and outlines the views of "hawks" and "doves" in Washington, Peking, and Moscow.

579

Savel'ev, IU. [THE PHILIPPINES IN THE NETS OF NEOCOLONIALISM] Filippiny v setiakh neokolonializma. Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie, v. 10, no. 10, 1966: 99-104. HX8.V22, v. 10

Deplores the fact that the Philippines, the "strewn gems" of the Pacific, are still headlocked in the grip of American neocolonialism, after attaining political independence from the United States. As stated by the New York Times, "In probably no other foreign country do Americans feel so much at home." The foreign policy of the Philippines ruling circles is directly tied to the United States role in SEATO and the advancement of a harsh anti-Communist line. U.S. strategic plans designate the Philippines for an important role despite the fact that the U.S. bases on the archipelago are a misfortune for the Philippine people and a direct threat to the neighboring countries. As the result the domestic political scene is growing more tense. The conflict between the Philippines national interest and the United States neocolonial interest becomes more acute as the country tries to extricate itself from the U.S. net. Nonetheless the Philippine people have faith in their eventual victory.

580
Scalapino, Robert A. IN SEARCH OF A ROLE: JAPAN AND THE UNCERTAINTIES OF POWER. Encounter, v. 27, Dec. 1966: 21-27. AP4.E44, v. 27

No nation of Japan's world stature has advanced so far economically and politically at such a low cost. The most important contributing element has been the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Freed from all but the most minimal security obligations, Japan has been able to concentrate on economic growth, and the results have been phenomenal. Japan is now one of the 4 or 5 wealthiest and most powerful nations in the world. It is among the top 7 militarily, although less than 10 percent of its national budget is allocated for military expenditures. However, politically Japan is a sharply divided nation, with no substantial agreement between the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists in the field of foreign policy. Official Socialist policy is based on four main objectives: pacifism, nonalinement, collective security, and Asianism. Liberal Democrats favor alinement with the United States, thereby continuing to seek maximum gains and minimal risks. While this policy has undeniably been successful, its very success has created conditions that demand new approaches--the status quo has reached some of its limits. Four broad courses of action are open to Japan: to continue to advocate pan-Asianism, beginning with rapprochement with Communist China; to move toward nonalinement concomitant to developing an independent military deterrent force; to move from alliance with the United States to a position of "equilibrium" between the United States and the Soviet Union; or to support the U.S.-Japanese alliance as a means of permitting the broader use of Japanese economic and political power, particularly in Asia. Unquestionably Japan will play a larger role in Asia in the future. Tokyo's most probable course will include cooperation and normalization of relations with China, offset by a more positive policy on every front in Asia and by assumption of additional responsibility for its own defense and the defense of non-Communist Asia. Japan is likely to seek a new relationship with the Soviet Union, but not one that will force it to abandon its alliance with the United States. In fact Japan's acceptance of its responsibilities as a major power will enhance its relations with the United States. "Whatever the future may hold, today Japan--not China--is the major power of Asia."

581
Schmid, Carlo, and others. [SHALL WE BECOME "GAULLISTS"?] Sollen wir "Gaullisten" werden? Epoca, no. 12, Dec. 1966: 12-13, 15-16, 18, 20.
P&GP RR

Asks whether Gaullism hampers or serves (1) European unification and (2) German policy, and whether West Germany should turn away from the United States toward France. Respondents are: Former West German Ambassador Hans Kroll, Bundestag Member Carlo Schmid, Paris Match Editorial-Writer Raymond Cartier, Rheinischer Merkur Correspondent Paul Wilhelm Wenger, Writer Friedrich Heer, Vorwärts Editor Jesco von Puttkamer, and Süddeutsche Zeitung Editor Maxim Fackler. Most of the men questioned distinguish between Gaullism as De Gaulle's policy and as a political movement. Kroll, Cartier, Wenger, Heer, and Fackler think that in the long run De Gaulle's policy has decidedly promoted European unification (for Heer, consolidation) along reasonable and realistic lines. Cartier points to the French President's positive influence on the development of the European Common Market, and Wenger to the fact that without successful blocking by De Gaulle of supranationalist tendencies within the Common Market no nation of the Outer Seven Group, Great Britain included, would be at all interested in joining the European Economic Community. Schmid and Puttkamer consider De Gaulle's policy acts as a drag but not a permanent one, on European integration. This, Schmid believes, will have to be accomplished without "posting billboards with the supranational principle." All Forum participants contend Bonn must maintain close ties with both Paris and Washington, with Paris for the sake of European consolidation and improving its own relations with the East, and with Washington for its own and West European security. All authors agree--although with varying degree of emphasis--that in the long run De Gaulle's policy will ease the solution of the German problem by enhancing the East-West détente. Preceding the panel's opinion Jochen Willke draws a general picture of De Gaulle's political stature, his goals and concepts.

582
Schmidt, Helmut. [THE GERMAN POLICY IN DEADLOCK: WE MUST FREE OURSELVES FROM HAMPERING GRANDIOSE IDEAS] Deutsche Politik im Patt. Wir müssen uns freimachen von den hemmenden Maximalvorstellungen. Die Zeit, v. 21, Sept. 20, 1966: 3. AP30.Z39, v. 21

The Soviet-American nuclear stalemate has substantially limited each side's freedom of action in their mutual relations. Both powers are now concerned with the preservation of their spheres of influence, which are threatened mainly by China. Consequently U.S. and Soviet attention has been focused on Asia rather than Europe, a development that gives greater freedom of action to the European nations. Both Washington and Moscow are perfectly aware of the forbidding risks they would take by becoming simultaneously involved in tensions on two fronts. The cohesion of the Soviet bloc has weakened over recent years. The trend toward greater independence of the former Soviet satellites will stop only if the West fails to respond by increasing economic, cultural, and political relations with them, especially with Czechoslovakia. West German-American relations may suffer a setback in the near future because of the incompatibility of the U.S. policy of preserving the European status quo with Germany's aspirations for reunification. Bonn's nuclear illusions may also account for some of the tensions between the two countries. Overall, however, the long-range interests of both nations are convergent. Britain will hardly seek any close continental partner in the near future; therefore the aloof friendship between London and Bonn is unlikely to change. De Gaulle's détente policy

toward the East is highly commendable. His military strategy gives France greater independence but is "weightless vis-a-vis the Soviet Union." The Atlantic alliance, weakened by De Gaulle, cannot be strengthened by an organizational reforms "within or without NATO," and common contingency-planning and crisis-management will probably become the rule. The German Federal Republic, in order to participate fully in such planning, should renounce any sharing of nuclear arms and should stop entertaining any illusion that with or without NATO it can achieve maximal security. There is an inverse ratio between West German security and the chances of German reunification. Since détente is so vital to German reunification, the problem is to reduce to a common denominator both the détente and the balance of power. Theoretically this is solvable through decreasing armaments gradually to the effect that each reduction will transpose the balance of power to a correspondingly lower level. Bonn should ponder with Americans its security problems, and with France its approaches to the East. In both cases the final decision about what policy is to be pursued should be Bonn's.

583
Shmelev, N. [EVOLUTION OF THE THEORY OF IMPERIALIST "AID"] Evoliutsiia teorii imperialisticheskoi "pomoshchi." Mirovaiia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 8, 1966: 62-74.
HC10.M5357, 1966

In analyzing the development of the concepts of western "aid" to young states, the author contrasts theory and practice. At the time of Eisenhower's administration the main task of western "aid" consisted in preventing neutralism among developing countries. In practice this line proved ineffective. The Kennedy administration embarked on a revision of the aims and methods of giving "aid", putting first the task of strengthening western influence in internal social-economic developments taking place inside "The third world". The Kennedy administration aimed at making the policy of "aid" more flexible and more effective in the general strategic plan. Although the Johnson administration continues to pay lip service to many of the ideas developed in the early 1960's, in practice it is increasingly guided by old concepts of "aid", putting first the winning of military and political concessions. (Abstract supplied)

584
[SHOCK WAVES] Ondes de choc [editorial] Observateur du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique, v. 10, Nov. 1966: 2.
DS41.O2, v. 10

The elections in the West German province of Hesse as well as the U.S. elections revealed that there is in both countries a definite movement to the Right. This phenomenon could have vast consequences in the world, and especially in the Middle East. While the elections naturally encouraged Rightist extremists in both countries, their other most important common aspect was the emphasis the winners put on the renunciation of international obligations. Even if the German National Democratic Party is not yet a menace, its program contains anti-Semitic and anti-Israel elements, as well as a tendency to disengage West Germany from NATO and to reunify the two Germanies. As strong indications already exist that the Party cooperates with some Arab Governments in the Middle East, the reinforcement of the Party certainly will have serious side effects on the Arabian anti-Zionists. On the other hand, in the United States the isolationist elements that recommend more exclusive concentration on the Vietnamese War definitely increased after the elections. Although the growing American lack of interest in other areas is probably caused by the war, and might be temporary, the Soviets are already using this situation for improving and strengthening their influence in the Middle East. Last week's Cairo agreement, placing a heavy responsibility on Israel for preservation of the status quo on its borders, is the best testimony of this development. Mr. Eshkol's recent announcement that Israel is extending its military service to 2 1/2 years demonstrates that Israel is aware of the situation and ready to assume the responsibility.

585
Singh, Lalita P. THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN ASIA: A STUDY OF ASIAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Columbia, University of Missouri Press [1966] 271 p.
HC412.S592

Studies Asian economic organizations and the politics of and initiatives for economic cooperation and integration in Asia. Singh, in four parts, deals with economic cooperation outside international organizations, regional cooperation under the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, international and intraregional economic cooperation under non-United Nations organizations, and the obstacles to far-reaching economic cooperation and integration.

586
[THE SO-CALLED CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA] O tak nazyvaemoi kul'turnoi revoliutsii v Kitae. Kommunist, v. 43, Nov. 1966: 104-110.
HX8.K56, v. 43

Denounces the Chinese "proletarian cultural revolution" as having no connection with the proletariat, culture, or revolution, and quotes the views expressed in the world Communist press as evidence for the assertion.

587
Solich, Eduard J. [CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND GERMANY] China, die Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland. Europäische Begegnung, v. 6, Oct. 1966: 554-558. P&GP RR

Memory of China's humilating relations with the West in the 19th century, newly awakened Chinese aspirations for political leadership in Asia combined with the United States refusal to acknowledge them, and, finally Communist ideology, have all contributed to Peking's anti-American policy. Peking hopes revert to the position of political influence over the rest of Asia, especially Southeast Asia, held by China 2000 years ago. Its communism adds a missionary zeal to the endeavor, which is further influenced by Peking's strong belief in power politics. This makes it imperative for China to oppose the United States presence in Asia. Red China's policy with regard to Germany has been largely a function of its anti-American policy, and, to a lesser degree, of its relations with the Soviet Union. To be sure Peking sees West Germany "with Marxist eyes as a shield of capitalism and neocolonialism" It attacks Germany in the hope of drawing Poland and Czechoslovakia, and--just possibly--East Germany also, to the Chinese side in its dispute with Moscow. In Peking's opinion, West Germany's much-too-close

links with the United States prevent Red China from establishing direct diplomatic relations with Bonn. Interestingly Peking has never accused Bonn of being dependent on the United States. China's trade with the German Federal Republic has certainly not been smaller than that with East Germany. Germans should bear in mind that, owing to Peking's implacable hostility to Moscow, the principal foe of German reunification, Bonn's friendly relations with Peking are most desirable. A prerequisite for that, however, would be U.S. comprehension that German interests with regard to China are not necessarily identical with the American.

588
SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS. Indian Marxist, v. 2, Dec. 1966: 13-16.
HX3.N2515, v. 2

To achieve the backing of the East European states in the Sino-Soviet dispute the Soviet Union is allowing those nations greater independence than ever before. The Albanian Communists remain closely allied to China, and continue to criticize the "Khrushchevite revisionists." While Bulgaria may seek a more independent policy, as indicated by the abortive conspiracy of April 1965, exchange visits with Yugoslavia and Rumania, and improved relations with non-Communist countries, to date Bulgaria appears to give the Soviet leadership its unreserved support. Czechoslovakia's economic dependence on the Soviet Union precludes any major assertion of independence, and it endeavors to promote closer economic integration among the other Communist nations. In its internal policy East Germany faithfully reflects the Soviet line, but Germans resent Soviet efforts to increase their economic dependence. Economically Hungary is becoming increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union; internally its closer association with the Soviet Union heightens suspicion of contacts with the West and limits the nation's freedom of expression. Polish criticism of China is less harsh than that of other nations, and the Poles still oppose an open break. Polish support for economic cooperation within Eastern Europe is unswerving, but the more liberal attitude hoped for internally in Church-State relations has failed to materialize. Rumania is asserting its military, political, and economic independence. It refuses to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, challenges the Soviet monopoly of leadership in the Warsaw pact, and is fast increasing its trade with the West. Internally, however, the Party retains and exercises its power over the country's intellectual and cultural life. Yugoslav-Soviet relations have steadily improved in all fields since Khrushchev's fall, and trade between the two countries is expanding rapidly.

589
SPAIN MAKES THE SCENE: MADRID'S SMILING OFFENSIVE, by L. Bruce Van Voorst; SEEKING THEIR NICHE, by M. Aguilar Navarro. Atlas, v. 13, Jan. 1967: 40-43. AP1.A83, v. 13

Van Voorst: Spain's recent internal liberalization seems tied to an increasingly aggressive foreign policy. The freedom of movement of American Armed Forces in Spain was suddenly restricted. Pressure was exerted on Washington with respect to the Gibraltar dispute, Spanish entry into NATO, and the European Common Market. The nation is establishing new ties with the German Federal Republic, and its shipyards are currently building 30 boats for Cuba. The most difficult questions concern Spain's future attitude toward NATO--a problem of major concern since the French withdrawal. While the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, endorsed by Secretary of State Rusk, has proposed that Spain take France's place in NATO, many fear a pro-Franco policy today would handicap the United States in negotiations with the government that will succeed him. In a sense Spain is already part of the NATO structure through bilateral treaties--so much so that the Soviet Union has placed it on the list of countries subject to retaliatory attack. Even without formal Spanish membership in NATO, the American military presence there will grow stronger. Spain's new flexibility in foreign policy shows in the revision of its traditional cold war policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Spaniards are becoming aware of their value in the play of forces between West and East. Navarro: Today's Spain desires influence on the destiny of mankind. The Spanish must find a way to take part in world affairs without depending too much on the effect of foreign forces and events on Spanish life. That Spain's ruling groups are forced to deal with the outside world and its ideological, social, and economic systems will, in the long run, bring about important changes in the behavior of its "blindly conservative groups." The country must outline a domestic policy which will make a fruitful foreign policy possible so that Spaniards can contribute to decisions on the future of mankind. To U.S. suggestions of entry to NATO and alining with anti-Communism Spain must give an unambiguous no. Those who encourage Spain's progressive incorporation into the European Economic Community deserve all of its help, encouragement, and understanding. Democratization of Spanish society cannot be achieved in a world subject to the warlike demands of the cold war. Economic development is the basis for renewal of Spain.

590
Strauss, Franz Josef. [GERMANY'S POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION] Deutchlandpolitik in europäischer Dimension. Europa, no. 11, 1966: 27-29.
P&GP RR

Although officially responsible German politicians assert that the division of Germany is the principal cause of the tension in Europe and that this division must be abolished before any détente can be achieved, Germany's friends in the West feel that the country can be unified only after a détente is attained. The Soviet Union supports the latter concept, because in the Soviet view the détente could bring about an international recognition of the status quo in Europe and drive the Americans from the European continent. Russia's real objective is the creation of a "cordon sanitaire" extending from Italy to Scandinavia with West Germany as its center. Within this constellation the Soviet Union hopes to unite both Germanies into a "people's front" and thus loosen the Federal Republic's link with the West. As long as the Federal Republic insists on reunification as a national aspiration, Russia will pursue its present policy. Hence the Germans have no alternative but to pursue the reunification of Germany within a West European unification program. Unless Germany is bound up in a European community, it cannot expect its neighbors to support its unification. In a European community, rather than being a danger, the preponderant German potential might become a contribution to the strength and dynamism of a United Europe.

591
Swearingen, Arthur Rodger, ed. SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST POWER IN THE WORLD TODAY. New York, Basic Books, [1966] 127 p.
D847.S9

Contents. --The Communist world in flux, by Max Frankel. --Soviet foreign policy since Khrushchev, by Philip E. Mosely. --The foreign policy of Communist China, by George E. Taylor. --U.S.-Soviet détente? by Marshall Shulman. --Moscow-Peking relations in perspective, by Rodger Swearingen. --Index.

Five articles assessing the implications for the West of the present flux in the Communist world. Frankel sees the United States playing a pivotal role in a "triangular" world, and dealing with communism as a political and military rather than ideological challenge. While Mosely sees present Soviet foreign policy as more cautious and moderate than it has been, he warns that at a more opportune time the Soviet Union may well renew its expansionist aims. Taylor discusses the three basic objectives of Communist China and its ability to achieve them: extension of the political power of the Communist state; domination of the policies of the Communist world; a shift of the world balance of forces toward the Communist bloc. Shulman insists that, although the conflicting expectations and philosophies of the great powers will not disappear, leaders may find it to the interests of their nations to enlarge areas of collaboration. Finally Swearingen describes the major areas of conflict between Russia and China: historical traditions and cultural heritage, attitude toward imperialism, and level of economic development. He concludes that the emergence of China confronts the United States with two "arrogant enemies instead of one," and that Soviet foreign policy must be viewed with realistic suspicion.

592
Tončić-Sorinj, Lujo. [PROBLEMS AND GOALS OF AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY] Probleme und Ziele der österreichischen Aussenpolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Nov. 1966: 645-649.
D839.A885, v. 17

Points out the limitations placed on Austrian foreign policy by the nation's obligation and resolve to preserve its neutrality. Austrian Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj underlines how easily a false step in Austrian foreign policy could offset the European power balance and destroy the foundation of Austria's independence--neutrality.

593
TRANSLATIONS ON COMMUNIST CHINA: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL, no. 375. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 21 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 38,341) P&GP RR
"CSO: 3577-S."

Translation of three editorials from the Chinese-language newspaper Chieh-fang Chün Pao (Liberation Army News), Peiping, Feb. 3, 9 and 14, 1966.

Three Chinese Communist exhortations on political attitudes. Permanently Bringing Politics to the Forefront (Feb. 3) stresses Chairman Mao's lesson that "in a society where classes exist, politics is the struggle of one class against another," and that struggle is "the motive force of social progress." All citizens are urged to become lifetime revolutionaries and students of Mao's works and to "bring politics to the forefront." To Advocate the Word "Public" (Feb. 9) demands that each man subordinate his personal interests to the public good in order to become what Chairman Mao describes as "lofty, pure, and ethical" so that "our army will have nothing to fear" from imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary cliques in which case "nothing will prevent us from marching ahead." The Most Important and Fundamental War Preparation (Feb. 14) points out that the most vital element in "war preparation," which Lin Piao emphasized to be the purpose of "our entire work," lies in one's readiness to bring politics to the forefront and use Mao's thought to arm the brains of all military commanders. The entire Army must be enabled to use Mao's thought as guidance, as a method of class analysis, and for appreciation of the nature of U.S. "imperialist aggression and war."

594
TRANSLATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENTS, no. 866. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 141 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 36,847) P&GP RR
"CSO: 3801-D."

Partial contents. --The Communist Party of Germany welcomes the documents of the Bucharest Conference of the Warsaw Treaty States, interview by V. Kuznetsov with Max Reiman in the Russian-language newspaper Pravda, Moscow, July 16, 1966, p. 3. --The current political struggle in China, by Giuseppe Boffa in the Italian-language newspaper l'Unita, Rome, July 10, 1966, p. 14. --The political struggle in the Chinese Party, by Emilio Sarzi Amade in the Italian-language weekly Rinascita, Rome, v. 23, June 11, 1966, p. 12-13. --The USSR, the People's Republic of China, and the US, by Carlo Galuzzi in Rinascita, June 11, 1966, p. 26. --Struggle in China over succession to Mao, by Paolo Danieli in the Italian-language monthly review Corrispondenza Socialista, Rome, v. 7, June 1966: 308-311. Thirty-one articles on international Communist affairs, including the following by an East German official and four Italian writers.

The First Secretary of the East German Communist Party Central Committee, Max Reiman, evaluates the Bucharest Conference as "an important contribution to strengthening peace." According to Reiman the Conference documents criticized American "aggression" in Vietnam and Bonn's support of Saigon "puppets," stressed that European security problems require urgent solution, and welcomed a general European conference to discuss a European system of collective security. Giuseppe Boffa writes that Mao is using Stalin's debate-controlling methods--the same methods that were condemned for damaging the development of a Socialist society and resistance to imperialist attack. Emilio Sarzi Amade discusses current Chinese accusations on the basis of which leaders of the Party, culture, and the press were dismissed; their positions excoriated as "rightist"; and their writing deemed to have been "anti-Socialist." Carlo Galuzzi considers the speculation that the United States and the Soviet Union may join to "contain" China. Paolo Danieli writes that the disturbance in China is a struggle for Mao's power between the "war party" and the "peace party" set off prematurely "because the internal Chinese situation and the international situation require immediate decisions." The outcome cannot be predicted due to frequently changing political positions as well as group and personal relations; however at the moment Lin Piao seems to lead. So far as war with the United States is concerned the bluster from Peking is moderate but it is powered by intransigent ideological fanaticism and may be symptomatic of weakness.

595
Tretiak, Daniel. CHALLENGE AND CONTROL. Far Eastern economic review, v. 54, Oct. 27, 1966: 216-217, 219, 221. HC411.F18, v. 54

The Vietnamese War is the most important foreign policy issue facing the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, and yet interactions among the three have reflected carefully measured, relatively low-risk policies. China's decisionmakers have seriously debated the nation's posture. On the whole they probably feel more hostility toward their former ally, the Soviet Union, than toward their traditional enemy, the United States. Since Jan. 1966 the speeches of Lo Jui-Ching and Liu Shao-chi have been far less anti-Soviet than those of Chou En-lai and have implied a willingness to reduce Sino-Soviet tension and use Chinese military power in Vietnam. These military leaders "have been among the more prominent 'losers' in China's recent political conflict." Clear and consistent Chinese foreign policy imperatives are emerging: avoid expansion of the war and conflict with the Americans, reject cooperation with Russia, and continue the fighting. Actions like the Fulbright hearings, liberalization of travel policy for Americans in China, and recent speeches by U.S. leaders indicate that the United States also wants to avoid escalating the Vietnam conflict. A count of "serious warnings" issued by the Chinese to the United States reinforces this conclusion. From 1961 to August 1964 maximum monthly Chinese charges of U.S. violations reached 8; immediately following the Tonkin Bay incident until the end of 1964, 14; January-May 1965, 8; June 1965-May 1966, 3; May-September 1966, 2. This suggests that since mid-1965 China has begun to realize the United States does not want to expand the Vietnam conflict to China or increase Sino-American tension. Sino-American talks in Warsaw have continued on schedule during the 1964-66 period. Nonetheless, these careful actions on both sides should not obscure the danger still inherent in the Vietnam conflict.

596

[20 YEARS OF TRADE BETWEEN ZONES: THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALL-GERMAN INSTITUTION] Zwanzig Jahre Interzonenhandel. Wirtschaftliche und politische Entwicklung einer gesamtdeutschen Institution. SBZ Archiv, v. 17, Sept. 1966: 279-283. tables.
DD216.S14, v. 17

Postwar development of East-West German trade, its fluctuations, supporting agreements, and its political implications for Germany. The trade between East and West Germany amounts presently to 2 percent of the West German and 10 percent of the East German foreign trade. It represents only one-twentieth of the prewar trade volume between both sectors. Still its cultivation and further development are enormously important for Germany's future, for it may substantially contribute to raising the standard of living in East Germany and to German reunification. Qualitatively the East German economy depends greatly on the West German market, although quantitatively this relationship is not evident. The recent negotiations between the "currency area of the West German Mark" and that of the East German Mark [the terms used in East-West German trade agreements to make them comply with the Bonn Government's Hallstein Doctrine] have been deadlocked due to the German Democratic Republic's insistence that it be mentioned in the agreement.

597

Ulbricht, Walter. STATESMAN TO PHILOSOPHER: CHAIRMAN ULBRICHT WRITES TO PROFESSOR JASPERS. Democratic German report, v. 15, June 24, 1966: 82-83. DD261.D3, v. 15

Partly excerpts and partly summarizes a letter by Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, to Professor Karl Jaspers "welcoming Jasper's contribution to the 'German Dialogue' between the two German states." Ulbricht declares Jasper's new book Where is the Federal Republic Going? [Munich, 1966] convinced him that they both are equally anxious "to do everything to ensure peace" in and for Germany. He asks Jaspers to express his opinion on the Four Points, designed to serve as a common platform for "the working classes of the two German states." The Four Points urge that both states renounce nuclear weapons, disarm themselves, and engage in mutual negotiations leading to détente, and that West Germany recognize the existing frontiers. Stating that "there is only one path" to German reunification Ulbricht defines it as: "rapprochement and peaceful cooperation between the two German states in a German Confederation."

598

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD EUROPE (AND RELATED MATTERS). Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 524 p. D844.U476
Hearings held June-July 1966.

Examines the complex relations among Western European states, between Western Europe and the United States, and between the Western community and the Communist world. A variety of witnesses are heard from within and outside the Government.

599

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. THE TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE OF AFRICAN, ASIAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES: A STAFF STUDY. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 156 p. D839.2.U58
At head of title: 89th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Discusses the political background, preparations, agenda, and resolutions of the Conference. Appendices give the participants and organizations attending, excerpts from selected speeches, press reactions, and other material. The report describes the Conference, which met in Havana in Jan. 1966, as "the most powerful gathering of pro-Communist, anti-American forces in the history of the Western Hemisphere." The Conference agenda primarily included items related to the "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism," and to the need for solidarity among African, Asian and Latin American peoples in that struggle.

600

Vandermeersch, L. [SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS] Les relations sino-japonaises. Esprit, v. 34, Dec. 1966: 813-829. AP20.E78, v. 34

Sino-Japanese relations are entirely dominated by the Japanese-American relations established by the Yoshida Security Treaty signed in 1951. The desire to preserve the alliance prevents Japan from recognizing Communist China. Nevertheless Sino-Japanese economic relations are developing favorably under a Japanese laissez-faire policy that is tolerant of private initiative. The contacts are made by the Socialist Party of Japan, which tries to establish a commercial

modus vivendi with China. Although recently the Soviet allegiance of the Japanese Communist Party caused a setback in relations, Chinese and Japanese civilizations are so closely related that they make contacts inevitable. Unfortunately the United States dominates the Far East with the sole purpose of stopping the expansion of communism by the primitive means of brutal force and support for corrupt regimes. It does not make the slightest effort to understand the situation and tries to prevent Japan from assuming its natural role of mediator. But the collapse of fascism in Japan left a vacuum which neither the dogmatic demagogues on the left nor the programless technocrats on the right can fill. Therefore it is Japan's role to develop a new world outlook and assure the Far East a balance that is based not only on old traditions but on new aspirations.

601
Vazquez, Lino Cortizo. COMMUNIST TACTICS IN LATIN AMERICA. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations of international Communist developments, no. 890, Oct. 12, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 38,130) p. 120-121.
"CSO: 3801-S."
"Translation of an article . . . in the Spanish-language newspaper El Universal (The Universal), Caracas, 14 September 1966, page 49."

Describes Communist methods of subversion as applied in Latin America. In order to split and undermine the established unity of trade unions, student organizations, etc. the Communists are organizing so-called Armed Liberation Forces. Although the movement was strong at the time of the Cuban crisis, it sharply diminished after the Sino-Soviet split. Recently Communist infiltration, subversion, and sabotage have lessened to the point where, in many places, trade unions have calmed down and Communist propaganda has lost its virulence.

602
[WHAT WILL THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE KIESINGER GOVERNMENT BE?] Ce que sera la politique étrangère du gouvernement Kiesinger. Entreprise, no. 589, Dec. 22, 1966: 15-16.
HC271.E5, 1966

As the future European policy of the Kiesinger government has not been discussed between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists during their negotiations for a new West German Government, it can only be guessed at from the positions and attitudes of the political leaders. Undoubtedly the new leaders of Germany favor improved Franco-German relations. Their disagreement with Chancellor Erhard's attitude toward France was the cause of his downfall, and a much more important question than the stagnation of the attempts at European unification. It seems that the new government considers it worthwhile to accept the growing French influence in Europe, because France will help West Germany in its attempts to abolish the division of Europe. Many other urgent questions remain on which the new government will have to take some position. The most important among them are: the unification of Europe, West German allegiance toward the United States, admission of Great Britain to the Common Market, and the East-West détente. Although Chancellor Kiesinger will probably try to ease the difficulties in the Common Market without hurting France, and the general positions of Strauss and Brandt are well known, the next months will probably bring answers to all these questions. On them the new West German coalition will be tested as well as the new agreement and cooperation between the Christian Democratic Chancellor and his Socialist Foreign Minister.

603
Wiedmann, Christoph. [NATO'S OTHER GOAL: THE SECURITY COMMUNITY IS BEING "REARMED"] Der andere Zweck der NATO. Eine Sicherheitsgemeinschaft wird "umgerüstet." Politische Welt, no. 99, Nov. 1966: 3-5.
D839.P65, 1966

Expounds on the need for transforming NATO into an effective instrument of the West's common foreign policy toward the East. Wiedmann considers ill-fated the suggestion, which he says is promoted by American liberals, that NATO orient itself toward East-West rapprochement and cooperation. This, along with the trend toward an American-Soviet tutelage over a European détente, would clearly be at odds with German national interests. Should NATO fail to serve as an instrument of common Western policy (including German policy) vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc, it certainly will not survive beyond the year 1969.

604
Wolfe, James. [A NEW ODER-NEISSE CONCEPT?] Neues Oder-Neisse-Konzept? Politische Welt, no. 98, Oct. 1966: 6-7. D839.P65, 1966

Criticism of a view, recently gaining ground in American policymaking circles, that the United States should recognize the Oder-Neisse Line as a final boundary between Poland and Germany. Wolfe, a faculty member of the University of Maryland, argues that such a move would at best be ignored by Poland, which has no counterproposal to offer in return. Warsaw, Moscow, and "Central Germany" [East Germany] would probably consider the offer an unauthorized interference in their own affairs, because in their view the Polish-German boundary has long been settled. Furthermore recognition by Washington of the Oder-Neisse Line would encroach on German vital interests, which the United States is bound to respect if it wants a viable alliance with the German Federal Republic and success for its own policy in Europe. The Soviet-American rapprochement, presently advocated by some in the United States rests on the George F. Kennan's concept of "disengagement." It is in effect a new trend toward "isolationism." The interest of the United States and the West would be best served if the United States were to continue its foreign policy in the international tradition established by George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and John Foster Dulles.

605
Yi, Sung-hon. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ASPAC MINISTERIAL MEETING IN SEOUL: PROSPECTS OF THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC COMMUNITY. Koreana quarterly, v. 8, autumn 1966: 11-24.
DS901.K89, v. 8

Present-day Asia is roughly divided into a free-world sphere, a neutral sphere, and a Communist sphere. In recent years efforts at achieving wider and broader regional cooperation have been gaining momentum. In particular the nations belonging to the free world segment began to realize that a closer cohesion was imperative. As the idea of a Pacific Alliance was originated in 1949 and had been dealt with at the abortive Manila Conference in 1961, the nations used it as a

basis for the Ministerial Meeting for Asian and Pacific Cooperation [ASPAC], held in Seoul in mid-June 1966. The meeting was attended by the Ministers of Australia, the Republic of China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam, and an observer from Laos. The Ministers evaluated the political situation and problems of common interest, particularly those affecting the peace, stability, and security of the Asian and Pacific countries, and reviewed existing economic and social conditions, trade, and cultural exchanges. In the discussion of political problems (e.g., the danger of nuclear tests, the Vietnamese War, etc.) views were slightly divided. The countries directly endangered by the Communist threat wanted to denounce Communist aggression in Vietnam, whereas Japan, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand adopted a more passive attitude, which influenced the wording of the final communique. Although no permament body has yet been established, the countries felt that economic and technological centers, a Social and Cultural Center for Asian and Pacific Regions patterned on UNESCO, and other similar united institutions were desirable. The Ministers also resolved that to implement the desired process of continuing consultations on a regular basis the Ministerial Meetings will be continued with the second one to be held in Bangkok in 1967. In the present fluid situation, when the United States is searching for a new policy toward Communist China, and the Communist world is carefully watching over developments in the area, the idea of regional cooperation among Asian and Pacific nations opens a favorable prospect for the establishment of a Pacific Alliance.

606
Ziegler, Jean. AFRICA'S PLAGUE OF RED ANTS: CHINESE SUBVERSION IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 192, Nov. 1966: 35-37, 96. AP4.R2164, 1966

While it is apparent that Communist China is in trouble with the African governments, this does not appreciably affect the development of Chinese Communist subversion in several of the rebellious African nations. China is not waging a "diplomatic campaign" in Africa but rather "a revolutionary campaign of agitation and subversion." Despite expulsion from African capitals, the Chinese are still very much in evidence, particularly in East Africa. Peking's attention is directed toward the alienated masses who are exploited and hungry--the ideal target for revolutionary foment and trouble. China's goal is simply to promote and achieve "a gale of violence" over the economic centers of Africa, the end result of which will be to hinder the West's raw-materials supply. Color and the segregation issue work to China's advantage. The Chinese play the role of long-suffering victims of colonialism in seeking communication with the African peoples. By equating the African rebel with the Vietcong and the "guerrillero in the mountains", China blots out some of the isolation so long experienced by the African peasant. China's second great advantage is the atomic bomb. To the peoples of Africa China is the first "colored" and underprivileged nation to achieve nuclear status--an impressive accomplishment indeed. The Chinese have a very simple message for Africa and they direct it to the impatient, yearning masses who seek solutions to their problems. In promoting a "violent anti-imperialist revolution" the Chinese keep their propaganda and leaflets readily available to those who can read; they send their technical experts to build roads; they send trained forces to beef up the losing side in intertribal fights; they teach the African how to be a good guerrilla fighter. Their aim is to keep the violence and revolutionary struggles active. Peking is succeeding in the African continent because of the unrest that exists there. In a stable environment the situation would not be so inviting.

249-857 O - 67 - 3

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

607
Basu, Bikash B. THE IMPACT OF MILITARY GEOGRAPHY ON MILITARY STRATEGY. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 96, Apr./June 1966: 115-123. U1.U5, v. 96

Military geography refers to "the military evaluation of geographic realities of a state, relating these to the formulation of its defence policies and war plans, and the actual conduct of combat operations." Geography is significant in determining the extent of the conflict and the physical and economic conditions of possible theatres of operations. It influences battlefield mobility and logistics problems. Climate and weather variations have to be taken into account in designing food, weapons, transport, and other equipment for troops. In formulating strategy leaders must consider the human and cultural geography of both their own state and that of their adversary. "Strategy deals with the mobilisation of all the forces and resources of a country at war." The geographic space of the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean provides "sieves of area defence" before the American homeland in which it can spread out antiaircraft and antimissile defenses and warning and tracking devices. The geographic space of the United States provides ample resources to sustain a sophisticated level of economic, scientific, and technological activity. Nations with weak economic bases often resort to guerrilla warfare, which involves even keener appreciation of geographic realities in assessing operational areas such as a common border with a friendly state, access to supplies, and favorability of terrain and climate. In fact the geographic environment assumes the greatest military significance in the strategy of guerrilla warfare.

608
Clark, John J. THE NEW ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. New York, Random House [1966] 242 p. HC65.C55
"Consulting editor William Letwin."

Contents.--The economist and the military.--The management of national defense by systems analysis.--Gaming and the theory of games.--Economic theory and the theory of conflict.--Economic warfare: a positive conception.--War and economic progress.

Considers, among other things, the dependence of national strategy on economic resources, the Soviet use of economic warfare, the relationship between economic growth and economic warfare, and the positive and negative effects of war on the national economy. Clark thinks that war, on balance, does not enhance economic progress, although in particular cases it would be difficult, "to disentangle the wastes of war from its sometimes tangible economic benefits." The work includes a number of case studies.

609
Miroshnichenko, N. [CHANGES IN THE CONDUCT AND CHARACTER OF MODERN COMBAT] Izmeneniia v soderzhanii i kharaktere sovremennogo boia. Voennyi vestnik, v. 46, Oct. 1966: 26-29. U4.V87, v. 46

The most powerful way of inflicting massive damage is by means of nuclear weapons. These arms have influenced not only the manner of conducting combat operations but the very character of combat itself. Thus modern combat can be distinguished by dynamic resolution, high maneuverability, rapid and radical shifts in a situation, uneven development in breadth and depth of the combat zone, a vastness of affected terrain, and complex radiation, chemical, and bacteriological effects. New principles have been introduced and old ones modified to enable greater dispersal of forces, surprise attack, uninterrupted engagement, and close-support for units in combat. The resolute and tense character of contemporary warfare makes especially great demands on training, knowledge, discipline, and physical fitness of troops, for as always the most significant element in battle is the individual man. For that reason all unit commanders must possess the highest possible moral and fighting qualities.

610
SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPLICATION OF CYBERNETICS IN MILITARY SCIENCE--USSR. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 17 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 38,476) P&GP RR
"CSO: 1880-D."
"Translations of two articles from the Russian-language newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)" Sept. 1966. Slav Rm

Contents.--Military application of cybernetics, by D. Kazakov.--Philosophical problems of cybernetics, by V. Bokarev.

The views of two Soviet Army officers on cybernetics. Lt. Col. Kazakov writes that in addition to Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the theory of dialectical materialism, officers should be versed in the modern military science that requires knowledge of the general method of cognition cybernetics. They should be familiar with Stows' applications, the methods and means that best reflect the specifics of the subject. Knowledge of this system of measures plus its skillful application are the necessary conditions for successful solution of the complex military problems in military construction and education of the Armed Forces. Engineer-Lt. Col. Bokarev presents some of the philosophical aspects of cybernetics and points out that this young science has a great future in military application especially in the deeper study of the "tendencies of armed conflict" and "scientific leadership."

611

Surikov, Boris T. [MILITARY APPLICATION OF ROCKETS] Boevoe primenenie raket. Moskva, Voen. izd-vo, 1965. 182 p. illus. (Raketnaia takhnika)
UG635.R9S9

Discusses contemporary nuclear rockets and missiles, their place in the military organization, and problems concerned with their use in combat for the benefit of Soviet officers not connected with such weaponry. Engineer-Colonel Surikov writes that a nuclear rocket-missile war would be a frightful tragedy for all humanity. Any hope of victory would depend on making retaliatory strikes with strategic weapons to eliminate the enemy's nuclear delivery capability, military-economic potential, and military concentrations in zones of the interior and all theaters of operations. This action would be supplemented by use of tactical nuclear weapons against troop concentrations, aircraft, and rear-area defenses. Antimissile missiles would play the vital role of preserving the life of the population. "The existence of nuclear-rocket weaponry in the hands of our Armed Forces is a powerful factor in deterring imperialist aggression against Socialist and other peaceloving countries. Our nuclear might assures all humanity of the opportunity to live in peace."

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

612

Afifi, Sabri. WE STARTED MISSILE PRODUCTION AT THE LAST POINT REACHED BY THE WORLD AND WE WERE ABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DELAY. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on the Near East, no. 26, Sept. 13, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publication Research Service. JPRS: 37,572) p. 100-105. P&GP RR

"Translation of an article . . . in the Arab-language daily Al-Gumhuriyah (The Republic), Cairo, 17 July 1966, p. 5." Nr East

Claims that the United Arab Republic is presently producing the most modern of missiles, superior to those received by Israel from the United States. The new missiles can easily destroy Israel's missile bases, as Israel's territory does not allow wide distribution. Furthermore the Republic has developed a perfect radar system, and its missile factories are well equipped and manned by workers who are protected by social and welfare legislation. Egyptian missile production, while it started late, has used all the experience gathered by other states in the field and has thus achieved a victory in production that can be surpassed only by an even greater victory in a war.

613

ALL EYES FOCUS ON NAVY'S POSEIDON MISSILE. Navy, v. 9, Dec. 1966: 24-27. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 9

In the United States deterrent mix the Fleet Ballistic Missile [FBM] system--Polaris--has loomed important. Growing directly out of Polaris technology is next decade's FBM, the Poseidon missile. Potentially operational by the 1970's, Poseidon will be "a whole order of magnitude advanced over the long-range Polaris A-3." It will be larger yet will fit into the same missile tubes that now launch Polaris. Poseidon will carry twice Polaris' payload and have twice the volume in which to carry sophisticated penetration aids, thus offsetting developments in antimissile technology. With all authorized FBM submarines now completed, the conversion of the earliest components underway, and the development of the new missile begun, the FBM system will continue as a vital part of the U.S. deterrent. Current patrols and test-firings of missiles demonstrate the reliability of the system. The FBM is a product of complex technological innovation in guidance systems, fire-control systems, and missilery. Yet, like all naval systems, the FBM is only as good as the men and officers who run it. They are the "sine qua non of FBM success."

614

Antier, Jean-Jacques. [AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND THE COMMAND OF THE SEA] Les porte-avions et la maîtrise des mers. Paris, R. Laffont [1966] 324 p.
V874.A65

Recounts the history of naval aviation from the wooden biplane to the bisonic bomber rising majestically from the deck of the Enterprise. Although many predict a decline in the importance of the airplane, the author feels that it is far from being obsolete. If improved to greater perfection and polyvalence, it will acquire a new importance in the future. And the aircraft carrier, the indispensable operational base for naval aircraft, will inevitably replace the obsolete naval bases that are so difficult to maintain in foreign countries. Then the aircraft carrier will leave the weapons of deterrence to the submarine and remain itself the only efficient defense weapon.

615

[ATLANTIC SPECIAL] Spécial Atlantic. Air & cosmos, v. 4, Dec. 17, 1966: 19-42.
P&GP RR

A description of the Breguet "Atlantic," the only aircraft basically designed for the European Antisubmarine Weapons System. The "Atlantic" program started in 1958 with the selection of Breguet project 1150. It has run according to schedule ever since, and the coordination of 5 countries and 12 contractors has produced an astonishing piece of work. Up to now of the 60 aircraft on order 27 have been delivered and the 33d production-line aircraft will be tested this month.

616

Bachtel, Charles L. ARMY AIR DEFENSE A CONTINUING TASK. . . . Signal, v. 21, Dec. 1966: 15-18.
UG1.M65, v. 21

Air defense requirements have resulted in revolutionary changes in the development and performance of an imposing array of weapons. To facilitate its approach to the problem the Army in 1950 created the Army Antiaircraft Command, now called the Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM). A study comparing World War II antiaircraft weapons and the new performance aircraft stressed the need for new defense systems and indicated the technical feasibility of an electronic semiautomatic defense system. The result was replacement of antiaircraft guns by the Nike-Ajax radar-guided missile plus other improved radar systems. To cope with the increased sophistication of delivery vehicles electronic equipment was used to compute and predict their rate of travel and path of entry, thereby eliminating many error-prone routine

tasks. Considering the speed of the missiles and the newer aircraft, only the computer could provide the instantaneous data that was required to adequately track incoming vehicles. The intercept process has become automatic from the point of detection to destruction. The human function is to monitor the machine and make the decision to destroy an enemy vehicle. All this must be done by individuals who have attained greater levels of skill and motivation than heretofore required. The new antimissile system (Nike-X) will have the capability to sift out decoys and identify and destroy the warhead. The Army's role will continue to be implementation of these technological innovations within the framework of the national defense system.

617
[BRÈGUET 1150 ATLANTIC] Brèguet 1150 Atlantic, von es. Flugwelt, v. 18, no. 1, 1967: 19-24. illus.
TL503. F626, v. 18

The ever increasing submarine threat has become one of the major concerns for all seafaring nations, since their economic life depends largely on the protection of their maritime communications and ship traffic. But the new submarine-based ICBMs have changed that important function into a vital defence rôle. The last World War has shown that long-range maritime patrol aircraft equipped with reliable and highly sensitive detection systems and effective armament are an indispensable ASW [antisubmarine warfare] weapon. However, the technological progress of submarines, which go deeper and faster and have an almost infinite endurance, is making most of the present ASW equipment obsolete. Therefore, experts from all NATO Countries have developed new ASW tactics in which a sophisticated antisubmarine aircraft is the keystone. The co-operation of the best specialists in ASW of the Free World has led to the design and development of the most modern antisubmarine patrol aircraft Brèguet 1150 Atlantic, which is now in production under a joint European programme and in service with the French and German Navies. (Abstract supplied)

618
Butz, Sam. OUR PILOTS CALL HANOI "DODGE CITY." New York times magazine, Oct. 16, 1966: 30-31, 62, 64, 66, 68, 72, 74, 76. AP2. N6575, 1966

U.S. commanders in Vietnam are calling the antiaircraft guns and guided missiles around Hanoi the greatest concentration of weapons and the most sophisticated air defense ever put to the test of combat. The speed and maneuverability of modern jet bombers and the small size of North Vietnam complicate the problems of its defense. Only well-trained troops equipped with modern radar and computer systems can react quickly enough to be effective. The air war in North Vietnam is unquestionably a test of advanced systems. "The U.S. is employing first-line Navy carrier and Tactical Air Command aircraft and electronic equipment to allow its pilots to navigate precisely, locate targets quickly, bomb accurately and get home as fast as possible. And in response the Russians have equipped the North Vietnamese with a truly up-to-date antiaircraft system." This is one of the most ambitious Soviet military aid programs undertaken to date. U.S. fighter losses are not as high as originally predicted by the Department of Defense, but despite the fine performance of American flyers the United States cannot claim victory. Air warfare is very flexible, offering both sides many opportunities for tactical innovations, and the entire complexion of the war could shift drastically at any time. Military men throughout the world are carefully watching the performance of SAM missiles in combat; while their performance scores on gunnery ranges were close to 100 percent, in Vietnam their kill-rate has been just over 6 percent. Although the Soviet SA-2 is by far the most deadly antiaircraft weapon ever fired from the ground, its shortcomings indicate the manned fighter-bomber will remain useful in conventional wars for the foreseeable future. However even a loss rate of 3 percent can become unbearable in a long war of attrition. The United States currently loses about one aircraft a day, a big increase from that of a year ago, and further improvements in Hanoi's defense are a definite possibility.

619
Cary, James. THE FUTURE OF ARMOR. In Tanks and armor in modern warfare. New York, F. Watts [1966] (The Watts land power library) p. 253-263.
UG446. 5. C28

The tank has many built-in advantages on the nuclear battlefield. By its very nature it provides considerable protection from the blast and fire-storm effects of a nuclear explosion and a means of crossing highly radioactive areas and maneuvering and fighting there. Armor is also useful in its traditional capacity when nuclear weapons are not used. The joint U.S.-West German effort to develop a new "Main Battle Tank of the 1970's" [MBT/70] shows America's commitment to armor. While details of MBT/70 are highly secret, rumors note it might be armed with either a missile or gun and use some material other than steel for its basic armor plate. Much credit for such developments belongs to the Army's new Combat Development Command, a unit commissioned to study how the Army will fight in the future. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have concluded armor will play an important role in future combat and have devoted considerable effort to developing armored vehicles of improved firepower, speed, and range. Both, for example, have produced new tracked armored personnel carriers for moving infantry into or through areas of heavy fighting. Increased mobility is a necessity of the nuclear age; because of the blast effects of atomic weapons future battle formations will have to be more dispersed so that fewer casualties will result from any single nuclear strike. In such circumstances there is little doubt that armor will continue to be an important weapon of the future.

620
Casella, Alessandro. CHINA'S ATOMIC TIGER. Far Eastern economic review, v. 54, Nov. 10, 1966: 353-354. HC411. F18, v. 54

China's recent success in launching its first guided missile has called world attention to the work of its scientists, many of whom are Soviet- or U.S.-trained. For example, Chien Hsueh-sen, a former professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is now directing China's missile research, assisted by two other U.S.-educated Chinese scientists and others who were trained in areas ranging all over the world. However this Western-educated elite is no longer indispensable to China, which is educating scientists at home in about 80 technical institutes and universities. Teaching methods emphasize practical application and economy. China has several dozen nuclear reactors including experimental ones, many of them built in the universities and without Russian help. All the electronic

equipment has been built by the students, down to the last transistor. Among the younger generation enthusiasm for science has been fostered, and scientists are held in high esteem. China's supply of nuclear weapons is not limited by technological know-how but by a limited industrial base and shortage of fissile material. "While the overall level of Chinese science is not yet up to that of the West, China's nuclear science and its related fields are apparently as good."

621
CHINA SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTS GUIDED MISSILE-NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST. Peking review, v. 9, Oct. 28, 1966: ii-iii. DS701.P42, 1966
"Press communique, Hsinhua News Agency, Peking, Oct. 27, 1966."

On October 27 China successfully launched a guided missile with a nuclear warhead that flew normally and hit its target. This successful test emphasizes the fact that China's scientific, technological, and defense capabilities are developing rapidly under the inspiration of Mao Tse-tung's thought. China's purpose in its nuclear development is to oppose American and Soviet nuclear blackmail and nuclear monopoly. This progress should be a source of encouragement to the Vietnamese and other peoples now engaged in heroic struggles against aggression and imperialism. The Chinese development of nuclear weapons is solely for defense, and for the ultimate purpose of destroying all nuclear weapons. "We solemnly declare once again that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons."

622
CHINA'S NUCLEAR PUZZLE. Business week, no. 1949, Jan. 7, 1967: 32. HC431.B87, 1967

At first officials played down the significance of China's fourth nuclear test. After examination of the debris scientists agreed it was not only the dirtiest to date but left them guessing regarding China's intent. While the device contained U-238, it is unknown why so much of it was needed. One guess is that the Chinese, as they have stated, are working on several types of nuclear weapons. The warhead just detonated need not fit on the tip of a missile but could adapt easily to the belly of a bomber. China's scientists are known to be having difficulty separating out U-235 from U-238. Their first two nuclear tests indicated they may be developing a fission trigger for an H-bomb. The third test achieved some thermonuclear reaction. The fourth test showed China could put a nuclear device atop a rocket. The pieces appear to fit, but the ultimate design remains unknown. Why was U-238 used in the latest test? Did the Chinese detonate one more bomb in 1966 for propaganda reasons? The possibility of the Chinese working on a multiple weapons arsenal remains a real possibility.

623
Clarke, Robin. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Science journal, v. 2, Nov. 1966: 71-79. illus. Q1.S57, v. 2

Refutes the theory held by many military strategists that biological weapons are cheaper and easier to use than many alternative types. The most likely candidates for use in biological warfare [BW], according to Clarke, are the approximately 160 infectious diseases known to afflict man. The ideal BW agent must be highly virulent, be quickly incapacitating or lethal, be capable of production in large quantities and storage for periods of 2 or 3 weeks, be highly stable when propagated as an aerosol, be infectious through respiration, and be difficult or impossible to cure. It requires a low level of both artificial and natural immunity in the population at risk, but the user must possess a highly effective and long-lasting vaccine. Few if any existing infectious organisms fulfill all these requirements. The military reliability of BW agents is further compromised by their inability to be tested realistically and by the criticality of meteorological conditions favoring their dissemination. The continued stockpiling of such weapons, Clarke asserts, constitutes a hazard comparable to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

624
Dulberger, Leon H. ADVANCED INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. Space/aeronautics, v. 46, Nov. 1966: 54-66. TL501.A786, v. 46

Traces the evolution, demise, and revitalization of the interceptor aircraft. The Soviet Union's inventory of bombers is advancing to the high-altitude supersonic types, thereby giving new impetus to U.S. interceptor requirements. Although current emphasis is on air-to-air missiles carried by both Soviet and U.S. bombers and eventually by U.S. interceptors such as YF-12A and the F-111B, missile systems have limitations. "Realization of the limitations of air-to-air missiles has been accompanied by a resurgence of interest in guns--weapons which have demonstrated their usefulness in Vietnam." Some military analysts foresee a need for "remotely-based interceptors able to tackle bombers soon after their 'launch phase.'" The YF-12A is now stalled in development, ranking in Defense Department priorities below antimissile defense systems, such as Nike-X, and a national fallout shelter program.

625
Dulberger, Leon H. STRATEGIC MISSILE & AIR DEFENSE. Space/aeronautics, v. 46, Sept. 1966: 62-77. TL501.A786, v. 46

Argues for increased technological advances to provide for an anti-ICBM defense system, a "new high-Mach interceptor," and for improved antisatellite defenses. U.S. offensive weapons systems have received the greatest outlay of money, imagination, and effort; U.S. defense capabilities are lagging far behind. The reasons are numerous, a major one being that it would cost too much to develop and deploy an antimissile system against the Soviet Union. "Disenchantment with the merits of defensive measures has led to the basic U.S. military posture, deterrence based on assured destruction--our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable society, even after absorbing a surprise first strike." The entire spectrum of missile defenses is discussed with a view toward "a counter-countermeasures capability somehow geared to leapfrog the attacker's penetration-aid abilities."

626
EXPLODING GAS BAGS MAY AID ABM EFFORT. Technology week, v. 19, Nov. 14, 1966: 19. UG630.M54, v. 19

Balloons that are filled with detonable gases and exploded high in the atmosphere to simulate the blast effect of a nuclear burst may permit the Department of

Defense to test the ability of missile reentry vehicles and high-performance aircraft to withstand blast effects. This test method will avoid the problem of violating the nuclear test ban treaty. Scientists working on "Project SLEDGE" have found that the gas explosions and durations correlate well with TNT and cost less. The natural buoyance of the balloons permits the control of height without TNT's requisite blast tower. Moreover, the balloons will work in higher altitudes than it is possible to lift TNT. Scientists are now evaluating the gas combinations most amenable to high-altitude use and the explosive patterns to expect. If tests prove feasible, balloons equivalent to up to 1 ton of TNT will be tested next summer, with eventual tests of balloons over 100 ft. in diameter equivalent to 10-20 tons of TNT. Scientists are studying how to tether the balloons at higher altitudes in order to control their path and to augment them with a radar reflector or other device that will allow target vehicles to home on the balloon.

627
Getler, Michael. ARMY TO PROPOSE BILLION-DOLLAR OVERHAUL. Technology week, v. 19, Oct. 10, 1966: 13. UG630.M54, v. 19

The Army is proposing a complete review and overhaul of current intratheater communications equipment and concepts under the code name Project Mallard. The project, which could cost $1 billion over several years, will produce the first total system of its kind proposed to date. Military officials envision the system as a high speed "mobile trunking and switching network" using pulse-code-modulation transmission techniques to make maximum use of its capacities. If current plans are approved, military officers estimate large-scale hardware buys will begin about 1971 with the system operational through the 1980's. Although NATO members will also be able to use the network, sources say there is no NATO participation or planning on the project yet. It is highly likely that British, Canadian, and Australian Armed Forces will participate in both the development and funding stages. Project Mallard design fits in with the anticipated heavy use of tactical communications satellites by army units in the field and provides communications support for the Automatic Data System for the Army in the Field. Current planning envisions a multichannel microwave network throughout a field army area capable of handling about 96 communications channels behind and 48 ahead of field headquarters.

628
Getler, Michael. DEVELOPMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR MUNITIONS TESTS TECHNOLOGY. Technology week, v. 19, Oct. 31, 1966: 18-20. UG630.M54, v. 19

Reports Air Force efforts to upgrade the quality of nonnuclear air-to-ground munitions including fleshette-type warheads, terminal homing systems for gravity bombs, new antipersonnel bomblets, standoff-range cluster munitions, and workable schemes for aerial mining. According to Getler the Air Force is supporting major efforts to improve bomb-fusing methods, resistance of externally carried aircraft ordnance to temperatures generated in supersonic flight, and compatibility of all Air Force nonnuclear ordnance with all Air Force aircraft.

629
Getler, Michael. RAC STUDY PIVOTAL FOR 'COPTER ARMAMENT. Technology week, v. 19, Aug. 29, 1966: 13. UG630.M54, v. 19

The use of 4.5-inch unguided rockets in helicopters has touched off an Army controversy over better aerial support artillery for air-mobile divisions. The Research Analysis Corp., completing a study in this area that may assist the Army in its 1968 research and development budget requests, recommends increased interest in helicopter armament. The Bell HU-1B helicopters are now being tested with the 4.5-inch rockets at Huntsville, Ala., where the increased blast properties of the larger rocket are proving to be a problem. Fort Sill, Okla., authorities maintain an aerial artillery provisional batallion equipped with CH-34 helicopters with 4.5-inch rockets, but the Army has not authorized them for general combat duty. Opponents of the 4.5 indicate they would rather see increased effort and money put toward developing a new unguided rocket. They say the 2.75-inch suppressive-fire rocket presently being used in Vietnam has the advantages of lighter weight, thus allowing more armament to be carried on a "copter," as well as adequate range characteristics. The debate on helicopter armaments evolves around the changing outlook for unguided weapons in general. There is speculation both "that a whole new aerial artillery system, combining both direct and indirect fire weapons in a single system, would rule out further use of unguided rockets," and that accuracy limitations of unguided rockets could be ameliorated. Also under development are new guided missiles for use in helicopters that may alleviate the fire-suppression problem.

630
Getler, Michael. SOVIET ABM DEPLOYMENT EXPECTED IN YEAR. Technology week, v. 19, Nov. 21, 1966: 10-12. UG630.M54, v. 19

Discloses official reports that the Soviet Union has begun to deploy an antiballistic missile [ABM] system. The article describes American reaction to the announcement and Washington's own plans for ABM deployment. The new furor, which has reopened the debate surrounding the Nike-X system, will affect decisions concerning the new American ICBM, the Improved Capability Missile, as well as the proposed Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft.

631
Getler, Michael. U.S., USSR SEEN NEARER WEAPONS ACCORD. Technology week, v. 20, Jan. 16, 1967: 14-15. UG630.M54, v. 20

Prospects for an agreement that would slow down or halt Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile [ABM] system look good to U.S. officials charged with arms control. An agreement would cover a wide range of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weapons. Three main factors are responsible for the optimistic view. Firstly Soviet ICBM strength is increasing, thus narrowing the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States. Despite a 3 to 1 U.S. lead in numbers of weapons, the megatonnage ratio between the United States and the Soviet Union "could be used to prove the gap either has disappeared or is quite narrow." Secondly the Soviet Union is again the reputed leader of the Communist world, Communist China having lost influence over the last 2 years. This was not the situation in 1964 when the United States introduced a seven-point plan for disarmament that included a

freeze on strategic weapons systems. Thirdly a Soviet ABM system would be very expensive. In addition, a large part of the Soviet ICBM force is being hardened, giving Moscow a second-strike capability, and the Soviets do not see their ABM system as "foolproof." Just as important as any of these reasons is the manner in which the Soviet Union views the intentions of the United States. Both the Soviet Union and the United States face the threat of a nuclear-armed Communist China. Even with an agreement between these two countries, consideration would have to be given to ABM protection against the Chinese. Unfortunately, U.S. and Soviet claims that their respective ABM systems might be deployed only against the Chinese would be less than convincing. There is speculation in the United States that the scheduled Feb. 21 Geneva conference will not adjourn without the administration making a "decision with regard to either the response to the Soviet ABM, should diplomacy fail, or the way to implement any agreement with the Soviets." U.S. plans for Nike-X have been deferred until the FY 1968 budget allocations. Conflicting reports on Soviet ABM deployment make it difficult to estimate the U.S. response. The Secretary of Defense has insisted right along that "assured destruction through upgraded offensive forces is the most cost-effective way to respond to an ABM."

632
Giese, Fritz. [THE INTERNATIONAL NAVAL SITUATION IN 1966] Die internationale Marinelage 1966. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Dec. 10, 1966: 674-675. U3.W38, v. 10

During the past twelve months the situation in the international naval sector has changed considerably compared with a year ago. New ships have been built, taken on trials or put into fleet service, new weapons have replaced older weapons systems, and last but not least there have been changes in the relative strength of certain navies. The U.S. Navy is still by far the most powerful and most modern fleet. Then follow the Soviet Navy, the British Royal Navy and the steadily growing French Navy. Among the smaller naval powers there have been no significant shifts in relative size, though here too there has been further progress in the modernization of various fleets, some with American or British support, other with the aid of the Soviet Union. (Abstract supplied)

633
Government Data Publications, Washington, D.C. ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE. Washington, D.C., c1965. 65 p. illus. UG630.G685, 1965

Provides details on American antimissile defense programs including proposed and development-stage means of detecting and destroying enemy missiles.

634
Hamilton, Andrew. ANTI-MISSILE MISSILE FOR EXPORT? New republic, v. 155, Dec. 10, 1966: 14-17. AP2.N624, v. 155

Stimulated by Chinese development of nuclear weapons, the Defense Department is now seriously considering the deployment of an antimissile missile system for two principal reasons: technological breakthroughs have lowered the cost considerably, and the possibility of defending nonnuclear countries against attack may slow the rate of nuclear proliferation. Ten years ago the Army took on the task of developing the Nike-Zeus and "mounted an intensive public relations campaign" during the Eisenhower and early Kennedy administrations "to 'loose the Zeus.'" After submitting the project to careful analysis, Secretary of Defense McNamara concluded that "in missile warfare the attacker held the decisive advantage"; the $20 to $40 billion Nike-Zeus would not provide adequate defense. Work on advanced antimissile missile systems has continued. Now that France and China have developed nuclear weapons without much outside help, the subject of proliferation is of acute concern in Washington. Also scientists have developed an extra-long-range missile which can protect large areas from a single launching site. Radar cost has been greatly reduced by new modular design systems. The advantage remains with the attacker in any full-scale exchange between nuclear superpowers. However, attacks by small nuclear powers such as China could be defended against with the new antimissile missile systems, with the price of nationwide deployment reduced to $8-$10 billion. Area defense missiles also eliminate the need for specially designed fallout shelters--existing buildings would suffice. The United States, however, can not delay its decision to produce the anti-missile missile for the 10 years it will take China to develop long-range missile capacity. Japan and India will be within range of China in the next 2 or 3 years. Also Germany continues to demand a more effective defense against the 700 or 800 medium-range Soviet missiles targeted on NATO. Overseas deployment of the anti missile missile could provide enough security to prevent these nations from embarking on nuclear programs of their own. Britain and France might find this system a good alternative to expensive offensive weapons. But overseas deployment would not be possible without first setting up a system in the United States--"domestic political pressure would insist on it." The problem of control of the antimissile missile as a nuclear weapon is not serious because the "nuclear warhead can be rendered incapable of offensive use." Strategists considering the effect of the system on proliferation should investigate the possibility of joint action between Russia and the United States to provide antimissile missile protection to nonalined nations.

635
Harrigan, Anthony. THE EXPANDING ROLE OF SEA POWER. Navy, v. 9, Dec. 1966: 28-31. illus. VA49.N28, v. 9

Throughout history seapower has meant many things, but not until today has it ever meant power over land. While amphibious operations are not new to the Navy, the Vietnam War is proving that seapower has undergone a dramatic transformation. From the Marines' vertical envelopment doctrine that employs the helicopter to the strategic capability of Polaris missile systems, seapower now extends far beyond the beach. Carrier assaults off Vietnam are as sustained as any land-based air assault. According to Prof. A. E. Sokol the alteration of seapower favors it "over any other part of national strength." Yet the American people still tend to regard naval strength in its classic role. For the future the Army's air-mobile concept might be applied to naval operations, creating a globally mobile striking force that would not need to be physically based on foreign soil. Carriers and other ships comprising the task force could easily launch and maintain all the men and equipment needed for combat or occupation. Such a system would approach the ultimate refinement of seapower.

636
INDUSTRY'S ROLE IN ASW. Undersea technology, v. 7, Nov. 1966: 22-55. V210.A1U5, v. 7

Contents. --ASW market firm despite war: vital industry role grows. --Reliability: watchword of ASW progress, by Charles B. Martell--The Navy's new oceanographic program, by Odale D. Waters. --ASW project office in second shakedown. --Sound is 'king' but non-acoustic systems show future promise, by Larry L. Booda. --Industry participation in ASW, by Robert N. McFarlane.

The U.S. Navy's antisubmarine warfare program, reviewed in the third year of its present organization by its director, by the oceanographer of the Navy, by its coordinator, by the editor of Undersea Technology, and by the president of the National Security Industrial Association. ASW needs and priorities, the oceanographic program and its ASW role, the organization of Navy ASW programs, trends in technology, and the role of industry in ASW are detailed.

637
Jones, Robert S. TANKS OF THE RISING SUN. Armor, v. 75, Sept./Oct. 1966: 45-47. illus. UE1.C33, v. 75

Reviews the history of Japanese armor design and production from World War I through World War II. Recent developments include "lightly armored and extremely mobile" antitank vehicles and the Mitsubishi medium battle tank. Jones recommends that "students of armor pay attention to future tank developments of this small but industrially able nation."

638
Leary, Frank. TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE. Space/aeronautics, v. 46, Sept. 1966: 78-92. TL501.A786, v. 46

Surveys current programs to meet the hard-to-define requirements of tactical air defense. Both the Army and the Navy are proceeding with research and development in reconnaissance, surveillance, and early-warning craft; improvements in the F-4 interceptor; and programs to equip advanced surface-to-air missiles (such as SAM-D) with electronic countermeasure, multifunction radar, and Mach-5 weapons capabilities.

639
Levin, Stuart M. HIGH-ACCELERATION MISSILES. Space/aeronautics, v. 46, Sept. 1966: 93-101. TL501.A786, v. 46

Underlines the need for advanced design and development of high speed (1000-g's acceleration and a few-seconds flight time) missiles. The engineer must come up with "quick-response, low-drag control fins; high-burn-rate fuels with physical strength"; and communications reliable through a plasma blackout to encourage implementation of the hard-point defense concept.

640
[LOOKING FOR AN ANTISUBMARINE TORPEDO] U-Jagd-Torpedo gesucht. Atlantische Welt, v. 6, Aug. 1966: 6. V3.A8, v. 6

A general description of the new antisubmarine torpedo "MK-46," which was developed by the U.S. Navy at the cost of $100 million. The article reports that the West German Navy is very much interested in the MK-46, for it would be especially useful in the shallow waters of the Baltic Sea.

641
Martin, Laurence. ANTI-MISSILE MISSILE: THE END OF THE BALANCE OF TERROR? Spectator, no. 7222, Nov. 25, 1966: 672, 674. AP4.S7, 1966

First of two parts.

Missiles can be intercepted at three stages: at launch, mid-course, or when reentering the atmosphere. Except for intercepting submarine ballistic missiles, systems for launch interception are hopelessly uneconomic. Production of the Nike-Zeus missile of the 1950's, designed to intercept the incoming warhead early in the terminal phase, was cancelled due to its inability to distinguish real warheads from decoys. To overcome this weakness, the Sprint missile was designed with improved radar devices and very high acceleration to intercept at a late stage. The development of "phased array" radar makes detection capacity almost infinite, but necessitates location of the defensive system near the place it is defending. Therefore, although such a system may protect selected targets such as military installations, its widespread use would be extremely expensive. New impetus may be given to the antimissile effort by a recently devised method of detonating warheads in space by radiation; in this way whole clusters of incoming objects can be destroyed at altitudes sufficiently high to diffuse their effects. This large kill radius makes possible thin defense of large areas rather than tight defense for precise points. The proposed "thin" system, using the Sprint missile for defense of cities and installations and Nike-Zeus for "area defense" of the entire Nation, is known as Nike-X. The debate over deployment no longer concerns military efficacy, but whether ABM defense is the most cost-effective way to achieve the desired protection. Even by expenditure of well over $32 billion for a damage-limitation program American casualties in the event of a Soviet first strike could be reduced only to 75 million at the very lowest. As the technical prospects for antimissile defense improve, the strategic and political dangers of the system become more apparent.

642
Martin, Laurence. ANTI-MISSILE MISSILE--2. STRAINS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. Spectator, no. 7223, Dec. 2, 1966: 717-718. AP4.S7, 1966

Second of two parts.

Communist China deserves important consideration in the antiballistic missile [ABM] debate currently raging in the United States. Studies done for the Defense Department reveal that an expenditure of $8-10 billion on a "thin" missile defense system could significantly reduce U.S. casualties from a Chinese first-strike. Some critics claim this is only the "thin edge of the wedge" intended to get the U.S. to begin ABM deployment. Others argue it would "destabilize" the situation, increasing the likelihood of war, accelerating the arms race, and arousing tension and worsening diplomatic relations. As far as the U.S.-Soviet stalemate is concerned, although an antimissile system could reduce casualties considerably, the inevitable number of deaths from nuclear conflict could never be regarded with equanimity. In Sino-American

relations, however, the antimissile offers the United States extended deterrence in the Far East without extensive conventional commitments. The Soviet Union is unlikely to consider American antimissile deployment provocative since it was the first to deploy such weapons. However America's European allies will carefully study how such actions relate to their own defense. Noting that existing American strategic forces are more than adequate for the job, Europeans are unimpressed by the argument that the ABM is needed for protection against China. They feel that America should resist being drawn into the costly endeavor of ABM deployment lest it be pursued at the expense of efforts related to their own security. The costs of an ABM system are hopelessly beyond the means of Europe to finance. In the future it appears that research and development on ABM's will continue, and with it pressures for deployment. On the other hand, the fundamental bases for mutual deterrence between the superpowers will not be removed.

643

Meyer, Ronald J. GERMAN ARMOR TODAY. Armor, v. 75, Sept./Oct. 1966: 34-38. illus.
UE1.C33, v. 75

Describes the armored vehicles developed for the Bundeswehr since 1956, including details of an infantry personnel carrier, an antitank vehicle carrying the SSll tank destroying rocket, and the "standardpanzer Leopard."

644

Nagashima, Shusuke. JAPAN'S DEFENSE RESTS ON U.S. TECHNOLOGY. Technology week, v. 19, Dec. 5, 1966: 32-33. UG630.M54, v. 19

Japan may step up its purchases of U.S. techniques for producing aircraft and air-defense missiles in the next 5 years. Although Japan prefers to produce the needed defense equipment at home, its industry lacks the technological capability to develop sophisticated weapons--it has conducted almost no research and development on them. Therefore weapons will most likely be manufactured by Japanese firms through licensing agreements with U.S. companies. While this arrangement often costs more than direct purchase, it contributes to the advancement of industrial technology. In the new 5-year plan the Japanese Self-Defense Forces plan to acquire: supersonic fighter and trainer aircraft; transport, aerial early warning, and rescue planes; rescue helicopters; Nike-Hercules surface-to-air and Hawk air-defense missiles; anti-submarine patrol planes and helicopters; and helicopters for use by ground forces. Japan's decision to buy American know-how for all major equipment reflects the superiority of U.S. military technology and Japan's decision not to commit itself to a large-scale defense research effort.

645

Ogorkiewicz, Richard M. FRENCH ARMOR. Armor, v. 75, Sept./Oct. 1966: 39-44. illus.
UE1.C33, v. 75

Considers recent developments of French armor. Particular attention is paid to the success of the AMX 13 light tank, which allows many variations of armament and is now used by the armies of 15 countries. The new equipment has resulted in organizational changes in French armor units.

646

Pay, Rex. LASER TECHNIQUES MAY AID A-ICBM SYSTEMS. Technology week, v. 19, Nov. 7, 1966: 33-34. UG630.M54, v. 19

Explores the possibility of using a laser technique to distinguish decoys from incoming ballistic missiles. The laser would be used to form a long-range hologram of the incoming payload while it was still outside the denser parts of the Earth's atmosphere. Thus a faster, more efficient image would be produced. Whether this technique will be successful over very large distances is, according to Pay, one of the major factors to be determined.

647

Ulsamer, Edgar E. MILITARY USES FOR THE AMERICAN SST. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Nov. 1966: 51-54. UG633.A65, v. 49

Department of Defense planners anticipate no immediate military use of the supersonic transport [SST] now in the development stage. Consideration should be given to the future, however, for, as was pointed out by one Senator, "Denying this military potential is tantamount to claiming that the first flight of the Wright brothers was of no value to military aviation." The defense industry foresees a range of diversified uses for the military SST based on the fast reaction time over great distances inherently required by modern defense missions. "The faster the response the less chance for escalation." It is believed that the supersonic transport could increase the advantages of flexible response and mobility for the United States. Based on scenarios emphasizing the economics and the military potential of the SST, evaluations show that in operations like the Big Lift exercise over West Germany in 1963 use of 62 supersonic transports would have cut the time element from 63.3 hours to 7 hours. In providing support for a strike force SST's would be able to leave after present-generation fighters have started on their mission (in contrast to the present procedure, in which the fighter has to delay its departure 2 to 3 hours). This allows the second crews and support teams required for a second strike to arrive concurrently with the main strike force. As a supersonic tanker, the SST could provide "greater point-rendezvous capability, greater mission flexibility through almost unlimited redispositioning ability, and avoidance of signaling the punch to enemy intelligence by prematurely committing subsonic tankers to the route of the combat aircraft." The SST would bring the United States closer to the underdeveloped areas of the world. Its security is intimately related to the security of the developing nations, but the Soviet Union has the advantage of being closer to these countries. U.S. supersonic-response capability may deter the Soviets from rushing supplies and troops to insurgent forces. "The real potential of the SST for military use is expected to come with second-generation SSTs of greatly increased range and payload."

648

Walters, R. E. THE SUBMERSIBLE FLEET OF THE FUTURE. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, Nov. 1966: 317-322.
U1.R8, v. 111

Discusses the role of the nuclear-powered submarine in future defense systems. In case of nuclear war such ships would probably insure the survival of some life. Short of war the submersible ship will be the dominant means of exercising seapower. Although its

construction is expensive, probably all seafaring nations will feel the need of building the nuclear-powered submarine and its supremacy could very well mean the dawn of a new era of seapower. If the Soviets would deploy such ships ahead of the West they would gain great advantage because they could more effectively concentrate their fleet in the Arctic Ocean and freely move from there into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The author feels that the future will belong to those who are willing to see the great potential within the sea for war and peace.

649
Ward, Chester. ANOTHER PEARL HARBOR? Washington report (American Security Council) Dec. 12, 1966: 1-4. P&GP RR

"Could there be another Pearl Harbor--a nuclear Pearl Harbor?" The tragic irony at Pearl Harbor was that the United States had the military capability to defend itself against any attack the Japanese could launch. Today this nation does not have the military capability to defend itself in the event of a nuclear-tipped ICBM attack. The tragedy of Pearl Harbor is minor compared to the potential disaster of a nuclear sneak attack today, and yet responsible officials permit the country to remain defenseless. The United States posture is based on the deterrence capability of its retaliatory forces--its purportedly invulnerable Polaris and Minutemen missiles. To preserve this "delicate balance of terror" Secretary McNamara has rejected recommendations of his Joint Chiefs of Staff for production and deployment of an antimissile defense system. This makes little sense in light of McNamara's recent admission that the Soviet Union is presently embarked on a multibillion dollar effort to protect its population and industrial centers with antimissile defenses. Yet McNamara continues to minimize this clear-cut danger and stress improved offensive capability. He has deferred his decision on antimissile production for another 2 years and has attempted to "cover his tracks" by authorizing another "independent" study of the situation. He continues to ignore the unanimous advice of his Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin pre-production measures this year. In this area where lead time is so crucial to national survival and where the Soviet Union is already several years ahead, the United States continues to defer its decision.

650
Winchester, James H. NEW WEAPONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR. NATO'S fifteen nations, v. 11, Oct./Nov. 1966: 91-94, 96-97. UA646. F5, v. 11

"Puff, the Magic Dragon"--a renovated C-47 working as a remarkably effective attack plane--is only one of the new weapons employed in the Vietnam fighting. The war is now a huge military laboratory as well as a battleground, with all American military services testing capabilities of weapons, equipment, and techniques and searching out additional requirements. American soldiers are using the M-16 rifle, which with its plastic stock and forearm weighs only 7.6 pounds with 20 rounds in the magazine. The M-16 fires through a gas-propellant mechanism and on semiautomatic firing can shoot 45 to 60 aimed shots per minute. The Stoner-63 small weapons systems, also used there, consists of interchangeable parts that can make up an assault rifle, carbine, light and medium machine guns, and a fixed machine gun. Antitank weapons of all sorts are being tested in Vietnam, as are "The Thing" (a tank-like weapon), new uniforms, radars, grenade launchers, and communications devices. The Navy is testing new types of bombs, river patrol craft, and mine detectors. The entire American action in Vietnam relies heavily on the helicopter, and several improved versions are being tested or are scheduled for use. Battlefield medicine is also undergoing rapid development and increased sophistication. Only the food hasn't changed: "it's cold much of the time and out of cans."

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

651
[ARMIES AND POLITICS] Armiia i politika. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 10, Sept. 1966: 2-23. DS1. S7, v. 10

Contents.--Armies and the liberation movement (editorial).--Armies and social progress, by V. Vasil'ev.--The soldier in independent Africa.--Aden as it is: a photoreport, by L. Pleshakov.--Pentagon "takes over" Africa, by O. Rzheshevskii.--People in green uniform coats, by G. Gal'perin.--Behind the screen of "coalition" war, by IU. Lugovskoi.--Again in Syria, by Jacques Qubar.--Bonn: in the Vietnam direction, by D. Umanskii.

V. Vasil'ev writes that the accession of armies to power in many Asian and African countries is not a chance episode but a specific phenomenon springing from laws of development which until recently had escaped the attention of researchers. The author analyzes these laws and explains the growing part being played by the military in Africa and Asia. "The soldier in independent Africa" is a translation from the periodical Présence Africaine. It discusses mercenary armies in African countries and points out that the moral rearmament of Africa against the neocolonialist threat lies in the education of a politically conscious soldier, one who is aware of the social problems of his own country and the continent as a whole. O. Rzheshevskii analyzes the efforts of U.S. ruling circles to establish military strongholds and foster stooges on the African continent. American activity in Africa reflects, on the one hand, the serious setbacks of American neocolonialist policies which are increasingly gambling on armed violence and, on the other hand, the demands for heightened vigilance and unity of African nations in defending their national democratic gains. G. Gal'perin writes about today's Ethiopian Army. IU. Lugovskoi states that the war in Vietnam has confronted Washington with a number of problems over which American politicians are unsuccessfully racking their brains. The more troops the United States hurls into the jungles of Vietnam the greater is America's isolation in the world arena. The crisis of Washington's aggressive policy has led to the strategy of so-called coalition war. However, the author stresses, the United States has been able to find only a few partners while the patriots of Vietnam enjoy the support of all progressive mankind. Jacques Qubar, correspondent of the French newspaper L'Humanité, visited Syria after the military coup there in April. He writes of conversations with young Syrian officers who were active in the coup. (Abstract supplied, modified)

652
Baturin, A. [THE STRATEGISTS OF IMPERIALIST BRIGANDAGE ARE MANEUVERING] Strategi

imperialisticheskogo razboia manevriruiut. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 47, no. 23, Dec. 1966: 79-83.
U717.R9A27, v. 47

Excoriates American leaders' grandiloquent phrases, such as "peace offensives," "peacemaking initiatives," and "peaceloving aims," employed in the face of savage U.S. military operations against the land and people of Vietnam. Statistics are presented from U.S. and foreign press sources on troop numbers, the ground and air equipment employed in various operations in North and South Vietnam, and the losses suffered by both sides. In expressing his regret that the dangerous adventure in Vietnam continues, the author warns that the "ruling circles in the USA bear the whole weight of responsibility before humanity for the murderous crimes committed by American militarists on Vietnamese soil. They cannot escape the stern court of people's justice. Throughout the whole world the struggle is broadening and strengthening among the masses of people to curb the transoceanic aggressors and end the marauding war in Vietnam."

653
Baumann, Gerhard. [THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AS A NATO-PARTNER (PART V)] Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als NATO-Partner (Teil V). Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 16, Sept. 1966: 495-523. U3.W485, v. 16
Bibliographical references included in footnotes.

History and motives of recent French policy toward NATO and the impact of France's withdrawal from the NATO military structure on the German Federal Republic. France's departure is very unlikely to result in any important upgrading of West Germany's position within NATO.

654
Beaufre, André. THE TRANSFORMATION OF STRATEGY. Diogenes, no. 55, fall 1966: 48-60.
AS4.D5, 1966

Strategy has drastically altered since the advent of both nuclear weapons and small, primitive "wars of liberation." Thus our conception of international conflict, still strongly colored by the experiences of the two World Wars, must be reexamined. Strategy had shown an evolutionary development since the beginning of history, when it was belied by the trench stalemate of the First World War and was discarded in favor of tactics. World War II seemed to bring its rediscovery, in the sense of large, strategic choices, but the issue was again confused by the atomic bomb and the success of guerrilla warfare. At first American specialists studied the various technical problems posed by nuclear weapons, discovering to their horror that their great destructiveness gave such an advantage to the aggressor that surprise attack was a distinct possibility. They solved this tactically through keeping nuclear-armed bombers in the air at all times, but the solution greatly increased the risk of accidental war. By the time this was resolved both sides possessed invulnerable deterrent forces, and it seemed as if nuclear war was becoming impossible. Credibility was the next problem to be solved, by the Soviets through calculated brutality, and by the Americans through "damage-limiting" and "flexible response." Dissuasion, a psychological maneuver, brought the true nature of strategy back into its own, into the realm of nuclear weapons. It can be seen from this that strategy encompasses any and all factors whose purpose is capitulation of the enemy. This lesson has gradually been rediscovered through conflicts between regular forces and guerrillas. Guerrilla warfare has become immensely more sophisticated in this century. It is a "manoeuver by wearying"--demonstrating clearly the psychological nature of strategy. Eventually the regular side--paradoxically the stronger--comes to realize that it cannot militarily impose a solution and that it therefore must "induce the adversary to accept a compromise." The "phase of negotiation" becomes the culminating moment of the battle. Strategy in the modern world, then, imposes peace by dissuasion where nuclear threats can be plausibly employed; in the Third World it uses force as only one element among many that attempt to resolve conflict through persuasion.

655
Bhagat, P. S. FORGING THE SHIELD: A STUDY OF THE DEFENCE OF INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA. Calcutta, The Statesman [1965] 102 p.
U21.2.B45

Investigates the essentials of "preparedness for war." Although he has written in terms of the Sino-Indian conflict, October-November 1962, Bhagat intends his conclusions to be generally applicable to all developing countries. Preparedness for war requires five fundamentals: high morale of the people, political and economic stability, quality leadership, well-defined national aims, and the will to fight. The organization and functions of the high command, the service headquarters, and theatre command and field forces play an important role in national preparedness. Many problems are involved in both the defensive and offensive aspects of war. "But in war there is the one intangible--the human factor. Superior generalship, the morale of troops, their fighting ability and leadership; these in the end will decide the issue."

656
Blechman, Barry M. THE QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES: SINAI, 1956. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, Dec. 1966: 408-426. JX1901.J6, v. 10

Quantifies the objectives, payoffs, and negative outcomes in a case of limited war, the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in 1956. The numerically computed payoff of the invasion is compared with minimum and maximum computed values for the outcome of alternative modes of dealing with the situation at hand: armed reprisal, threat of force, propaganda and psychological warfare, diplomacy, and formalized pacific settlement. On the basis of these figures the author concludes that the actual action taken, limited war, was in this instance the most appropriate in terms of maximizing gains and minimizing losses. With the caveat that in some instances he made intuitive determinations of probabilities, Blechner feels that "quantification is both desirable and relevant" to the study of international conflict.

657
Bondarenko, V. IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY-TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY IN THE RELIABLE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY. In U.S. Joint Publication Research Service. Soviet military translations, no. 333, Oct. 13, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 38,144) p. 1-12.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 1850-N."
"Translation of an article . . . in the Russian-language periodical Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), Moscow, no. 17, 66, pp. 7-14." U717.R9A27

Asserts that military-technological and moral-political superiority are today the two most vital factors in reliable national defense. The first is dependent directly on the economic potential of the country and is determined by three indices: the quality and quantity of weapons and military equipment, the degree of troop training, and the effectiveness of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. The role and significance of the various aspects of military-technological superiority, the relative importance of individual kinds of armed forces, the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, and other factors all change under the influence of concrete historical conditions, new problems, and the rapid improvement of weapons. In view of the present level of military science military-technological superiority can be maintained only by mobilizing all economic, scientific, technological, and moral-political forces of the country.

658
Boxhall, P. G. THE STRATEGIC USE OF ISLANDS IN A TROUBLED OCEAN. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, Nov. 1966: 336-341.
U1.R8, v. 111

Examines the strategic value of the British islands in the Indian Ocean. The islands of Socotra and Masirah were found to meet the requirements set for military bases in this area. Boxhall believes they can easily replace the uneconomical and politically undesirable bases at Aden and Bahrain and fulfill most of the British commitments in south Arabia and the Persian Gulf. An investigation of Diego Garcia, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Cocos, which may protect the British and Commonwealth interests in Africa, demonstrated that their strategic use is possible and feasible at moderate cost. Although the present British maritime concept holds that the Navy's limited requirements in this region can be met by only two bases, the examination was useful as it proved that strategic problems can be surmounted economically and without undue political stress by skillful use of strategic geography.

659
Bromley, Dorothy (Dunbar) WASHINGTON AND VIETNAM: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MORAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1966. 120 p.
DS557.A6B65
Bibliography: p. 114-117.

Background information on the significance of American support to President Diem and his successors, on the Geneva Agreements of 1954, and on the steps leading to the buildup of American forces in Vietnam. Mrs. Bromley criticizes the American negotiating position, asserting that it almost inevitably prevents peace negotiations. She speaks for the growing body of American and foreign opinion that feels that this war to contain communism is instead encouraging its spread by martyring the Vietnamese people and risking nuclear confrontation with China.

660
Brown, Neville. SELLOUT ON RHINE ARMY. New Statesman, v. 72, Dec. 16, 1966: 896.
AP4.N64, v. 72

While last summer's decision on the redeployment of the Rhine Army was welcomed in Great Britain, the later announcement that it would not begin before the end of 1967 was met with some consternation. Apparently the postponement was due to the U.S. offer to buy more British arms and thus to help compensate for the costs of the Army, which the West German Government has not been able to pay. People asked themselves how the British Government slipped into this "bizzare and humiliating" situation. Evidently it has been tricked and coerced by the ruthless American diplomacy, which is not yet ready to accept any hard decisions concerning the future of NATO. One likely result of this foot-dragging might be that the NATO Council will fail to seize "what might have been an excellent opportunity to simplify the arrangements for European defense and so take proper account of the realities of the nuclear balance." At this time NATO also might have opened the way for a general reduction of the military forces in Europe and offered an occasion for constructive discussions with the Warsaw Pact countries about the prospects for arms control and disarmament. Another depressing aspect of the whole affair is that it might inveigle Great Britain into other "offset" agreements with the United States. The Labour government still does not seem to see that drastic reductions in overseas commitments, service manpower, and equipment are absolutely basic to an early and sustained economic recovery.

661
Brownlow, Cecil. CHINESE THREAT SEEN FOCUSED ON SOVIETS. Aviation week & space technology, v. 85, Nov. 14, 1966: 29.
TL501.A8, v. 85

Some top U.S. officials consider Peking's drive for a nuclear capability to be directed more toward intimidating the Soviet Union than the weaker Asian nations around its periphery. China possibly regards its nuclear program as a means of assuring success to conventional incursions into such disputed territory as Russia's Kazakh province by neutralizing the Soviet nuclear threat. Other "tempting" potential targets within reach of a medium-range Chinese missile include the Soviet cities of Samarkand, Tashkent, and Alma Alta. Officials are somewhat in the dark about the Chinese missile's warhead size, range, and triggering device, but concede the test indicates more rapid Chinese progress than previously anticipated. While the Chinese buildup could present a threat to the continental United States in the mid-1970's, U.S. officials claim China does not see America as a paper tiger. The impact of China's weapons development on the smaller countries around its periphery has been minimal, largely due to the firm U.S. presence in Asia.

662
Buchan, Alastair. AN ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER? Encounter, v. 27, Dec. 1966: 62-66, 68, 70-71.
AP4.E44, v. 27

Of events shaping international politics, none will have as profound an effect on the kind of international system that will prevail in the last part of this century as the configuration of power to emerge in Asia. Will China dominate the area; or will a countervailing system of power develop? Assuming the latter and given

the poverty and internal chaos of their nations, Asian leaders must decide for the coming years of nation-building whether to remain primarily dependent on the protection of the external powers or develop a balance of power with China from their own resources. Both the power of China and the effectiveness of the external powers have been exaggerated. Militarily weak in relation to its size, China shows no sign of losing its innate caution and pursuing Asia by force. An Asian balance of power should not seek to contain China physically but rather to reinforce China's neighbors against internal revolution. To rely on external powers for unification means entanglement in their ideological and territorial disputes and the possibility of abandonment when the external powers lose interest. For example after its experience in Vietnam the United States is unlikely to undertake open-ended commitments in Asia. In fact a great deal can be said for the trend toward decoupling various centers of tension to prevent a conflagration in one area from engulfing others. Asia does not need an integrated military alliance but a diplomatic coalition of its stronger powers. The core of the system might be a treaty of mutual cooperation between India, Australia, and Japan, eventually embracing Pakistan and Indonesia. Parallel developments might include an Australian-New Zealand defense union and closer links between Australia and Malaysia and Singapore. The Manila Pact could be renegotiated to exclude France and downgrade the position of the United States and Britain, while still leaving Thailand and the Philippines some access to the United States on diplomatic and defense matters. The ANZUS treaty should remain unchanged and Japan might be encouraged to undertake a substantial measure of naval and air rearmament.

663
Bykov, O. [WASHINGTON AND BONN: PARTNERSHIP AND CONTRADICTIONS] Vashington i Bonn: partnerstvo i protivorechiia. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 8, 1966: 50-61.
HC10.M5357, 1966

The article deals with the main lines along which there is collaboration between two states, which are beginning to form inside NATO a military and political alliance; both inside it, and in the imperialist camp as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the problem of nuclear armaments, the crux of the Washington-Bonn axis. The author convincingly demonstrates the danger to the cause of peace from the policy of granting nuclear arms to West Germany, whose official policy proclaims aims of retribution, of the redevision of Europe and the establishment of a hegemony of the Federal Germany Republic. In conclusion, the author indicates that to this policy there are counterposed the might and the peace loving aims of the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union, opening the way to a prohibition of nuclear arms and the establishment on the continent of Europe of a system of collective security. (Summary supplied)

664
Caraley, Demetrios. THE POLITICS OF MILITARY UNIFICATION: A STUDY OF CONFLICT AND THE POLICY PROCESS. New York, Columbia University Press, 1966. 345 p. UA23.C24
"Sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University."
Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. [291]-337)

A case study of the intense political conflict over unification of the military services during the period 1943-47. Caraley analyzes the goals, tactics, and perceptions of the actors involved in order to show how conflict develops and is resolved in the executive and legislative branches. Part 1 gives the background of the conflict, and Part 2 describes the various proposals presented 1943-46 and the issues that developed around them. Part 3 discusses the bargaining and gradual resolution of the conflict 1946-47 by the executive branch and Congress, while Part 4 analyzes the influences affecting congressional behavior, both "intra-legislative and extra-legislative." Part 5 assesses the outcome, describes recent organizational trends within the Department of Defense, and presents some tentative generalizations on the role of political conflict in the policy process.

665
Carter, Luther J. ANTI-MISSILE MISSILE: NEXT ENTRY IN THE ARMS RACE? Science, v. 154, Nov. 25, 1966: 985-987.
Q1.S35, v. 154

Prompted by the U.S. announcement that the Soviet Union may be deploying an extensive antimissile [ABM] defense system, such national figures as George Romney and concerned Congressmen are urging that the United States embark on the same path. The looming question is whether such a step will constitute but another increment of the arms race. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, as indicated in his budget proposals for the coming year, does not favor ABM deployment at this time. In considering such a policy, he distinguishes between two threats and hence two levels of deployment. The Chinese nuclear threat is still nominal and will continue to be so at least until 1970. A thin "area defense" against the primitive Chinese warheads would employ the Zeus missile and cost about $8 billion. Against a formidable Soviet nuclear threat, "an area defense system employing Zeus would be combined with a 'point defense,' of various major installations and cities, with the fast-acceleration Sprint missile." This system would cost between $15 and $25 billion and possibly much more. With the postponement of an ABM decision, current defense plans center around continued development of the Poseidon missile. In the meantime every effort will be made to maintain U.S. "3- or 4-to-1 superiority" over the Soviet Union. From the arms control point of view, "so long as there was substantial doubt that the Soviets were deploying an ABM, it was easy to argue that a U.S. deployment would be destabilizing and a bad example for the Russians." News of the recent Soviet moves toward ABM deployment have not appreciably changed opinions on either side of the argument. Those who are pushing for U.S. deployment had their arguments reinforced; those not in favor of such a move still think it unwise. With the coming presidential campaign a lively debate can be expected, for Republicans such as those on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee "suspect the administration of being more interested in avoiding an arms race than in the 'aggressive pursuit of advanced weapons development, such as the antiballistic missile system or the advanced manned strategic aircraft.'"

666
Champeau, Commandant. [DEFENSE PROBLEMS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Les problèmes de défense de la République fédérale d'Allemagne.

Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Nov. 1966: 1760-1773. D410.R45, v. 22

The recent French initiative concerning NATO disclosed the latent perennial discrepancies between the French and the West German defense conceptions. The discrepancies include the evaluation of the menace, the necessity of integration within NATO, the interpretations of deterrence, and the German participation in nuclear strategy. Yet a Franco-German friendship is vitally important for both countries as well as for the future of Europe. If thoroughly studied Germany's position appears to be coherent, permanent, and well integrated into a broader concept covering its future. In the absence of a possibility of building up their own defense, the Germans favor integration within NATO. Furthermore, deeply worried about the security of their country and not wanting to become a battlefield in any future war, they emphasize deterrence and reject the "flexible response" concept. Unable to influence the supreme decision on the use of nuclear weapons, they demand equal participation in the allied nuclear force. In politics they favor an integrated European community and visualize a unification of Germany under the condition that the East Germans will be permitted to freely choose their form of government. They want to postpone the resolution of vital problems such as territories, boundaries, minorities, etc. to some later, more opportune time. Because of the Soviet position the Germans do not expect reunification in the foreseeable future. This German attitude creates a serious situation, for if Germany is not given some kind of political compensation, discrimination against it in strategic matters cannot be justified much longer. On the other hand the Soviet Union should carefully ponder the situation and moderate its intransigence. If, unfortunately, West Germany should be rejected from the European community it seems to favor, it might be forced by circumstances to seek the achievement of vital objectives by its own means. Presently West Germany, aware of the necessity of détente, tries to contact the East European countries in cultural, economic, and technological fields. This may be the most secure path to a united Europe. But nobody can be certain that some purely nationalistic temptations were not motivating the recent German action.

667

Charisius, Albrecht. [THE ESSENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF "TOTAL DEFENSE" AS AN ELEMENT OF THE WEST GERMAN WAR DOCTRINE] Wesen und Entwicklung der Theorie von der "Gesamtverteidigung" als Bestandteil der westdeutschen Kriegsdoktrin. Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, v. 5, no. 6, 1966: 704-717. P&GP RR

Bibliographical footnotes.

Seeks to explain that the German Federal Republic's theory of "total defense," a component of its general strategic doctrine that has been integrated into NATO strategy, is designed to prepare West Germany for launching military aggression against the German Democratic Republic and "other European Socialist states." Charisius describes in considerable detail the evolution of that strategy to its present form.

668

CHINA: ITS MISSILE HAS IMPACT, BUT ITS ARSENAL WILL BE SLOW TO GROW. Space/aeronautics, v. 46, Dec. 1966: 24-25, 27. TL501.A786, v. 46

Surprised by the Chinese Communist test of a nuclear-tipped guided missile, the United States was able to ascertain by radar only that it was a ballistic missile and not an air-breather. "The West must accept for the moment Chinese claims that the bomb was on the missile, and not just lying on the Lop Nor salt beds timed to go off when the missile arrived." The question remains whether China's missile threat represents a real threat and not just a "paper tiger." The United States does not intend to deploy an anti-missile defense system against missiles from the East. The Soviet Union, however, is increasing its surveillance and troop strength along the Sino-Soviet border. How does one assess the impact of this present development? By determining just what can be expected of China's economic and industrial base. Despite the Soviet cancellation of its industrial and scientific aid projects, the lack of significant Chinese headway in economy or industry since 1957, and the fact that its gross national product is only $70 billion, Communist China is determined to become a major nuclear power. While ignoring its nation's other needs, China has directed all its energy into the nuclear weapons industry. China's nuclear accomplishments are impressive. It is producing twice as much enriched uranium as is being consumed in its nuclear tests, and its thermonuclear-weapons development program is comparable to that of France. U.S. observers, however, feel that the necessary delivery system is lagging far behind, mainly because China has neglected the basic industries needed to produce missile and aircraft components. China does produce jet engines and some aircraft and is good at copying the designs of outdated Soviet missiles. Even so, Western observers feel China is in for grave times. "China can only hope to keep her economy and her people intact long enough to develop the international clout so desperately desired. For the United States and the West, and for the Soviet Union, the hope is that China will have to turn her attentions inward before too many missiles are pointed outward."

669

Chou, En-lai. PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI ON CHINA'S THIRD NUCLEAR TEST. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Communist China digest, no. 173, Aug. 22, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,161) p. 117-118. P&GP RR

"CSO: 3503-D."
"Peiping, NCNA-English, 10 May 1966."

Excerpts from the Chinese Premier's speech at a banquet hosted by the Albanian Party and Government Delegation. "Our sole purpose in developing nuclear weapons is defense, and our ultimate aim is the elimination of nuclear weapons," Chou emphasizes. Present nonproliferation treaty proposals are merely attempts by U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists to maintain their nuclear duopoly and world domination. Under these circumstances China has no choice but to develop nuclear weapons.

670

CIVIL DEFENSE AND DOSAAF. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 53 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translation no. 340) P&GP RR

"JPRS: 38,286."
"CSO: 1850-D."

Articles from Soviet periodicals concerning civil defense and the association of volunteers for coopera-

tion with the Armed Forces [DOSAAF]. Subjects covered range from training of young people in civil defense through veterinary treatment and fire-fighting at oil fields.

671
Combaux, Edmond. DEBATE ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Orbis, v. 10, summer 1966: 360-389.
D839.O68, v. 10

Scenario for a debate on NATO's problems among a moderator, a philosopher, a "NATO man," a Frenchman, a European, an American, and a military engineer. During the course of the discussion they investigate NATO's rationale, the significance of the alliance in the affairs of participating countries, and the possibility that changes in the world and in the member states may demand a reorganization of the NATO structure. The simulated discussion ranges over the alliance's response to revolutionary movements in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America; the consequences of the ideological conflict; and the role of Atlantic alliance in the nuclear age.

672
CONGRATULATIONS ON CHINA'S SUCCESSFUL GUIDED MISSILE-NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST. Peking review, v. 9, Nov. 4, 1966: 24-26.
DS701.P42, v. 9

Statements from the leaders of several countries congratulating Communist China on the occasion of its test of a nuclear weapon carried by a guided missile. North Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh, Nguyen Huu Tho (President of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation), Jacques Grippa of the Belgian Communist Party, Cambodia's Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, and President Sekou Toure of the Republic of Guinea are among those quoted.

673
Däniker, Gustav. [STRATEGY OF A SMALL STATE: THE POLITICAL-MILITARY POSSIBILITIES OF SWITZERLAND HOLDING OUT ON ITS OWN IN THE NUCLEAR AGE] Strategie des Kleinstaats; politisch-militärische Möglichkeiten schweizerischer Selbstbehauptung im Atomzeitalter. Frauenfeld, Huber [1966] 230 p. diagrs., tables.
U163.D27

Contents.--A small state in the second half of the 20th century.--Threat in new dimensions.--The small state's answer.--An instrument of security.

Criticizes Switzerland's defense policy, which has relied on conventional defense. Däniker considers the nation's defense posture far too costly compared with its efficacy in the nuclear age. He weighs the pros and cons of Switzerland's either entering a defense alliance or embarking on a nuclear armaments program of its own. The author points out that the latter would best safeguard Switzerland's traditional independence.

674
DARE TO STRUGGLE AND BE GOOD AT STRUGGLE. Peking review, v. 9, Sept. 23, 1966: 27-28.
DS701.P42, v. 9

"In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Publication of Chairman Mao's Article 'Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One.'"

"Concentrate a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one" is a capsule version of Chairman Mao's concept of "tactically taking the enemy seriously." Chairman Mao's theories of liberation wars are in the great tradition of the Marxist-Leninist theses of strategy and tactics. These theories enabled the Party, the Army, and the people to achieve victory in the Chinese revolutionary struggles 20 years ago. The enemy of today must be despised strategically, but taken seriously tactically. In the first instance the enemy as a whole is seen as a paper tiger with which one wages a "tit-for-tat struggle." In the second instance it is better to wipe out one enemy division than to rout 10 divisions injuring them only partially. A revolutionary people should seek superiority in each campaign while overcoming initially inferior strategic positions. "Piecemeal annihilation" of the enemy until the revolutionary forces have attained superiority strategically is the "fundamental method of conquering the enemy and winning victories." This method can be applied to all struggle, military and political. Thus in following Chairman Mao's brilliant, illuminating theories, the Chinese peoples "are sure to defeat imperialism, modern revisionism, the reactionaries of all countries and all ghosts and monsters."

675
David, Heather M. U.S. DEFENSES SEEN SUFFERING FROM DOD COST REDUCTION. Technology week, v. 19, Sept. 19, 1966: 20.
UG630.M54, v. 19

Congressional charges that DOD cost-reduction programs are sometimes degrading combat potential center on the category called "Buying Only What We Need." The House Armed Services Special Investigations Subcommittee has claimed (although most of the evidence remains classified) that military capability has been damaged and that the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] is responsible for the pressures being exerted on the services to cut back. The subcommittee claims that OSD decisionmakers overrule military recommendations as "marginal." Pressure on OSD to meet designated savings quotas is probably one reason for cost-reduction decisions. The subcommittee cited several instances wherein savings were reputed to have occurred, when in fact they had not or were offset by subsequent expenditures. Nonprocurement of M-14 rifles for combat was cited as a saving at the cost of military capability. Cost reduction emphasis has been on ammunition provisions and spare parts, cuts in both of which could be serious. "Some of the claimed savings result from routine decisions ordinarily expected of management, the subcommittee said, and others have actually been made possible because practices which were grossly wasteful, or actual deficiencies in management, were discontinued." Also research and development projects that do not produce the expected results are chalked up as savings when the procurement end of the program is cancelled.

676
A DESPERATE PROPOSITION: RUSSIA SHOULD FIGHT NOW. Atlas, v. 12, Nov. 1966: 19-24.
APl.A83, v. 12

Reproduces bitter debate in the left-wing press that was touched off by Les Temps Modernes' recent editorial advocating active Soviet participation in the Vietnamese War. The editorial argued that the United

States is consciously risking world war while relying on China's unpreparedness and the split in the Communist camp. The Americans hope that by crushing the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam they can convince the world they will not tolerate such actions wherever they might occur. In this situation humanitarian and pacifist phrase-mongering is as nauseating as the praise for Gaullist strategy is idiotic, and the prudent wait-and-see policy becomes the tomb of any revolutionary movement. Such a policy only paves the way to further disasters. Since China's attempt to stop the Americans will presently be virtual suicide, the Soviet Union should draw a line and announce that it will promptly retaliate if it is crossed. The Soviets must risk a war before it is too late, otherwise they will bear the heavy responsibility for the destruction of liberation movements and revolutions in Asia and elsewhere. Les Temps' editorial provoked a sharp retort from Jean Daniel in Nouvel Observateur. It is irresponsible, said Daniel, to place such a tremendous burden on the Soviet Union when nobody can tell if the United States would be intimidated by the retaliation threat, and any further escalation might lead to a nuclear war. Presently preventing war and keeping alive the revolutionary idea is much more important than victory over the United States. Anyway, before next summer is over, Russian pilots and technicians will be active in North Vietnam. Why then recommend such drastic measures, when alarming the American people and creating dissension in the United States is the surest method of ending the Vietnamese War. The Communist l'Humanité warmly defended the official Soviet policy of nonintervention and self-control, while the Italian l'Espresso called the Soviet passivity "alarming and tragic," a simple return to the cold war policy. L'Espresso deplored the incompetence of the intellectual groups and the hypocrisy of politicians who try to conceal the fact that the Vietnamese War is only a stage in the old game the United States, Russia, and China are playing in Asia in which the goal is to "reconcile the class struggle with the politics of power, the people's right to self-determination with the necessity of avoiding a world war."

677
[DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT] Differences entre l'O.T.A.N. et le Pacte de Varsovie. Chronique de politique étrangère, v. 19, July 1966: 427-442. D839.C82, v. 19

The Warsaw Pact and NATO are essentially different in their origin, aims, and practice. NATO is an association of sovereign states, formed with their full consent, based on the democratically negotiated and ratified North Atlantic Treaty. In contrast the Warsaw Pact has been imposed on the East European countries by the Soviet Union without regard to their national interests. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 to stop the Soviet expansion; the Warsaw Pact, signed in 1955, was not a response to NATO, as many affirm, but a protest against the Paris agreements allowing West Germany to become a member of the West European Union and NATO. And while NATO is subordinated to civil authority, the Warsaw Pact is a purely military organization in which the Soviet Union plays a predominant role. Presently its coherence is mainly due to the East European countries' belief that the Pact safeguards their security. Important differences also prevail in the civil and military organization of the alliances. Because the Soviet Union presently pretends that the organizations are similar and must be admitted as equals to any disarmament negotiating body, these differences must be taken into account. Then it will become clear why the Soviet Union asks for a nonaggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. An examination of the results of the abolition of the two organizations, which also might be discussed, will clarify this request. While the abolition of NATO would deprive its members of a consultative and cooperative organization and loosen the ties between West Europe and the United States in defense matters, nothing like that will happen in Eastern Europe if the Warsaw Pact disappears. The bilateral mutual assistance treaties between the Soviet Union and its satellites will remain valid. If both organizations are abolished the Soviet Union will be able to preserve the present disposition of its armies. The West European countries, after the departure of U.S. forces, will be separated from the United States by the Atlantic Ocean, and their defense against Eastern Europe will become exceedingly difficult. These differences can be clearly seen from the following appended documents: the comparative texts of the alliance agreements, a table of the bilateral mutual assistance treaties between Warsaw Pact members, and an agreement on united command by the Warsaw Pact signatories.

678
Dutt, D. Som. THE DEFENCE OF INDIA'S NORTHERN BORDERS. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966. 11 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 25)
P&GP RR

Discusses the organization of Indian Armed Forces necessary to effectively defend the nation's northern border against Communist China. Dutt recommends a Himalayan Army: a specially trained, highly mobile, and lightly equipped infantry, specifically suited to the terrain in which they will fight.

679
Dutta, Satyabrata. SINO-AMERICAN CONFRONTATION. Modern review, v. 120, Oct. 1966: 307-310.
AP8.M6, v. 120

The strained relations between Communist China and the United States have reached "a peril point of no return." Many observers consider the steady escalation of the war in Vietnam, the military preparations in China, and the "fatal expectancy" of war in both nations to be the prelude to a catastrophic showdown. Although a spark may touch off a nuclear conflagration, strong deterrents limit the likelihood of such a development. Among scholars and some politicians in the United States the belief is gaining ground that settlement with China should be reached on the basis of political accommodation rather than military confrontation. While militarism exercises tremendous influence on American policy, U.S. leaders recognize limits on their decision to unleash war against China. In spite of recent Sino-Soviet ideological differences, the Soviet Union's nuclear power remains a direct check on U.S. policy. The Soviet desire to avoid war is genuine, but that nation could not passively witness the defeat of Communist China. In addition, Americans are beginning to recognize that containment cannot succeed in Asia as it may have against Soviet encroachment in Europe. Chinese policy also has limitations, in both its military capability and domestic capacity. A power-conscious America must concede the limitations of U.S. involvement; an ethnocentric China must exercise restraint and moderation in its international behavior. "It is safe to assert that

realism cannot envisage the possibility of an imminent confrontation between the two powers."

680
Evelegh, J. R. G. N. THE CONVENTIONAL DEMOLITION BELT IN NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, Nov. 1966: 328-329.
U1.R8, v. 111

Explores the potentialities of a conventional demolition belt in a nuclear confrontation. The belt is described as a zone running parallel with the frontier about a mile from the border and about ten miles deep, with natural and artificial obstacles which could be blown up. The charges would be permanently ready for firing and their arming and ignition would be governed from remote control points behind the belt. The belt would give to the defender the capacity to identify the size of the aggression, to deploy appropriate forces in time, and to respond immediately to any penetration. The obvious advantage of the demolition belt would be that the defender would be able to make an adequate nonnuclear response for some hours after a major enemy aggression had begun and this fact would enable the use of nuclear weapons not too soon, not too late, or not at all.

681
Feld, Bernard T. ON THE CHINESE SEPARATION TECHNOLOGY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Sept. 1966: 33-34.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Considering the difficulty of obtaining uranium-235 in amounts sufficient to produce U-235 bombs, much speculation followed the Chinese Communist nuclear weapons tests, for it was determined that the first bomb contained U-235. Many scientists were inclined to believe that the Chinese were "milking" the 2-percent enriched-uranium rods being processed in the Soviet-supplied reactor. "Although this rather comforting view of the Chinese nuclear capacity could still be maintained after the second Chinese explosion also turned out to be of a uranium-235 device, the most recent Chinese explosion must be taken as quite convincing evidence for an indigenous full-fledged uranium-235 separation facility." Using International Atomic Energy Agency figures on a French heavy-water-cooled reactor similar to the Soviet-supplied reactor in Peking, it is possible to determine that the uranium-235 content of the Peking reactor would probably have been exhausted in the first two tests. The third explosion was in excess of 200,000 tons of TNT--far greater than could have been achieved with the already depleted uranium supplies. Although part of this energy could have been supplied from other sources, the Chinese are obviously "in the business of separating uranium-235 on a large scale, and entirely on their own, thus rendering somewhat academic the argument about how they got started."

682
Féral, Bernard. [DO WE FACE AN EVOLUTION IN AMERICAN STRATEGY?] Vers une évolution de la stratégie américaine? Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Nov. 1966: 1727-1749.
D410.R45, v. 22

Many recent political, financial, and military factors seem to indicate that American strategists are considering a withdrawal of U.S. military forces and a progressive disengagement in Europe. The new American strategic concept, as interpreted by Secretary McNamara and Ambassador Cleveland at the July meeting of the NATO Council, is based on the presumption that the Soviet menace in Europe has lessened. Consequently the Americans regard as possible the limitation of any military operations in Europe to conventional arms, and plan to establish a larger margin between conventional and nuclear wars. Seemingly their ultimate goal consists in the raising of the "atomic threshold" and the restoration of the value of deterrence. In Asia the expensive Vietnamese War may be just a first step toward a new phase of U.S. Asian policy. Although the American strategic concept in Vietnam required only aeronaval action, U.S. forces have been drawn by unpredictable events ever deeper into ground operations. As maintaining U.S. forces on the territory of two foreign continents posed a problem, the American strategists were facing a difficult choice until President Johnson's recent declaration in favor of the Pacific area cleared the way. This declaration corresponds perfectly with the present general line of American policy, which, while seeking improvement of peaceful coexistence with Russia and a nonproliferation treaty, first tries to attain as a prerequisite a détente in Europe. Unfortunately, just at the moment when the United States seems to be ready for discussing these vital questions with the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese War prevents any agreements and is likely to do so for several years.

683
Fink, Donald E. NATO REBOUNDING FROM FRENCH EXIT: GROUP LOOKS AHEAD WITH CONFIDENCE AS MEMBER NATIONS PLEDGE FIVE-YEAR, $100-BILLION OUTLAYS TO IMPROVE JOINT DEFENSES. Aviation week & space technology, v. 85, Oct. 10, 1966: 26-27.
TL501.A8, v. 85

NATO officials claim that the Organization has weathered the impact of French withdrawal and that the remaining members intend to re-equip and modernize their forces. They have pledged total defense expenditures of $100 billion through 1971, with emphasis on improving NATO's military capability. "Equipment buys" are already pending for counterinsurgency/observation aircraft and matériel for the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment [NADGE] network and the NATO communications satellite system recently proposed by the United States. France's official attitude toward NATO, coupled with its desire to participate in specific aspects of the alliance such as NADGE, intelligence and technology, and perhaps satellite communications, leaves the NATO nations in a dilemma. They do not want to drive France out entirely, as her stand could easily change in a post-De Gaulle government. Loss of French airspace may affect NATO flight operations and enhance Spain's importance to the alliance. Military officials see NATO's general future as secure, although the size and structure of military forces will probably change in the coming years. Current commitments can be maintained with a reduced number of troops assigned to NATO if the firepower of the remaining forces is improved, or if the United States keeps strategic forces available for airlift across the Atlantic.

684
Fleming, D. F., ed. IF THE VIETNAMESE WAR ESCALATES INTO CHINA? Minority of one, v. 9, Dec. 5, 1966: 7-27.
AP2.M55985, v. 9

249-857 O - 67 - 4

Contents. --Policies propelling the United States toward an attack on China, by D. F. Fleming. --The military problems, risks, and prospects, by Arnold E. True. --China's responses, by Mark Mancall. --Soviet responses, by D. F. Fleming. --Consequences inside the United States, by John M. Swomley. --Alternatives to Pax Americana, by William Appleman Williams. --Some conclusions about our role in the world, by the guest editor.

Bitter criticism of the U.S. policy in Vietnam and a gloomy view of its consequences for the United States. The valiant North Vietnamese resistance and a fear of China's future nuclear power may induce the United States to escalate the Vietnamese War into China. The only reasonable alternative, drawing China from its isolationism into the world community, may not appeal to American leaders. The U.S. Government in its "messianic megalomania" may well engage the nation in a genocidal war with China. And if American rulers succeed in crushing all patriotic dissent in distant countries they will finally suppress it at home. The freedom of Americans is at stake in Vietnam.

685
Gellner, John. HALF AIRLINE--HALF WEAPON. Canadian aviation, v. 39, Nov. 1966: 32-33, 35. TK7800.E438, v. 39

Describes the problems and priorities Canada's Air Transport Command is encountering in its fulfillment of the White Paper on Defense (1964) directive to change "the main direction of the Canadian defense effort from the support of allies in the deterrence of the big (nuclear) war to the more modest--and more realistic--tasks of peace-keeping, peace-restoring, and small war operations." One of the biggest problems for the Air Transport Command is usefully employing aircraft and personnel for peacetime functions "without detracting from essential, specialized training for purely military tasks."

686
Getler, Michael. CHINESE MISSILE SHOT FORCING NIKE CHOICE. Technology week, v. 19, Nov. 7, 1966: 13-14. UG630.M54, v. 19

If a decision were made in 1967 to go into production of the Nike-X, a complete system could not be installed at least until late 1971 or even as late as the end of 1975, according to top-level military officers. Secretary of Defense McNamara has publicly announced that initial Chinese ICBM deployment is possible as early as 1975, but that the lead times for a Nike-X system to counter the Chinese threat are small enough to postpone a decision. A sizeable portion of the scientific community are concerned about this narrowing gap; they have voiced some doubt about the accuracy of estimates for Nike-X deployment and the pace of Chinese nuclear development, which has exceeded predictions in the past. Defense officials claim there is no evidence that the Chinese missile tested recently was an air-breathing cruise-type that could be launched from submarines, but they do not rule out Chinese deployment of such missiles in the future. To meet the Chinese threat interest is currently focusing on a thin-area antimissile defense over the entire United States. Interest is also being exhibited in an even lower-cost deployment option for the antimissile system, which would be used to protect and assure the destructive capability of a portion of the U.S. ICBM force. However, many question whether it is cheaper to defend or increase the quantity of such relatively inexpensive weapons as the Minuteman.

687
Gill, William J. WILL CHIANG COUNTERATTACK SOON? Washington report (American Security Council) Oct. 31, 1966: 1-4. P&GP RR

Chiang Kai-shek's renewed vows to return to the China mainland coupled with recent actions taken by his government may indicate a stiffening determination to attempt his long-promised Nationalist invasion of the mainland. At the annual observance of China's "Double Tenth" National Day in Taipei, and for several days before and after, Chiang rallied his people on the invasion issue, emphasizing widespread active opposition on the mainland to Mao's regime. Communist officials and soldiers who join the Nationalists, he proclaimed, will be awarded "according to merits," incorporated into the national Armed Forces, and there accorded equal treatment. Chiang's highly-trained Armed Forces may well be in a position to conduct a successful invasion, particularly if joined by dissident mainlanders. The Nationalists assume a great risk without an American nuclear guarantee to counter Mao's nuclear threat against Taiwan, but they may decide there is even greater risk in delaying while Mao's strength grows. If Chiang decides he cannot wait any longer, not only Asia but the rest of the free world will anxiously watch to see how far the United States is willing to go to support a loyal ally.

688
Gomane, Jean-Pierre. [CHINA AND WAR] La Chine et la guerre. Études, Dec. 1966: 647-668. AP20.E8, 1966

Traditional China had established its civilization on peaceful conceptions. Its wars were essentially defensive. Only after the Communist revolution did China take over the mission of destroying imperialism and spreading communism throughout the world. Now in global perspective China sees war as one of the instruments for attaining its goal. The Chinese menace is reflected in the country's "direct" (military), "indirect" (political), and nuclear strategy. Presently China maintains a formidable conventional army, well equipped and trained in guerrilla warfare, which can be successfully used within its territory. On the other hand, as long as the Chinese lack of efficient transportation affects the mobility of its Army, and its Navy and Air Force are insufficient and need improvement, it cannot wage a war abroad except in closely adjacent countries. In the field of indirect strategy China uses ideological and economic means to spread communism in the underdeveloped countries and win over the East European countries to the Chinese version of communism. Although originally successful in the third world, its inability to satisfy the economic needs of these countries and the competition with the Soviet Union after the Sino-Soviet break eventually rendered its attempts rather ineffective. Undoubtedly during recent years China's explosion of its nuclear bombs has greatly improved its strategic position. Today China is able to threaten Japan, India, and the whole of Soviet Asia. Of course, these countries are sufficiently protected against a Chinese attack by American and Russian nuclear power respectively. In the future, when China develops its intercontinental ballistic missiles, the world balance will probably depend on Moscow-Peking relations and the development of interception means. But even then only a Sino-Soviet alliance would permit total deterrence against attack by

the United States. In the meantime China, in its isolation and free of the obligations of U.N. membership, is likely to concentrate on spreading communism throughout the world by indirect means. But if its nuclear power grows substantially it also might risk, not because of Marxist messianism but purely for emotional reasons, an attempt to conquer the world for which it basically feels only indifference and contempt.

689
Green, Philip. DEADLY LOGIC; THE THEORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. [Columbus] Ohio State University Press [1966] 361 p.
U162.6.G7

"A publication of the social science program in national security of the Mershon Center."
Bibliographic note: p. 327-344.

Deterrence theorists have presented nuclear deterrence to the American public as an acceptable alternative to either accepting communism or pursuing an aggressive policy that will lead to war. They have fostered the idea that somehow their work is more "scientific," rigorous, and reliable than previous national-security analysis. One of the most important instruments they have used for this end is systems analysis, represented admirably by Herman Kahn's work. Its significance for arms policymaking has been enormous, but it is frequently founded on undocumented and arbitrary assumptions and in actuality tells absolutely nothing about the likely consequences of probable nuclear wars. His analysis is neither objective nor scientific, and his conclusions, although in some instances valid, do not even follow logically from his highly impeachable data. "Scientific" analyses of deterrence have also been promulgated under the rubric of formal game theory. For the deterrence theorists gaming provided a "minimax" strategy--defining one's best course of action in terms of the worst that one's opponent can do, and implying a highly conservative defense posture. Game theory necessitates the quantification of utilities, at best a specious process in the realm of international politics. Threats and bargains have been studied in the laboratory, giving rise to yet another school of deterrence theory. But all such studies depend on "an asymmetrical evaluation of the world in which behavior that is reasonable and even educational when done by us is offensive saber rattling when done by our opponents." Rationality of decision-makers--choosing correctly--is the crucial assumption in most deterrence theory. Yet it is "rationality" that pushes the arms race into an upward spiral, that eschews international cooperation and disarmament, and that refuses to make a choice between "peace" and "honor." It requires near-perfect information, something almost impossible to obtain. It requires consistent sets of national goals, and the United States lacks even those. The concept of rationality, in fact, offers no guidelines for choosing among alternative policies. Deterrence theory is not merely poor theory; worse still it is not, as claimed, based on ethically neutral precepts. Military conflict between communism and the West is taken for granted. No form of conflict is absolutely prohibited; the theory treats all violence and destruction as qualitatively equivalent; it blurs the moral distinctions between weapons and targets; it cloaks the commitment to destroying foreign populations in a morally neutral guise; it subordinates all political choices to military ones; it is culture-bound; and it expresses an "antipopular political bias." "Rationality" implies necessity; yet ethically "nothing has to be done unless we desire to do it." In sum, policy decisions of the magnitude of deterrence must be based on political judgments, not on unassessed assumptions. The deterrence theorists have somehow imagined that meaningful statements cannot but be couched in the language of science, despite the fact that supportive evidence exists for only a very few nontrivial social science propositions. The constant "false references to a workable theory (or theories) of strategy" have harmed public debate and are coming to replace all other approaches. The deterrence theorists constitute an elite, the exclusiveness of which serves only to narrow the channels through which policy flows. As such they undermine even the democratic political process.

690
Harkness, Douglas S. THE DEFENCE OF THE FREE WORLD:--CANADA'S ROLE. Canada month, v. 6, Dec. 1966: 10-12. F1001.C1623, v. 6

Asserts that Canada's commitments in support of the U.N., NATO, and NORAD should not be diminished. In this appraisal of Canada's defense policy, Harkness points out that Canada's inability to meet its assigned roles within NATO and NORAD seriously undermines the defense capability of both Canada and the Free World. Canada's role in U.N. peacekeeping operations should constitute one of the main features of Canadian defense policy. For Canada to meet the requirements of its several roles, its Armed Forces must be well equipped and trained to meet both national and international obligations.

691
IS SOVIET ARMS RACE STARTING AGAIN? RUSSIANS' ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEM RAISES PENTAGON FEARS THE U.S. MAY LOSE ITS ADVANTAGES. Business week, no. 1942, Nov. 19, 1966: 38-40.
HC431.B87, 1966

The arms race has been "cooling" for the past 5 years, but two recent top-level announcements--Russia's decision to deploy an antimissile system and President Johnson's decision to produce the Poseidon missile--may show it "warming up" again. Military tensions have not imperiled the thaw in political relations to date. The political thaw has not been strong enough, however, to change military plans on either side. Already presidential hopefuls are sounding the cry of "defense gap" reminiscent of the missile gap charges in 1960. The United States has 1,054 land-based strategic missiles and 656 on submarines compared with the Soviets 300 and 150. Current U.S. plans call for upgrading missile quality rather than quantity. During this period defense planners expect the Soviets to narrow the gap somewhat, but apparently not as rapidly as is occurring. The Soviet Union appears intent on achieving parity with the United States in destructive force of warheads, if not in actual missile numbers. If the Soviets deploy a missile defense as well, the nuclear balance is in danger of tipping. Both Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have urged Secretary of Defense McNamara to start Nike X production, but McNamara prefers to overwhelm and confuse the Russians with offensive strategy. He favors production of Poseidon, development of "penetration aids," research on a new manned bomber faster than the B-52 that would carry nuclear-tipped air-to-ground missiles, and a new generation of intercontinental missiles. President Johnson leans toward McNamara's view, but political pressures may cause him to consider a thin missile-defense aimed initially at deterring China.

692
JSP ADOPTED SECURITY POLICY. Japan Socialist review, no. 117, Oct. 1, 1966: 6-21.
HX9.J3, 1966

The platform on security policy adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the Japanese Socialist Party [JSP] in August 1966. The JSP begins with a criticism of current policy and a warning against Japan's probable involvement in the tensions of Asia. In order to secure the peace, it exhorts, Japan must take the following steps: (1) scrap the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty and secure positive neutrality; (2) work toward diplomatic normalization with all nations including China, Korea, and the Soviet Union; (3) disband its national self-defense forces; (4) promote economic and technical cooperation with Socialist and developing nations, implemented by a "Peaceful Coprosperity Corps"; and (5) work for establishment of U.N. peacekeeping capability.

693
Joffe, Ellis. PARTY AND ARMY: PROFESSIONALISM AND POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE CHINESE OFFICER CORPS, 1949-1964. Cambridge, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard University Press, 1965. 198 p. (Harvard East Asian monographs, 19)
UA835.J6
Bibliography: p. 183-195.

Examines the relationship between the Party leadership and the officer corps in Communist China, focusing on the clash between the demands of an emerging military professionalism on one side and the need for political control on the other. Joffe concludes that although the issues dividing the party leadership and professional officers have been resolved for the present, the roots of tension still exist and could lead to stormy army-party relations in the future.

694
Johnson, Max S. A MILITARY MAN SIZES UP EUROPE'S DEFENSES. U.S. news & world report, v. 61, Nov. 14, 1966: 60-62, 64.
JK1.U65, v. 61

NATO's dilemma today is its quest to maintain an effective defense while taking the easing of tensions "at something like face value" and attempting to draw closer to the Soviet bloc. Since European military experts assume that any war with the Soviet Union would quickly become nuclear they recognize no adequate defense other than nuclear defense of Europe. Conventional war is dismissed by them as out of the question. Political problems, too, are rife, as all of the NATO nations are squabbling among themselves over external trade, internal trade, costs, etc. If NATO is to be saved a common purpose must be found. France is necessary to European defense and must be brought back into the alliance. The admission of Spain would further strengthen NATO's defense lines. The recent French withdrawal, added to the other problems that plague the American presence in Europe, has tended to weaken the determination of the United States to shore up NATO; yet Europe's perception of American discouragement serves only to exacerbate "the tendency in Europe to ease up on NATO obligations." If the United States did withdraw from Europe, that continent would in effect have no alternative, in the event of Soviet aggression, but compromise. Without heavy U.S. participation, West Germany would bear the burden of European defense, and most likely Bonn would conclude it could not maintain this burden. France's abandonment of NATO has in many ways harmed much more than it has helped, both directly, in the military realm, and indirectly, in logistics factors. Emphases in defense planning will inevitably shift, just as they have shifted in the past from "strategic nuclear war to limited war, sublimited war, conventional war and now to a new enigma: tactical nuclear war." With the probability of war a new low, solutions to the alliance's hard questions will be increasingly difficult to find "without the territory and the military forces of France."

695
JOHNSON'S BAD LUCK. Peking review, v. 9, Nov. 11, 1966: 27. DS701.P42, v. 9
From Jen min jih pao, November 3, 1966.
Chi Kor

Describes Communist China's reactions to President Johnson's comments on its latest nuclear weapons test. The Chinese contend that President Johnson scheduled his Asian trip in October to avoid being in the Far East for an anticipated November nuclear test. Johnson found it a "tragic fact" that China's lack of concern for its people's well being is demonstrated in continued nuclear development. The Chinese are not afraid of U.S. imperialism or the policy of containment and will continue to grow stronger militarily. According to Johnson, China's test will have adverse effects on efforts to attain a nonproliferation treaty. Actually, "U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist leading group are frenziedly trying to strike a big bargain over nuclear non-proliferation by means of which they hope to perpetuate their nuclear monopoly."

696
Kashin, Alexander. THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE IN ASIA. Studies on the Soviet Union, n.s., v. 5, no. 3, 1966: 1-10. DK1.S75, n.s., v. 5

All facets of Sino-Soviet relations reflect their deep rift. The U.S.S.R. blocked China's probe to make a satellite of India, without which China saw little hope of becoming a world power, then further frustrated China's ambitions in Asia and Africa. Chinese influence in Asia was first set back by the wreckage of the Sino-Indonesian alliance consequent to the Communist failure to seize power in Indonesia. The second blow lay in the Algerian conference where China's aggressive stance alienated its friends. Chinese attempts to exclude Soviet participation offended the Communist and non-Communist delegations, which did not object to economic aid from both "Western imperialists" and "communist revisionists." Chou En-lai's "revolutionary situation" in Africa, which was to serve as Peking's leadership of the non-white nations, was largely a product of Chinese wishful thinking. Not long after Algiers China suffered another defeat in the international sphere. This came about in 1966 when adroit Soviet diplomacy mediated the Indo-Pakistani conflict and won international recognition of the Soviet Union's right to concern itself with Asian affairs. The Soviets' cautious tactics established in the eyes of most Asian and African leaders an image of a force working for peace and stability, ready to help national liberation struggles but anxious to avoid a direct confrontation with the West. Peking's rigid foreign policy thus paved the way for new Soviet penetration in Asia. Vietnam, however, may prove the Achilles' heel of the Soviet Asian policy. The Chinese,

by obstructing the overland flow of Soviet aid to Vietnam, hope for marine transport and a retaliatory U.S. naval blockade before which the Soviets will make an ignominious retreat, thereby revealing their "revisionist, capitulatory" nature before the world. Alternatively they hope such a move would force the Soviets into war. Whatever the outcome China stands to gain.

697
Kennedy, Donald E. THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN ASIA. New York, Praeger [1965] 308 p. (Studies in international security, 8)
UA830.K4

Contents. --China and the Asian balance. --The external powers: national interests in Southern Asia. --The Southern Asian countries: policies and potentials. --The threat of Communist subversion. --Internal defence and external assistance. --High level violence in Southern Asia. --An indigenous defence system. --Index. --Maps.

Questions whether defense cooperation between countries of Southern Asia and other countries can grow most easily out of formal political collaboration, or whether military planning for future conflict must precede the development of an Asian political climate that favors such commitments. Kennedy gives particular attention to collective and bilateral security arrangements and their evolution in a post-colonial world.

698
Klefisch, J. W. [SOVIET STRATEGY] Sowjetische Strategie. Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung, no. 11, Nov. 1966: 336-341.
P&GP RR

The postwar history of the Soviet Union's military posture proves how greatly that nation's strategy and armaments have been influenced by what Moscow has perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the West's intentions toward the Soviet Union. America immediately after the war undertook an "enormous production of aircraft and nuclear weapons" based on its fear of Soviet aggressive plans toward West Europe. Moscow's suspicions of Washington's intentions were reinforced by the American requests made at the 1946-50 disarmament sessions of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. The Americans made it clear that only after the Soviet Union put its research, development, and heavy industry under foreign, penetrating control would the United States be ready to renounce its atomic bombs. To the Soviets, who view their own secrecy as an essential element of power, assent to that requirement would have meant paving the way to American domination of the world. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 enhanced the excitement of the arms race, with the resultant military alliances and the mutual increase of conventional forces in Europe--the increase was, of course, first engendered by the new vulnerability of the American nuclear umbrella over West Europe. Consecutive changes in the role assigned to the West's conventional forces brought about corresponding changes in Soviet military planning. Until the establishment of the nuclear balance of power in the mid-fifties the Stalinist doctrine of "active defense" was in force in the Soviet Union. It provided for deep retreats by one's own forces and for sabotage action against the enemy's rear. The Soviet's only defense against American nuclear attack was the satellite states' airspace. Afraid to provoke war against itself, Moscow manifested passivity in supporting Communist revolutions outside the fixed boundaries of the Soviet bloc, a trait for which it has since been indicted by Peking. With the establishment of the nuclear balance of power Soviet strategy has undergone radical changes. Some of them are referred to in Soviet military literature in a most oblique manner due to their seeming contradiction of Communist dogmas. The most fundamental change so treated is the acceptance by Moscow of the U.S.-Soviet balance of power as a basis of Soviet security. Trimmed of its semantic ballast Vasilii D. Sokolovskii's book Military Strategy seems to base world peace on a kind of American-Soviet "companionship of goldminers," i.e. partners who do not exclude the possibility that one day one of them may grab everything, but until then consider defense against any outside intrusion their common concern. That common concern in the Soviet view consists of the prevention of nuclear proliferation, suppression of wars between second-class powers, and--as far as the world strategic and political situation permits--non-intervention in the affairs of other nations. The overall analysis of contemporary Soviet strategic writings indicates that the Soviet Union is really interested in the American plan of arms control and in securing a permanent peace.

699
Klönne, Arno. [ON THE SITUATION OF EUROPEAN AND GERMAN POLICY] Zur Situation der Europa- und Deutschlandpolitik. WH; Werkhefte, v. 20, Nov. 1966: 349-355. P&GP RR

The present NATO crisis is a natural result of the far-reaching political and strategic changes that have taken place since the German Federal Republic was incorporated into the alliance. NATO's original raison d'être--to "roll back" the Soviet sphere of influence from Germany and East Europe--became unrealistic after the Soviet Union acquired nuclear attack capability against U.S. territory. Despite that, Bonn alone among the Western allies, has continued the policy based on the premise that West European and German military strength, including nuclear forces, would finally "roll back" the Soviet Union. This strategic doctrine has failed to take into account that in a highly industrialized environment such as Europe any "localization" of a military conflict would be impossible. The trend toward East-West détente in Europe has resulted in growing disparity between the Western allies' and West Germany's foreign policies. The rift deepens the more the German Federal Republic strives for nuclear status and hopes to incorporate East Germany into its own political system.

700
Kosygin, Aleksei N. TO LIVE IN PEACE, TO DEVELOP COOPERATION. Daily review; translations from the Soviet press, v. 12, Dec. 6, 1966: section 4, 1-11.
Slav Rm

Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Aleksei Kosygin's comments at a press conference in Paris, Dec. 3, 1966. Kosygin expressed his views on a number of topics including European security, the problem of Germany, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Soviet-American relations, the Vietnamese War, and Chinese policy.

701
Krasil'nikov, A. N. [POLITICO-MILITARY DOCTRINES OF BRITISH RULING CIRCLES SINCE WORLD WAR II]

Voenno-politicheskie doktriny praviashchikh krugov Anglii posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Voprosy istorii, v. 41, Aug. 1966: 62-76. D1.V6, v. 41

The article analyzes the specific features of the military-political doctrines and conceptions of the ruling circles of Britain from 1945 to our days. Showing the utter groundlessness of bourgeois leaders' assertions that the Soviet Union's aggressive post-war policy was allegedly responsible for the appearance of such doctrines, the author reveals the real causes that prompted the emergence and continuous replacement of these military-political doctrines in adaptation to the changed alignment of world forces. The author convincingly shows that their principal aim is to enable Britain to assume the role of the second leading power of the capitalist world after the United States. The article cites abundant data to show that Britain's aim in aspiring to the role of the second great military power is not to uphold universal peace, but to defend her imperialist, colonialist interests, to suppress the mounting national-liberation movement, to fight the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. (Abstract supplied)

702

Labrousse, H. [BETWEEN SUEZ AND SINGAPORE] Entre Suez et Singapour. Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, Jan. 1967: 79-87.
D410.R45, v. 23

The situation in the Indian Ocean continues to be unstable and disquieting. The war in Yemen goes on, and tension prevails in Aden even after Great Britain's decision to evacuate the bases. There is unrest in Djibouti, the Chinese pressure manifests itself on Africa's eastern shore, and a rivalry has grown up between Somalia and Ethiopia. The civil war still rages in Indonesia, latent conflict exists between China and Pakistan, and of course there is the war in Vietnam. The development of the Chinese bomb only augmented the pressure and rendered more threatening the Chinese will to expand. In view of this situation the Americans and the British worked out a new strategy for the Indian Ocean area, the conception and form of which are entirely original. Liberated from the continental ties and inconvenience of military bases in foreign countries, the new strategy will use ocean spaces of nuclear-age dimensions. Based on mobile, aeronaval, secret, and efficient means; located on islands easy to guard and defend; using powerful means of communication and satellite control; this new strategy inaugurates a new era in the use of deterrence. It is adapted to the encirclement of the Asian continent by enormous Anglo-American power and will represent the most efficient protection for the Asian and African people and the best "containment" of Communist China. If the United States and Britain can solve decisionmaking problems concerning the use of nuclear power, and a new formula is invented permitting the protected states to subscribe to this security loan without becoming satellites or losing their apparent neutrality, the new strategy with its deterrence power will be the best instrument yet applied to the task of preserving peace.

703

Lacouture, Jean. [VIETNAM BETWEEN TWO PERIODS OF PEACE.] Le Vietnam entre deux paix. Paris, Éditions du Seuil [1965] 269 p. (L'Histoire immédiate)
DS557.A5L23

Contents.--Introduction, by Philippe Devillers.--The two edges of a wound.--How to restore a war.--The end of Ngo.--The quadrille of the generals.--The helicopter and the knife.--Peace at Colin-Maillard.--Escalation toward what?

A "Vietnamese mosaic" composed mostly of articles published in Le Monde during the period between 1959 and 1965, unpublished travel notes, studies, and syntheses. Lacouture recommends a political regulation of the Vietnamese conflict on three levels: between the Government and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam in order to establish a government expressing the real balance of forces; between Saigon and Hanoi; and between the great powers themselves in order to establish a nonaggression pact (the key to appeasement in Vietnam) and guarantee the independence of the Vietnamese states.

704

Legault, Albert. ATOMIC WEAPONS FOR GERMANY? International journal, v. 21, autumn 1966: 447-469.
D839.I5, v. 21

Final burial of the multilateral nuclear force, reinforced by French withdrawal from NATO, leaves West Germany no alternative to "joining the concert of its allies and striving for closer understanding with the countries of Eastern Europe." This point was emphasized by De Gaulle's visit to Moscow last July, where the intention of inducing Germany to abstain from nuclear weapons possession indefinitely provided France and the Soviet Union with a common ground. However the opportunity for solving the German problem in other nations' interest has disappeared; the solution must come from a powerful Germany no longer subject to alien dictates. France's activities only add to German fears that the allies will come to terms with the Soviet Union privately on matters of German concern. Germany resents her inability to enjoy the same liberty as other Western allies in developing nuclear weapons, and the minor status in which they propose that she remain. She feels deprived of weapons indispensable to her security and politically essential for her rehabilitation in the European community. In addition political and psychological motives induce Bonn to seek a more powerful voice in Western atomic strategy. Most of the solutions advanced to resolve the German problem have aimed not at restoration of freedom of action but at permanent renunciation of nuclear weapons. This is true of the proposals for denuclearization of Europe, political union of Europe, and German reunification. Two future courses are open to NATO: first, the peacetime coordination of French, British, and U.S. strategic forces in preparation for employment in war; second, establishment of two coordinated command structures, one strategic and the other tactical. Within the tactical command structure Germany could play the principal role. While not entrusting that nation with nuclear weapons, this plan at least would allocate responsibilities most relevant to Germany's immediate interests. Nuclear armament of Germany would not thwart its reunification as many would like to claim. Should Germany choose the way of "nuclear independence, not the allies, not the United States, not the Soviet Union will be able to prevent it."

705

Leont'ev, A. FOREIGN BASES IN THE THIRD WORLD. New times, no. 49, Dec. 7, 1966: 6-9.
D839.N483, 1966

Although the map of the world has changed since World War II, the Western powers' military bases

remain where they were and new ones have been added. The biggest base owner is Washington. It is committed to defend 42 countries, provides military aid to many more, and maintains over 2,200 military installations on foreign soil, of which 428 are complete bases, missile launching sites, airfields, or naval port facilities. More than a million U.S. servicemen, "nuclear and missile weapons," aircraft and other military hardware are stationed abroad. Since missiles based on U.S. soil can reach any point on the globe, against whom is the United States securing itself thousands of miles from home? Dean Rusk's "concern doctrine" does not explain who asked the United States to concern itself with the whole world. A mounting disquiet pervades Asia, Africa, and Latin America over the U.S. bases. Dismantling them is urgently necessary if the struggle against colonialism is to be ended and independence of the developing countries safeguarded. That is why the Soviet Union's tabled resolution in the General Assembly for removing foreign military bases from the developing continents has met with support throughout the world. There is no doubt that closing these bases will deprive the host countries of certain revenues but the loss will be only temporary. The experience of the United Arab Republic and Tunisia testifies to that. Moreover the elimination of foreign bases would restore the security of the host countries and their neighbors, remove a central cause of international tensions, and diminish the danger of world war.

706
Lih, Kun-hou. THE NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL OF COMMUNIST CHINA. [Taipei, Taiwan] Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Republic of China, 1965. 46 p. (Publications of the APACLROC. Pamphlets, 94) DS740.4.L457

Contents. --A Soviet Russia supported atrocious act. --Two explosions provoked world condemnation. --Nuclear tests do not signify scientific progress. --Cruel exploitation and utmost brutality. --Ever-expanding aggression threatens the world. --Contravention of the Chinese people's peace-loving nature. --The male-factors disturbing the world peace must be first done away with.

Condemns Communist China's nuclear weapons development and concludes that the Chinese mainland should be bombed to demolish the nuclear bases and to destroy the despotic regime. "Those two measures should prevent a nuclear world war, and it is a right course for the protection of human freedom and peace."

707
London. Institute for Strategic Studies. THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1966-1967. London, 1966. 48 p. tables. UA15.L65, 1966-1967

Eighth of the Institute's annual assessments of the military forces of the principal powers. Figures as of August 1966 that indicate the size and nature of the regular Armed Forces of the Communist and Western powers are given. Although the document does not project force levels or weapons beyond 1967 or "reflect the facts of geography, vulnerability, efficiency, etc., on either side," it may "be found useful in the context of discussions on strategy and disarmament." Part One gives figures for individual Communist nations, Part Two the Western alliances, and Part Three the nonalined countries. The figures for an individual country are often broken down by branches of services, and wherever possible cover new developments or improvements in weapon systems. Appended are tables showing estimates of comparative strategic strengths, major nuclear delivery systems, comparisons of defense expenditures in NATO countries, defence expenditures as a burden on national economies, defense budget comparisons for two nuclear powers, and functional breakdown by manpower for four nuclear powers.

708
London. Institute for Strategic Studies. SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. London, 1966. 44 p. (Its Adelphi papers, no. 26) P&GP RR

Contents. --Introduction. --The Middle Eastern interests of outside powers. --The principal interests of Middle East states. --Interests in conflict and at risk. --The competition for influence. --Oil. --Military bases, defence commitments and strategic routes. --Regional rivalries. --The Arab-Israel dispute.

A study of Middle Eastern conflict, based to a large extent on papers presented to the Seventh Annual Conference of the Institute for Strategic Studies, held in Oct. 1965 under the chairmanship of Raymond Aron. The study is limited to conflicts involving the use or potential use of armed force as opposed to social or economic conflict without threat of military action.

709
Long, J. F. L. SHIFTS IN RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC POSTURE. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 6, winter 1966: 297-302. UG635.G7 A1252, v. 6

Recent remarks by Soviet leaders have given hints of new directions in strategic thinking. The pressure under which the Soviet political leaders operate can be seen most plainly in an article published in April 1966 in the magazine Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil. In this article the authors, former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sokolovskii and Major-General Cherednichenko, present a vigorous case for imbuing Russia's military with the degree of combat readiness achieved by the United States and its NATO allies. Although the authors seem to accept the Warsaw Pact view that the readiness of the Socialist States to respond to a Western attack will deter aggression, they do not seem willing to rely on it. They seem far from convinced that the Soviet Union "is really in a position to withstand the first nuclear blow, retaliate, and win." Of special interest is the authors' forthright adoption of the view that the primary objective in a nuclear war is the destruction of the enemy's economic strength, its state administration, and its armed forces. Interesting also is their opinion that although a general war might be a long one, the contingency that one side would try to destroy the other in the shortest possible time must be envisaged and planned for. Therefore, they assert, the Soviet armed forces must henceforth be ready to deal with a possible space-air surprise attack which aims to defeat the Soviet Union in the very first moment of the war. Sokolovskii and Cherednichenko "make it clear beyond doubt that the Russian response should either be a nuclear counter-attack or a pre-emptive blow." Lately Russia has decided upon the upgrading of its naval power. The "Blue Belt" cryptically announced by Marshal Malinovskii might well be the "N" type torpedo-attack fleet to be used as an essential counter-measure to the U.S.

Polaris. The Soviets apparently have also found an answer to the vital question of maintaining uninterrupted contact with submarines at great depths but, unlike the United States, have not yet developed a worldwide control system. They also can maintain secure communications with troops in the field, tanks, and aircraft. Finally the Soviet development in the Mediterranean area suggests an expansion of the Soviet "Marine Corps." This development includes the modernization and re-equipment of airborne forces, the search for staging platforms in the Middle East and Africa, and the recently reported employment of in-flight refueling techniques for delivering short-range MiG 21 fighters to Egypt.

710
Mendershausen, Horst. UNREST AND COHESION IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: NATO AND THE GERMAN QUESTION. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1966. 39 p. ([Rand Corporation. Research] memorandum RM-4936-PR) Q180.A1R36, no. 4936
Bibliographical footnotes.

Discussion of unrest in the Atlantic Alliance. The current difficulties are seen as part of a traditional tension within NATO, not as result of the détente between USSR and the West. Two key factors explain the continuing unrest in the Alliance: (1) the high degree of institutionalization of the military pact in peacetime, and (2) the deep involvement of the Alliance with the unfinished business of World War II, divided Germany. These two elements also explain the cohesion of the Alliance. The author details the reasons for this paradox and shows why the Alliance has not outlived its usefulness. Included in the discussion are the indispensable role of NATO as a regional peace system, the complex political problems of such a system, and the confusion created by juxtaposing peace-oriented political management and war-oriented military posture when there is no acute conflict between USSR and the Alliance. (Abstract supplied)

711
Mennevée, Roger. [DOSSIER ON FRANCE, NATO, AND THE FOREIGN BASES] Le dossier de la France, l'O.T.A.N. et les bases étrangères. Documents politiques, diplomatiques et financiers, v. 47, Dec. 1966: 1-30. Dl.D6, v. 47

Documents France's withdrawal from NATO. While the possibility of a withdrawal had been discussed in the foreign press, especially in the United States, since the spring of 1965 and its importance had been generally minimized, when it actually happened, it caused great disarray among the NATO States. The article discusses the advantages and deficiencies of some proposed sites for NATO establishments, the transfer of military bases from France, and the withdrawal of French forces from Western Germany, which in the author's opinion mostly depends on future Franco-German relations. The question of the participation of the French forces stationed in Germany in the kind of conflict anticipated in Article 5 of the Atlantic Pact is being presently discussed by Gen. Lemnitzer and Gen. Ailleret. If an agreement is reached it will probably be a secret one, and the news will be publicized only in the form of a communiqué.

712
Mikhailov, B. [NATO: CRISIS AND SEARCH FOR SALVATION] NATO: Krizis i poiski spaseniia. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 47, no. 18, Sept. 1966: 83-87. U717.R9A27, v. 47

A Soviet view of the consequences of the French decision to quit NATO's military organization. However, according to the author, it would be naive to conclude that the serious crisis NATO is undergoing will end its threat for the peaceloving nations, especially the countries of Socialist friendship, for the removal of French armed forces cannot be considered a significant weakening of the alliance's military potential. American forces, which constitute NATO's main striking power, continue to increase in numerical strength. Bundeswehr participation is also growing. The amassing of modern weapons, including nuclear ballistic missiles, proceeds unabated. Nevertheless imperialism can no longer dictate its will to other nations.

713
Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW IN NATO?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? Revue militaire suisse, v. 111, Dec. 1966: 557-561. U2.R5, v. 111

Asserts that the expensive relocation of NATO's offices is much less disturbing than the alliance's military situation. After reviewing the latest developments in NATO and the attempts to withdraw British and American forces from West Germany, the author argues that instead of trying to establish an equality of rights between the European partners and the United States, an equality and equilibrium of conventional forces should be established between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This, he feels, would be much more reassuring.

714
MOSCOW: THE MILITARY ON TOP. Intelligence digest, v. 29, Jan. 1967: 5-7. D410.R47, v. 29

While the "pedlars of 'peaceful co-existence' with Communist Russia" are pressuring Western nations to cut military expenditures to the bone, Kremlin leaders have decided on a record high military budget. Far from being necessary because of the growing power and aggressiveness of China, as is claimed, this arms expenditure reflects a significant concession to the Russian military chiefs who form one of the main supports for the Kremlin hierarchy. The growing self-confidence of the warlords of Russia is reflected in their recent unprecedented publicity, their assertion that the Army's importance was equal to that of the Party in World War II, and their calls at the last meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee for increased military might. Military disenchantment with Khrushchev's attempts at peaceful coexistence and at keeping the Army budget within bounds contributed to his downfall. Current dissatisfaction in military circles with Kremlin handling of the Vietnam conflict and with recent shifts toward accelerated economic development has resuscitated the old rivalries. The recent increase in military expenditures shows an awareness and a substantial degree of submission by the Party leadership to the power and threat of the military.

715
Mosen, Wido. [WAR GAMES AND STRATEGY] Planspiel und Strategie. Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung, no. 9, Sept. 1966: 276-280. P&GP RR

Contends that the theory of games does not directly influence political-strategic planning in any important manner, but nevertheless gives policymakers better cognizance of choices in a given situation. Interestingly the biggest discrepancy "between political reality and strategic model thinking, including games," is to be found in the field of arms control--the area most suited for rational analysis.

716
Naoki, Kobayashi. THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND THE PEACE ARTICLE. Japan quarterly, v. 13, Oct./Dec. 1966: 444-454. illus. DS801.J274, v. 13

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution contains a statement renouncing war: "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. . . . Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." This Article represents the first voluntary and effective surrender of a portion of its own sovereignty by a nation. Special conditions underlie its enactment such as Japan's military defeat and occupation, its suffering from atomic bombs, and its "over-familiarity" with militarism. Although to some extent the occupying powers might have forced acceptance of Article 9, to a great extent it was in accord with the feelings of most Japanese people. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Japan established a "police reserve" of 75,000 men, the basis of today's Self-Defense Forces. Since that time Japan's rearmament has proceeded steadily. A constitutional revision was discussed in the mid-1950's, but the conservative government, realizing the low prospects of achieving this, switched to a new interpretation of the Constitution: the argument that it did not forbid armament for self-defense. Nevertheless the view of the majority of Japanese legal experts is that the Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional, and a strong pacifist outlook in support of Article 9 still persists among the Japanese public. A majority of the people also oppose the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which is inseparably bound to the whole process of rearmament. Surveys of public opinion taken by the University of Tokyo bear out these conclusions.

717
1966 DEFENSE TOP MANAGEMENT ANNUAL REPORT. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Oct. 1966: 42-145. UB153.A65, v. 13

Interviews with key Defense Department executives, including the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Joint Staff, the Heads of the four Services, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and the Heads of the Defense Agencies. The major topics stressed are problems of defense organization and management, nuclear power, and the challenge in Vietnam. Each official describes the functions of his office within the Department, its problem areas, and its plans for the future.

718
Örvik, Nils. SCANDINAVIA, NATO, AND NORTHERN SECURITY. International organization, v. 20, summer 1966: 380-396. JX1901.I55, v. 20

The term "Nordic balance" stands for a concept of security that revolves around Finnish neutrality and the Russo-Finnish treaty of 1948, Swedish neutrality, and the Norwegian-Danish reservations against foreign bases and nuclear weapons. Implied in the concept is that this policy of "calculated weakness" affords a position of strength--a lever or counterthreat which can be used against the Soviet Union. The sudden recent interest in a Nordic balance coincides with the decision made in 1960-61 by Scandinavian NATO members Denmark and Norway not to receive NATO nuclear weapons on their territory. Both the multilateral force and the British proposal were firmly rejected. On the other hand the Scandinavian nations were also cool to Finnish President Kekkonen's proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone, arguing that such a plan must be part of a general European settlement. The nonproliferation issue is a political dilemma: internally the Scandinavian nations must pledge themselves to maintain the nuclear ban, while externally they must retain the option of threatening to introduce nuclear weapons. Part of their defense posture includes the assumption that if they are threatened, their Western allies will assist with whatever means are needed. Even a nuclear-free zone guaranteed by the great powers is only a partial solution in an international environment of increasing polycentrism, and problems of inspection and joint control would be no less acute in the Nordic area than elsewhere. The security necessary for the stabilization of the area must come from a "Euro-Atlantic alternative, a tightly organized European entity which would work together with the North American nations."

719
Page, Jerry D. DIMENSIONS OF DETERRENCE. Ordnance, v. 51, Nov./Dec. 1966: 265-267. UF1.067, v. 51

The "spectrum of deterrence" now encompasses three new dimensions: space, Chinese Communist strategy, and technological momentum. The Defense Department space program is evaluating the feasibility of performing certain defense missions in and from space and comparing the uses of space as opposed to other environments. Technological advancement has proven the usefulness of unmanned satellites in communications, high-altitude nuclear-detonation detection, weather observation, and navigation. The Manned Orbiting Laboratory project is investigating man's defense capability in space. The second new deterrence dimension is best expressed in Lin Piao's now famous statement of Sept. 3, 1965, revealing Peking's plans for the expansion of world communism. U.S. response to this challenge is evident in Southeast Asia where the Nation is standing firm in Vietnam, and in development of equipment and techniques for conducting counterinsurgency and limited-war operations. The third dimension of deterrence is the "technological momentum" essential to keep America in the forefront of weapons excellence. The technological war is not an arms race in the conventional sense but a deadly competition for offensive and defensive superiority.

720
Paret, Peter. INNOVATION AND REFORM IN WARFARE. [n.p.] United States Air Force Academy, 1966. 17 p. (The Harmon memorial lectures in military history, no. 8) U19.P29

Compares the military institutions' mastery of new aspects of war during the French Revolution and Napoleonic period to the lack of knowledge that resulted in the inefficient and ineffective conduct of World War I. The technical complexities of modern military problems can be understood through the formal analytic methods

developed in recent years, Paret notes. But three obstacles to understanding contemporary war remain: an insufficiently educated public, a failure among political and military leaders to appreciate the political nature of war, and the friction between violence and control that permanently characterizes all armed conflict. The soldier of today, Paret concludes, must seek to understand not only the techniques of his profession but the goals that he and his country pursue.

721
Peltier, Louis C., and G. Etzel Pearcy. MILITARY GEOGRAPHY. Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand [1966] 176 p. maps. (Van Nostrand searchlight book, #30) UA990. P4
Bibliography: p. 173-174.

Treats current concepts of military geography--its uses in the "conduct of military affairs" and the ways in which "geographic conditions may influence or constrain the exercise of military power." Explored in detail are the concepts of grand and military strategy, tactics, logistics, civil affairs, modern technology, normal and special types of military regions, and geopolitics.

722
Perret-Gentil, J. [WEAKENING OF THE BIG MILITARY ALLIANCES] Affaiblissement des grandes alliances militaires. Revue militaire suisse, v. 111, Nov. 1966: 520-533. U2. R5, v. 111

The postwar period has given birth to two military alliances in Europe whose establishment may have averted a catastrophe. NATO, at least, undoubtedly stopped Soviet expansion in Europe. But the situation has changed, and the alliances are weakening. The Sino-Soviet split affected the Warsaw Pact, and the withdrawal of France hit NATO. Obviously the United States can be partially blamed for the latter. In armament it favored its own and German industry, and the high command and nuclear decisionmaking were exclusively in its hands. But all the grievances against the United States do not seem important enough to disrupt an alliance whose importance cannot be underestimated. Today, when only two superpowers control the Northern Hemisphere, the alliances naturally attach themselves to them. NATO's defense system forms an arc in which the United States, France, and Germany can be regarded as pillars. With France's withdrawal the system lost its central pillar, a rear base where communications, stores, aviation, etc. were concentrated. The defense line had to be projected to the French-German border, a situation tolerable in peace but extremely dangerous in a potential war. Moreover modern war with its extremely fast weapons requires a single command. In this context even a unified Europe will represent only a small contribution. There seems to be no place for French nuclear force as an instrument of a grand design. On the other hand the French withdrawal from NATO will reinforce West Germany's position in the alliance, and thus German forces might play again a primary role in Europe.

723
Pitman, George R. A CALCULUS OF MILITARY STABILITY. Journal of peace research, v. 3, no. 4, 1966: 349-358. AS9. J6, v. 3

In this paper we attempt to develop a criterion for evaluating the relative stability of the international strategic weapons environment. Because of the unacceptable levels of damage and casualties expected to result from a war in which thermonuclear weapons are employed, the criterion is based on an evaluation of the relative propensity of a nation to initiate such a war. This propensity is measured in terms of the fraction of the population fatalities which would be spared under the conditions of a first strike instead of waiting for the opponent to strike first and then retaliating. Other factors which influence the stability of the military environment are a nation's evaluation of the opponent's propensity to strike first, the level of casualties which can be expected to result from the war, and the wide spectrum of tactical options available to each side in the conduct of their nuclear campaigns. (Author's summary)

724
Ponikarov, N. D., V. I. Chumakov, and A. P. Durikov. [WHAT ONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DEFENSES AGAINST THEM] Chto neobkhodimo znat' o iadernom oruzhii i zashchite ot nego. Pod red. M. P. Kamenchuka. Moskva, Atomizdat, 1965. 168 p. illus. UF767. P625
Bibliography: p. [167]

A handbook designed for broad readership as well as civil defense workers. The book presents methods for ascertaining magnitudes of damage sustained from nuclear explosions with appropriate charts and tables; examines bases for calculating degrees of damage suffered from nuclear projectiles; and examines in detail the character of destruction, damage, and radiation conditions in a city subjected to nuclear attack. Concrete recommendations are made for defense measures to limit the possible consequences of a nuclear attack.

725
Prazhski, IAn. [WAR IN VIETNAM: "ESCALATION" OF ERRORS] Voina vo V'etname: "Eskalatsiia" proschetov. Problemy mira i sotsializma, v. 9, Oct. 1966: 75-78. HX8. P72, v. 9

The situation at the front lines in Vietnam eloquently evidences the Pentagon's ruined hopes. Despite its publicized "escalation" of the war in the territory of South Vietnam and piratical flights over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV] the United States continues to tolerate serious losses at the hands of the Vietnamese people fighting for their freedom and independence. The Americans can obtain little joy from the results of their so-called "dry season" campaigns to break up the resistance of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army and terrorize the DRV population by massive aerial bombing attacks. Concentrating huge armed forces in South Vietnam the American command attempted their deep penetration of the liberated areas, destruction of the Liberation Army forces and partisan units, and fortification of the interior. With this aim in the first 6 months of 1966 the command undertook close to 2,000 punitive expeditions, 200 of them carried out by full brigades and divisions. However even with this effort its strategy could not succeed. The Liberation Army destroyed or damaged 1,400 airplanes and helicopters and more than 1,000 military vehicles. Troop losses among the U.S. and South Vietnamese "marionette army" forces were more than 100,000, not counting up to 50,000 deserters. To compensate for the misfortunes suffered in ground operations the American command

more and more frequently spreads its "bomb and napalm carpet" over the "villages and jungles of the country." In agreement with official U.S. data an average of ten to twelve thousand such sorties are made in South Vietnam each month. The strategic B-52 bomber groups alone exceeded 350 missions in the course of the year. And on a continually larger scale the American aircraft operating over South Vietnam use toxic substances that poison the population and destroy animals and crops. All this, together with thousands of flights from aircraft carriers operating in the Tonkin Gulf and airbases in Thailand whose bombs and rockets ravage cities, bridges, dikes and settlements, will not frighten the Vietnamese people in into submission. With each day the people's resistance grows as does the indignant protest of the world's progressive people.

726
[PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS] Problemy revoliutsii v voennom dele; sbornik statei. [Sostavitel' P. M. Derevianko] Moskva, Voen. izd-vo, 1965. 193 p.
U104. P85

A collection of essays giving the background of the current trends in military affairs, discussing the new weapons and doctrine, and illuminating the paths of future Soviet military development.

727
Rabinowitch, Eugene. OFFENSE IS THE WORST DEFENSE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Oct. 1966: 32-34. TK9145. A84, v. 22

Air Force predictions that aerial bombing of North Vietnam would rapidly destroy its will to fight have proven as false as General MacArthur's prediction that invasion of North Korea would lead to rapid victory. President Johnson should have been aware of the political implications of his military decision and willing to revise it when it failed to yield the desired military and political results. The aerial attacks have strengthened Hanoi's commitment to fight and welded the people of North Vietnam more strongly to the Ho Chi Minh government. The disastrous worldwide political effect of the attacks are obvious, particularly in Europe and Asia. Even more alarming is the reversal of the trend toward American-Soviet rapprochement that began after the Cuban confrontation. Whatever potential military advantages the bombing has must be measured against this long-term political damage. Soviet-American cooperation is particularly critical now, when a third world power, China, is challenging peaceful coexistence and supporting all forces aimed at overthrowing the status quo. Fear of the universal calamity of nuclear war has frozen frontiers in Europe and the Near East; U.S. intervention in Vietnam must extend that freeze to Southeast Asia. If the United States cannot defend South Vietnam from Communist takeover without converting North Vietnam to shambles, then pulling out may be the lesser of two evils. The war will not end through free elections, negotiations, fair compromises, or coalitions as long as civil war still rages in the South. The United States must end aerial attacks on the North in hopes that this unilateral action will initiate reciprocal unilateral steps by North Vietnam. Even without such a response, the U.S. must stop the catastrophic deterioration of its world political position that the bombing of North Vietnam is causing.

728
Rachkov, A. [MADE IN WEST GERMANY] Zdelano v Zapadnoi Germanii. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 10, Oct. 1966: 37-39.

The military policy of Bonn on the African continent has two distinct aspects. This is, firstly, penetration into the new independent nations under cover of "friendly military assistance" and, secondly, military alliances with the most reactionary and racialist regimes for fighting the national liberation movements. The author cites numerous facts of direct support of Bonn for the racialists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonialists in Angola and Mozambique. (Abstract supplied)

729
REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA. Current history, v. 52, Jan. 1967: 1-54. D410. C82, v. 52

Contents.--Southeast Asia: how important--to whom? by Richard Butwell.--Vietnam: the quest for stability, by Bernard B. Fall.--Thailand: its meaning for the U.S., by Bernard K. Gordon.--Indonesia's quasi-military regime, by Frederick Bunnell.--The changing world of Malaysia, by René Peritz.--Cambodian neutrality, by William E. Willmott.--Military rule in Burma, by Josef Silverstein.

Explores the strengths and weaknesses of the nations of Southeast Asia. Butwell assesses the area's importance to U.S. security and analyzes U.S. posture there. Fall warns that the Vietnamese war may escalate to involve the nuclear superpowers "by sheer accident, if not by design." Gordon discusses Thailand's importance to the United States in terms of providing air bases, stopping China's expansion, and promoting regional cooperation in Asia. Indonesia's new quasi-military regime, according to Bunnell, faces a threat of economic austerity that may alienate the vested interests maintaining the regime. Malaysia is reevaluating its traditional relationships, notes Peritz, particularly those with the United Kingdom. Wilmott traces the Cambodian trend from pro-Western to anti-Western neutrality. Silverstein criticizes the failure of the military to unite Burma, give it efficient rule, and provide an improved standard of living.

730
Rubinskii, IU. [FRANCE AND NATO] Frantsiia i NATO. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 12, 1966: 27-37. HC10. M5357, 1966

The exit of France from the military organization of the North Atlantic pact has brought about the most acute crisis in the entire history of this aggressive bloc. This event is but a political consequence of internal contradictions that have been ripening for a long time in the system of imperialist alliances; an event, that in its turn, stimulates a further sharpening of such contradictions. It represents not only the bankruptcy of the imperialist strategy of "containing communism", but also a direct threat to United States hegemony in the Western world. The article analyses the factors that influenced the change in the French position; the author's main attention is devoted to an evaluation of the situation resulting from the actions of the French Government. In the new situation, concludes the author, the prospects for the struggle to achieve European security and the cooperation of states with different social systems have improved. (Abstract supplied)

731
Ruge, Friedrich. MLF: A GERMAN POINT OF VIEW. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, Sept. 1966: 42-51.
VI.U8, v. 92

Argues that Germany "neither asked for the possession of nuclear weapons nor had it any part in formulating the original MLF concept." German Vice Admiral (Ret.) Ruge reviews the series of events that brought Germany into NATO and the German position on further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The reason Germany acceded to the multilateral nuclear force [MLF], which was originally envisioned as mounted on merchant ships at sea, was that it seemed a reasonable way to neutralize the 700 Soviet missiles aimed at Europe. The proper step would be the creation of a supranational body, the Atlantic Nuclear Force, but in absence of such a move Germany will concentrate on building its conventional and civil-defense forces. All the Germans wanted from the MLF was a voice in nuclear responsiblity, not a finger on the trigger. If the Federal Republic drops the MLF issue, the Soviet position on nonproliferation may become clear; during that time Britain and the United States can launch the nucleus of an Atlantic Nuclear Force.

732
Sanguinetti, Tony. [THE ATOM AND NAVAL BATTLES] Atome et batailles sur mer. [Paris] Hachette [1965] 285 p.
UA700.S24

Contents.--Introduction to the study of modern conflicts.--Threats and instruments of naval defense.--Tasks and employment of forces.--The French Navy.

Analyzes the contribution of the Navy to France's national defense in modern nuclear conflicts from the viewpoint of feasibility and efficiency. In the author's opinion a correct definition of French defense policy can issue only from a synthesis of France's imperative needs, its technological and budgetary possibilities, and the inconveniences defense may bring to the nation. To this end he probes the requirements of French naval defense, the reapportionment of the tasks of combat, and the desirable use of existing French naval forces. Sanguinetti feels that discussion of these essential factors must preceed the forming of a definition.

733
Sapozhnikov, B. [JAPANESE-AMERICAN ALLIANCE RELATIONS AND U.S. AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM] IApono-amerikanskie soiuznicheskie otnosheniia i agressiia SSHA vo V'etname. Kommunist Ukrainy, v. 41, Nov. 1966: 32-39.
HX8.K586, v. 41

The recent visit of Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko to Japan revealed that good relations with the Soviet Union are useful not only for Japan but the whole Far East. A most vital problem is U.S. imperialism's wreckage of peace in Southeast Asia. Viewing that with indignation Japan's people resent Premier Sato's government, which, contrary to common sense and lessons of the past, moves under Washington's yoke to assist in the plunder of the Vietnamese nation. The Vietnam War has disturbed economic and trade relations in Southeast Asia on which Japan's continued rate of growth depends. For some time Japan's monopolies sought to escape the constricting frame of Japanese-American "cooperation." On the heels of the collapse of the U.S. adventure in Korea with the consequent decline of American prestige in Asia the Japanese Government advanced into Southeast Asia with a number of "economic cooperation agreements" to develop indigenous industries. Japan formed a "fund for economic cooperation with the countries of Asia" designed to protect Japanese private capital investment. But needing more expansion capital Japan fell upon loans from the United States or U.S. assistance in facilitating loans from international credit institutions. In return the United States pressured Japan for a more active part in Vietnam. Aware that an open appearance at the U.S. side in a military adventure would foment a domestic crisis, the Japanese government acquiesced only to "indirect" participation in the war against Vietnam despite strong U.S. inducements such as arrangement for a normalization of Japan's relations with South Korea and profitable trade relations with the American-owned firms on Taiwan connected with the U.S. military effort in Vietnam. Nevertheless the instability of capitalist markets led Japan's business circles to show interest in trade with the Soviet Union, which besides being a close neighbor, is rich in raw materials and has broad economic development prospects in Siberia and the Far East. Of course the establishment of good relations with the U.S.S.R. does not please the U.S. aggressors, who have strong adherents among Japan's political leaders. But these persons are in direct opposition to the national interests of the people of Japan who resolutely step forward for peace and broad cooperation with Socialist countries.

734
Smith, Jack A. THE VAST U.S. MILITARY BUILDUP IN THAILAND. National guardian, v. 19, Jan. 14, 1967: 3-4.
AP2.N244, v. 19

In the spring of 1950, shortly after the Communists took power in China, the United States sent 100 military advisers to Thailand; today Thailand, with 35,000 American air- and infantrymen, is transformed into "a military base for American aggression" and the most important U.S. military outpost in Southeast Asia. The use of Thai bases for air bombardment of North Vietnam is merely a dividend on an investment orginally directed at China. One condition demanded by Bangkok in return for the bases is that the U.S. troops continue fighting in Vietnam. In an emergency, however, the nation is so committed to the United States that it would have no alternative to accommodating a U.S. pullback to Thai soil. In this event it would receive assurances of U.S. defense, support for the military dictatorship, and increased money aid. Thus, for the use of Thai airbases aimed at China, the United States has assumed an obligation toward Thailand which could keep Southeast Asia boiling for many years. Obviously the United States is not sending thousands of men and hundreds of planes merely to meet the threat from a few hundred insurgents. Thailand itself has an armed force of 130,000 men. Not communism but the threat of internal uprising against the military dictatorship appears to be the motivation for Bangkok's alinement with the United States. However the political substructure of the nation is undergoing subtle changes, and, in spite of the seeming stability of the government, unforeseen changes are likely.

735
Sokolovskii, V. D., and M. Cherednichenko. CURRENT MILITARY STRATEGY. Survival, v. 8, Aug. 1966: 266-270.
U162.S9, v. 8

Translated and abridged from Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 47, Apr. 1966: 59-66.
U717.R9A27

Since the great powers acquired nuclear weapons and missiles the role of military strategy has greatly increased and changed. Today "military strategy without a scientifically based theory is inconceivable." The next war will be global and short. Victory will depend on combat readiness of all forces, but especially nuclear forces, and skill in using them. In view of the evident Western preparations for a surprise attack, the Soviet Union must maintain at constant combat readiness "armed forces capable of dealing a crushing retaliatory nuclear strike in good time, of disrupting the enemy's aggressive concepts, and defeating him in the shortest possible time." Consequently the most urgent present strategy task is drafting a plan for waging "missile-nuclear" war. Such a war should destroy the enemy's economy, its state control system, and its armed forces. The war's strategic operations should consist of nuclear strikes against military, economic, and political targets. Thus Western nuclear forces are "targeted to strike at the depth of the socialist countries, in order to create 'atomic chaos'" and destroy them as organized societies. But increasingly there are also capabilities for preventing surprise attack--"capabilities of detecting in good time not only the beginning of the attack, but the beginning of the enemy's direct preparations for it." In the initial period of the war retaliatory nuclear strikes must be launched early enough to "disrupt the nuclear attack" and achieve the above described objectives. As a result of the retaliatory strike the enemy may be rendered incapable of launching further attacks. Exploiting the "moral and political superiority" of the Soviet soldiers over the enemy, maintaining firm and uninterrupted control of the armed forces, and securing the help of scientists and institutions similar to those the West is now using in military research will be invaluable to the Soviet Union in defining strategy and waging war.

736
Spiess-Reitmeyer, Karl-Heinz. [RED CHINA AND OIL] Rotchina und das Erdöl. Kampftruppen, no. 5, Oct. 1966: 144-145. P&GP RR

The petroleum industry is as vital to China's supplies of energy as is coal mining to Europe's. Its importance for China's future economy cannot be overestimated, considering the fact that about one-fourth of the nation's vast territory is oilbearing. Also China's internal security depends to a great extent on rapid development of a national transportation system that is able to prevent new opposition centers and semi-sovereign territories from being formed in the country's interior. And development of such a system depends largely on oil. However the incipient nature of the country's industrialization and the great shortage in technical manpower account for what is a disproportionately small production of oil (about 7-million tons of crude oil in 1962). The strategically sensitive location, near the Sino-Soviet boundaries, of China's main petroleum supplies makes them vulnerable in case of armed conflict between both nations. It is thus no wonder that China has embarked on its own "atomic tests" program.

737
Stone, Jeremy J. ABM--THE NEXT MLF? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Sept. 1966: 20-21.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

An arrangement more plausible than the multilateral nuclear force [MLF] for nuclear sharing in Europe would be an antiballistic missile [ABM] system. Where the MLF failed to satisfy either European or German desires for control of nuclear weapons, an ABM system embodies surprisingly relevant means to do so. Motivated by current Soviet activity in developing and deploying an antimissile defense system, the United States is embarking on a similar path despite wide agreement that the Soviet force will not be effective against U.S. forces. An ABM system goes beyond arrangements for allied consultation and may satisfy West German desires for a politically acceptable weapons system with shared control. An antimissile system is "defensive," and its coverage of wide areas affords Europe an overall defense arrangement. This presupposes concerted action among the nations of Europe, something the MLF concept could not provide. ABM missiles would have to be targeted by Europeans. Because they are expensive, joint funding would be necessary. Joint responsibility is also implied in these efforts. Where the MLF's Polaris forces were an unsuitable defense against Soviet MRBM's, an ABM defense system "is sensibly related to the MRBM's." Unfortunately, however, ballistic missile defense represents "not only a political step toward German access to nuclear weapons but also a potential strategic threat." Both the Soviet Union and the United States stand to lose if strategy heads in this direction. Moscow's enemies will be delighted to see Russia divert its resources from critical economic needs and America strive to maintain at all costs a strategic lead against the Soviet Union.

738
STUDY THE "TALK WITH THE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT ANNA LOUISE STRONG." Peking review, v. 9, Sept. 2, 1966: 9-13.
DS701.P42, v. 9

"Abridged reference material published by 'Jiefangjun Bao' (Liberation Army Daily) on August 23."

Three main points of Mao Tse-tung's teachings must be remembered. First, imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers. Second, the outcome of war is ultimately decided by the people, not by new types of weapons. Finally, the people of the world must unite to defeat U.S. imperialism "and all its running dogs" and carry the world revolution through to a successful end.

739
SURVEY OF FRANCE. Nuclear engineering, v. 11, Dec. 1966: 937-952. TK9001.N75, v. 11

Contents.--Collaboration--with all but one.--French nuclear policy, by Robert Hirsch.--The nuclear industry in France and the evolution of its structure, by R. Gibrat.--Nuclear industry chart, no. 1--France.--French industry faces the challenge of nuclear engineering, by Roger Julia.--Bubble chambers: developments in France.--Reports from the sites.--Uranium supplies from the Gabon, by Maurice Moyal.--Development of swimming pool reactors in France.

Surveys the nuclear energy industry in France. Current policy, the set-up of the industry and problems it faces, specific planned developments such as bubble chambers and swimming pool reactors, and nuclear reactor facilities already in existence are explained in some detail. Editorial comment cites the degree to which France cooperates with other nations in the

nuclear field as belying accusations that she is isolationist.

740
Tiushkevich, S. [THE CONTEMPORARY REVOLUTION IN MILITARY SCIENCE: ITS SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS] Sovremennaia revoliutsiia v voennom dele: istochniki i kharakter. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 47, no. 20, Oct. 1966: 17-25.
U717.R9A27, v. 47

Describes the contemporary revolution in military science as transforming the whole military "business" to the very core and substantially influencing the economic, social-political, and ideological relations of states and social classes. With the qualitative transformations realized in military science the more powerful states have become bound to the present and future destiny of humanity. On the one hand, these transformations have enhanced the aggressiveness of imperialist nations like the United States and have threatened the people of the world with calamity and pain; on the other they signify the creation of an entirely new basis for defending the Socialist countries and give the builders of communism both a reliable shield and a punishing sword. Thus analysis of the revolution in military science has high significance for the development of military theory and practice and for improving the defense capabilities of the Soviet Union.

741
Tivanov, V. [BONN'S NUCLEAR STAKE] IAdernaia stavka Bonna. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 47, no. 22, Nov. 1966: 78-82.
U717.R9A27, v. 47

Washington's European policy becomes increasingly dangerous as America's monopolistic bourgeoisie relies more and more on its alliance with West German "militarists and revanchists," who in turn encourage the Americans toward an even more reactionary course on the continent. At the end of 1965 West German leaders announced that the "postwar period" was over and that a "new stage" in the history of the West German State would begin. But according to Chancellor Erhard, speaking in the fall of 1965, the dominant circles of West Germany do not intend to reject Adenauer's cold war policy or his preparation for hot war. The basic policy of the "new stage" appears to be a diligent Bonn effort to convert the country into a nuclear-missile power with an independent capability to conduct policy from a position of strength. American ruling circles, who reasonably regard West Germany as their principal ally in aggressive operations, excite Bonn's nuclear appetite in all possible ways. Meanwhile rockets for antitank and antiaircraft use are already being produced in West Germany. The new organization of the Bundeswehr calls for further strengthening the Armed Forces with rockets. Both the rockets and conventional artillery projectiles could be equipped with atomic warheads. To assure reliable performance on the part of military personnel under nuclear conditions the West German leaders are seeking to develop highly disciplined professionals throughout the ranks. Wehrkunde reports that the military establishment intends to increase the number of professionals in the principal military services up to 95 percent in the Navy, 82 percent in the Air Force, and 55 percent in the ground forces. West German workers demand a radical contraction of the military budget and the transfer of the funds thus saved to the improvement of social conditions in the country, but Bonn pays little heed to their demands while it steers a course of totally militarizing the nation.

742
Tung, Ming. THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY WILL SURELY TRIUMPH OVER U.S. IMPERIALISM'S COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY--IN COMMEMORATION OF THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE PUBLICATION OF COMRADE LIN PIAO'S ESSAY "LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR." Peking review, v. 9, Sept. 9, 1966: 12-14. DS701.P42, v. 9

Lin Piao's famous essay, published a year ago, provides the people of the world with a powerful ideological weapon in the fight against imperialism and modern revisionism. Reactionary nations that wage antipopular wars cannot depend on people and are forced to exaggerate and put blind faith in the role of weapons. U.S. imperialism thus has become a slave to its nuclear weapons, and U.S. military strategy depends on nuclear blackmail. U.S. strategy has changed from massive retaliation to flexible response, but it still relies on efficient conventional and nuclear weapons, which are powerless in the face of a revolutionary people fearing neither hardship or death. Mao Tse-tung's military-strategic concept of people's war advances the fundamental Marxist principle that people are the motive power in the creation of world history. "U.S. imperialism like a mad bull dashing from place to place, will finally be burnt to ashes in the blazing fires of the people's wars it has provoked by its own actions."

743
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe. THE CRISIS IN NATO. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 366 p.
JX1393.N67U47
Hearings held March-June 1966.

Testimony by experts from the Government and from private institutions on the crisis facing the North Atlantic alliance. The subcommittee undertook to assess the impact of the French initiatives on NATO military posture, explore the political issues underlying the current crisis, and examine the alternatives open to the United States in its relations with NATO.

744
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe. THE CRISIS IN NATO. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966.
UA646.3.U4

Report issued as a result of the March-June 1966 hearings devoted to the problems facing the North Atlantic alliance. The Subcommittee recommends that the United States apply itself to the urgent task of providing the "bold, imaginative leadership necessary to help NATO overcome the problems of obsolescence."

745
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. REPORT ON THE SOVIETS AND THE SEAS. Report of a Congressional delegation to Poland and the Soviet Union. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 26 p. (89th Cong., 2d sess. House report no. 1809) GC59.55.U5

A report by two Committee members who were delegated to visit Poland and the U.S.S.R. on the Soviet Union's oceanography, fisheries, and merchant marine. They say that the programs of the U.S.S.R. in these fields are well planned, encompassing political, military, economic, and scientific objectives. The organizations to implement them are described as competent and coordinated. The two Committeemen concluded that "the entire Soviet maritime policy has already gone a long way toward achieving supremacy at sea, and unless effectively challenged by the free world, can be expected to achieve this strategic objective well before the end of this century." They recommend a number of steps whereby the United States may meet the Soviet challenge on the seas."

746

Valiev, S. [ARMED TO THE TEETH . . . AGAINST WHOM?] Vooruzheny do zubov . . . protiv kogo? Azila i afrika segodnia, v. 10, Dec. 1966: 6-9.
DSI.S7, v. 10

South Africa's military budget has trebled; its expenditure on the manufacture of arms in 1966 was 40 times the 1960 level. This is the largest military budget of any state in Africa. The article presents facts which reveal that South Africa's armaments are directed against the peoples of Africa and threaten their independence.

747

Vidal, Jean-Emile. WHERE IS CHINA GOING? Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 38 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translation on international Communist developments no. 897) P&GP RR
"JPRS: 38,316."
"CSO: 3801-D"
"Translation of a series of seven articles in the French-language daily organ of the French CP, L'Humanite (Humanity), Paris, 26-30 September, 1 and 4 October 1966."

Articles on Marshall Lin Piao's desires to change the workers' mental attitude, the deification of Mao Tse-tung and "liquidation of the old culture," the primary role assigned the Army in the "proletarian cultural revolution," how the Red Guards were organized outside the Party and the Youth League, requests for workers and peasants to busy themselves with their factories and fields, and the "World Strategy" of Lin Piao. Vidal summarizes criticism of the basic concepts of Chinese leadership.

748

[THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT] Le conflit vietnamien. Chronique de politique étrangère, v. 19, July 1966: 355-432. D839.C82, v. 19

A brief biography of Ho Chi Minh, the proceedings of the 1954 Geneva Conference on the problems of Korea and Indochina, and a review of South Vietnam's foreign policy toward the United States, 1954-1956. The South Vietnamese economy, the economic and legal aspects of the Vietnamese War, and the positions of the states eminently interested in this war are also discussed. Appended are a full text of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, as well as a list of Hanoi's four points of 1965, and Washington's fourteen points of 1966, which illustrate their attitudes toward solving the Vietnamese War.

749

Waterkamp, Rainer. [CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE] Crisis Management in Europa. Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung, no. 9, Sept. 1966: 271-276. P&GP RR
Bibliographical footnotes.

An ever-growing trend toward rapprochement between the West and the Soviet bloc promises to affect international affairs most importantly for the foreseeable future. The strategic political implications of a "hostile bipolarity" in the world's balance of power compel both superpowers to base that balance on "cooperative bipolarity." Both sides are determined to prevent the outbreak of the "big war." Kept mutually at bay they have increasingly lost their freedom of maneuvering with a resulting gain of maneuverability by smaller and second-rate powers. American deterrence strategy assures--in case the enemy delivers the first nuclear strike--the destruction of the aggressor, but has been unable to provide for adequate protection of its own civilian population. American counterforce strategy, a humane supplement to deterrence strategy, is based on the premise that both sides will aim at destruction of the opponent's military power only and save his civilian sector. The way the two strategies fit together leaves much to be desired. The magnitude of risk involved in any nuclear hostility reduces the credibility of military alliances; yet they are indispensable for an effective early warning system, without which the deterrence strategy would be impotent. Furthermore, in nuclear warfare the demarcation line between tactical and strategic matters is so intricate as to be inconsequential for practical application of the limited atomic-war concept. The British Labour government holds that conventional and fullscale-nuclear wars are possible in Europe, but not limited atomic war. Washington seems in fact to share that view. Under these circumstances crisis management becomes of utmost importance for the preservation of peace in Europe, as do the Continent's trends toward disintegration of military alliances, reduction of troop levels, and denuclearization. Due to the diverse military-geographic factors that affect the NATO partners their security interests and strategic concepts vary somewhat. The "regionalization" of NATO--the principle that NATO has already applied in the ban on nuclear weapons over the territory of its Scandinavian members--would take such variety into account. This in itself might eventually lead to "neutralized bipolarity" as a basis for the world balance of power. It could result in denuclearized and demilitarized zones established in Europe with the approval of both the Soviet Union and the United States. To prevent its alienation from the rest of the world the Federal Republic of Germany should attune itself to current trends by revising its priorities and letting East-West détente take precedence over national reunification. Bonn will have to accept the idea of two German states for a stipulated period of time in order to ease the crisis in Europe. As the point of departure for policy revision Bonn should clearly manifest its temperance in nuclear matters. Bonn's talk of "Germany's potential nuclear capability" impedes viable arms control and disarmament arrangements, which are absolutely necessary for relaxation of East-West tensions.

750

Wilson, George C. ANTI-MISSILES: NEW TWIST IN THE ARMS SPIRAL. Nation, v. 204, Jan. 9, 1967: 46-49. AP2.N2, v. 204

Pentagon experts maintain that the Soviet Union is deploying a sophisticated "area" antiballistic defense system complete with long-range antimissiles "almost as good as our own." If the Russians can protect their entire country from U.S. missiles, military planners assume they may then be tempted to attack first. Defense Secretary McNamara's answer to this drastic prognosis is to keep U.S. offense so far ahead of the Russian defense that a Soviet first strike would clearly result in an unacceptably destructive U.S. response. While McNamara's argument could save the Nation billions of dollars, technical and political arguments against that option have won the favor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress, and even many of McNamara's own civilian weapons experts. President Johnson must make a decision soon; the political climate here and abroad rules out another postponement. The time seems to have passed for diplomatic breakthrough on the arms race, as Russia is committed to both an extensive ABM system and faster ICBM production. Even if agreement were possible, what could the United States and Russia do about China's nuclear missiles? On the other hand, how will India and Japan feel if the United States spends billions of dollars on antimissile defense while they stand undefended next to China and Russia? McNamara admits China will have medium-range ballistic missiles as early as 1967 and intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1975. With this latest twist in the arms spiral, an American Defense Secretary can actually declare that a nuclear attack would kill 130 million Americans without ABM defense or 60 million with an ABM defense that costs $30-40 billion.

751
Wood, David. THE ARMED FORCES OF AFRICAN STATES, with an introduction by W. P. Gutteridge. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966. 31 p. illus. (Adelphi papers, no. 27)
P&GP RR

Assesses the military strength of African armed forces by country and by service, and summarizes the amount of military assistance each receives from foreign powers. Wood also deals with the armed forces of non-African countries stationed on African soil.

752
[THE YELLOW PERIL] Le peril jaune. Perspectives, v. 22, Dec. 24, 1966: 2-3.
HC10. P4, v. 22

Separately paged.

As soon as China develops its thermonuclear bomb the yellow peril will become imminent; China has already set in motion an interplay of forces among itself, Russia, and America. Of the three the United States is still the most powerful and the Soviet Union second, but if China can combine its enormously strong conventional potential with its nuclear power it will undoubtedly replace Russia as the second-most-powerful nuclear force within 2 or 3 years. What then are the prospects for future relations among these three superpowers, which are holding in their hands the future of mankind? Will they make a tacit or formal agreement and divide the world into zones of influence? Will China support the United States against Russia, or Russia against the United States? Or will the Soviet Union support the United States against China? Although a return to the Chinese-Soviet alliance cannot be disregarded (in case there is a complete change in the Russian and Chinese governments), a thorough examination of the causes of tensions among the three powers demonstrates that the last eventuality is the most probable. The precondition for such a development seems to be the ending of the Vietnamese War, which would allow the Russians to assist the United States in preventing the expansion of China and thus check the yellow peril. This cooperation might logically lead to joint Soviet-U.S. destruction of China's nuclear installations before it is too late.

753
Zagoria, Donald S. CHINA'S STRATEGY: A CRITIQUE. Indian Marxist, v. 2, Dec. 1966: 9-12, 39-40.
HX3. N2515, v. 2

Chinese Communist leaders are sure the strategy that brought success to their revolution is applicable to other developing countries. Lin Piao's recent article "Long Live the Victory of the People's War" is clearly intended to guide Communist Parties in the Third World along this line. The method of revolution Lin suggests is not new--fomenting uprisings in the countryside against the cities into a people's war--but the emphasis he places on armed conflict does reflect Peking's plan to engage the United States in a series of debilitating protracted wars against local guerrillas. Vietnam is a critical testing ground for this strategy. Lin's article seemingly encourages Hanoi to continue fighting rather than to negotiate and take over South Vietnam by political means. The importance Lin attaches to the virtues of self-reliance suggests an effort to rationalize the lack of substantial aid from Peking. Chinese strategy shows serious weaknesses and is growing more dogmatic and crude. Bitter toward the United States as an obstacle to their Third World domination, the Chinese mistakenly think they can transfer their animosity to others. While certain tensions do exist between the United States and the poorer nations, few view America as an unequivocal enemy. Except for their success in China and Vietnam, the Communists have been unable to seize control of nationalist movements anywhere in the Afro-Asian world. This failure may be due to strong government factions within these nations, to the Chinese inability to intervene physically on behalf of local guerrillas, and the strong influence still exerted by Moscow on the side of evolution rather than violent change. The most serious weakness in the Chinese approach is its almost obsessive preoccupation with violence and war as the path to social change, a route which few countries are willing to follow.

754
Zav'ialov, Ivan G. [SPEED, TIME, AND SPACE IN MODERN WAR] Skorost', vremia i prostranstvo v sovremennoi voine. Moskva, Voen. izd-vo, 1965. 190 p.
U103. Z38

Draws on a number of past and projected cases to demonstrate the significance of speed, time, and space in military operations. Zav'ialov aims at a readership of generals, admirals, and other military officers on active and reserve lists.

755
Zitzewitz, Horst von. [BENELUX IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE] Benelux im atlantischen Bündnis. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Dec. 1966: 720-727.
D839. A885, v. 17

Explains that France's withdrawal from NATO military activities has greatly increased the importance of

the Benelux countries in the alliance and with it their potential influence on NATO strategy. Zitzewitz discusses in some detail the strength of the Dutch, Luxembourgian, and Belgian military forces as well as their actual and potential contribution to NATO.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. Biological

756

Asimov, Isaac, and Theodosius Dobzhansky. THE GENETIC EFFECTS OF RADIATION. [Washington] U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Technical Information [1966] 49 p. (Understanding the atom)
QH652.5.A8
"Suggested references": p. 47-49.

Traces radiation's genetic effects from the structure of genes and chromosomes, through normal cellular sexual reproduction and spontaneous mutation, to the actual effects of normal background and manmade radiation on the mutation rate. Man's genetic load--the pool of deleterious genes carried from generation to generation in a species--should not be increased if at all possible, despite the fact that the species probably can absorb a "moderate increase" without the threat of extinction.

757

Brownlow, Cecil. MILITARY EXPORTS EXPECTED TO REMAIN HIGH. Aviation week & space technology, v. 85, Oct. 3, 1966: 26-27.
TL501.A8, v. 85

According to Defense Department estimates West Germany will buy approximately $2.5 billion in military hardware from the United States over the next 5 years, a slight reduction from the $3.2 billion of the past half-decade. On a world basis Defense officials foresee little change in the predicted $15 billion export market for U.S. military equipment through 1975. Because of the tight money situation there, West Germany cannot purchase U.S. hardware, as agreed, at a rate equal to the cost of supporting the 225,000 American servicemen in Europe. Thus U.S. force levels in Europe will most likely be cut, particularly with the completion of the heavy logistics jet transport by Lockheed, the C-130. Defense Dept. export-sales guidelines include: promoting sales of U.S. military hardware to allied, financially capable nations to encourage overall defense capability and ease the balance of payments problem; sharing advanced technology with allies, with reimbursement to U.S. industries; supplying advanced, firstline hardware to allies, provided there are no "uncompensated security risks;" negotiating multilateral agreements under the NATO aegis; and procuring military hardware from abroad in return for purchase of American equipment, if quality and cost compare.

758

Commoner, Barry. FEASIBILITY OF BIOLOGICAL RECOVERY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK. Ramparts, v. 5, Dec. 1966: 20-26. AP2.R19, v. 5

If the American public is to decide the value of civil defense, it must look beyond the instantaneous catastrophe to the question of whether the Nation can recover from nuclear war. Although many statistics are available on the immediate destructive effects of nuclear attack (human and industrial casualties, etc.), data relating to the factors on which the Nation's recovery depends are strikingly absent. A common analytical approach used for this analysis is a "scenario," which is set up to study a general set of relationships within a particular locale and circumstances. The main point to be gleaned from the three Hudson Institute scenarios given here is that the death and disease following nuclear attack are not caused solely by the immediate blast and fire of the weapons. Destruction of sanitation and other modern conditions will unleash multitudinous sources of infection. Problems of food, clothing, shelter, and a vast array of other social, political, and psychological needs will become urgent. A society surviving nuclear attack will be delicately balanced between recovery and further deterioration. Any added strain or unforeseen circumstances will tip the balance downward. Paradoxically shelters could be detrimental to the ultimate survival of the population if survivors are in excess of available supplies and facilities. The immediate destruction of large-scale nuclear attack, the probability of high amplification of this damage by biological and climatic processes, and the self-contradicting consequences of civil defense measures leads to the conclusion that the American Nation cannot survive a major nuclear war.

759

Eriskat, H. [HAZARDS OF AND PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION] Strahlenrisiko und Strahlenschutz. Neue Technik; nouvelles techniques; new techniques, v. 8, Dec. 1966: 360-364. tables.
TJ212.N4, v. 8

Reports the European Atomic Energy Community's research work with regard to nuclear radiation and its biological effects. Eriskat also outlines EURATOM's measures against radiation hazards to the population. According to the Community's findings, the average radioactive contamination of air around the globe in 1964 ranged from 0.5 to 2pCi per cubic meter. It decreased by about 80 per cent in 1965, almost to the level of the air's natural radioactivity. The downward trend began in 1963 after the record high that resulted from the 1961 nuclear tests.

760

Gus'kova, V. N., and others. [CERTAIN DATA FOR DETERMINING THE BIOLOGICAL CONSTANTS OF SOLUBLE URANIUM COMPOUNDS IN A TEST ON ALBINO RATS] Nekotorye dannye po opredeleniiu biologicheskikh konstant rastvorimykh soedinenii urana v eksperimente na belykh krysakh. Gigiena i sanitariia, v. 31, Nov. 1966: 39-42.
RA421.G5, v. 31

The authors studied the absorption, the distribution and the excretion of uranium soluble salts in rats' bodies. The tests were carried out with uranil nitrate that was introduced in a single dose of 0.7 mg/kg or was given per os daily for a period of 12 months in a total dose of 16 mg/kg. The animals were killed in the course of a year at different intervals from the beginning of the experiment. The excretion of uranium from the kidneys occurs at biological periods of partial excretion, comprising 1.8 (43%) and 15.5 days (57%); that from the bone tissue was eliminated in 24 (76%) and 400 days (24%) and that from the whole body in 20 (85%) and 400 days (15%). (Abstract supplied)

249-857 O - 67 - 5

761
Little, John B. ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: IONIZING RADIATION. New England journal of medicine, v. 275, Oct. 27, 1966: 929-938.
R11.B7, v. 275
Bibliography: p. 937-938.

Available evidence suggests that the major biologic effects of ionizing radiation at low doses and low dose rates are carcinogenesis and the production of genetic mutations in the gonads that passed on to the offspring. The carcinogenic risk is of importance to the exposed person himself whereas genetic effects are important so far as average radiation exposure to the entire population is concerned, for such exposure will determine the rate at which deleterious recessive mutations are introduced into the population pool to become manifest in future generations. With the exception of the fetus, which appears to be very radiosensitive, the current risk to most individuals, whether from occupational, accidental or clinical exposure, is probably small as compared to other hazards of everyday living. The magnitude of the genetic risk to the population as a whole, however, is not clear. At present 90 per cent of the excess radiation exposure to the world population above natural background comes from clinical sources, primarily diagnostic x-rays. In the future, however, radioactive isotopes released from bomb detonations or atomic-energy installations may become a significant factor. These isotopes are important as an internal radiation hazard from contaminated food, water and air, and the problems involved in radiation protection are complicated and quite different from those for conventional external sources. (Author's summary)

762
Marei, A. N., E. I. IArtsev, and E. I. Moiseenko. [DISTRIBUTION OF STRONTIUM 90 IN THE HUMAN ADULT SKELETON] K voprosu o raspredelenii strontsiia-90 v skelete vzroslogo cheloveka. Gigiena i sanitariia, v. 31, Nov. 1966: 35-39.
RA421.G5, v. 31

The authors studied the distribution of strontium 90 in case of global precipitation, in the skeleton of 20 adult persons. A definite ratio was noted between the isotope concentration in certain bones and its average concentration in all of the skeleton. (Abstract supplied, modified)

763
Mitchell, Harold H. PLAGUE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE AS A PROBLEM FOLLOWING A THERMONUCLEAR WAR. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1966. 49 p. illus., maps. ([Rand Corporation] Memorandum, RM-4968-TAB) Q180.AIR36, no. 4968
"Research . . . sponsored by the San Francisco Operations Office of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission under contract AT (04-3)-414, Project Agreement No. 3."
Bibliography: p. 49

In the context of plague as a postattack problem for the United States, examines plague ecology and past epidemics in various parts of the country, the treatment and prevention of the disease, and its likelihood of becoming a serious problem in the postattack environment. Despite tremendous advances in medicine and public health, plague is endemic among many wild rodent populations in the United States, and it is difficult to predict "the way the ecological upsets will go and what the subsequent behavior of the wild rodents will be" following atomic attack. Since "even a single case of bubonic plague can become pneumonic and start the human-to-human spread which may then involve large numbers of people," plague remains a potentially serious problem in the postattack environment. The present paper represents part of a larger Rand study of the biological and environmental consequences of nuclear war.

764
U.S. Office of Civil Defense. RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE: PLANNING AND OPERATIONS GUIDE. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966] 1 v. (various pagings) P&GP RR

Reprints of published and draft writings from the Federal Civil Defense Guide explaining the nature of radioactive fallout, probable postattack fallout conditions in the United States, and the various procedures that may protect the American public from radiological hazards.

2. Economic

765
[AFTER VIETNAM, WHAT?] Forbes, v. 100, Jan. 1, 1967: 31-34. tables. HF5001.F6, v. 100

Examines the unusual problems defense industries face due to the special nature of the war in Vietnam. Companies producing critical war supplies lack the power to claim priorities on manpower and skilled technicians as they could in a declared war, but at the same time military orders must receive precedence over civilian ones. No company wants to turn down defense business because of its uncertainty, but many question the permanence of the market position built from it. The author finds two basic trends evident from his study: Companies such as Lockheed, McDonnell, General Dynamics and North American are facing the fact that defense is their main business, and efforts at commercial diversification are definitely in second place. On the other hand, Raytheon, Bendix, Northrup, and others are attempting to sell their wares and talents on both the commercial and defense markets. Only time and an end to the Vietnam War can determine which policy is best.

766
Amery, Julian. EAST OF SUEZ UP FOR GRABS. Reporter, v. 35, Dec. 1, 1966: 16-21.
D839.R385, v. 35

Britain's presence East of Suez has become an important bone of contention in London. The financial element in maintaining these commitments looms large. The British defense budget is not really adequate to do the job properly, and if British forces outside Europe are withdrawn enormous savings will be achieved. Great Britain is in the grip of an economic crisis. But its economy is wholly based on overseas trade and investments--two-thirds of which are East of Suez. Since communism, "which does not tolerate foreign investment," is a very real threat in many of these nations, London has a strong and compelling interest in keeping such countries as Malaysia, Pakistan, and South Africa in the Western camp. Even revolutionary nationalism of the Sukarno and Nasser brand is inimical to British interests. Time after time British military intervention has saved regimes threatened by communism and Communist-backed "revolutionary" movements. In the Middle East, for example, the oil-bearing

countries, backed by British force, have begun to take the initiative in developing and rebuilding the area. The Labour government's recent and sudden decision to abandon Aden and the South Arabian Federation will have disastrous consequences for the Federation itself and for British power in the Arabian Peninsula. The decision has given Egypt's Nasser a new lease on life, and he clearly intends to try to take over Aden. On this basis the Soviets have renewed interest in the Nasser government, possibly with hopes of establishing themselves in Egypt and Aden--the key to the Persian Gulf and East Africa. The island bases jointly planned for the Indian Ocean by Great Britain and the United States could "scarcely deter Egyptian subversion backed by a visible Soviet presence in Aden." An alternative would be for the United States to assist Great Britain in maintaining the base at Aden, but Southeast Asian commitments will probably keep the United States out of the Middle East. The British Government must therefore alter its decision and stay in Aden, at least until Nasser withdraws from the Yemen. Britain must "soldier on. The defense of its economic interests requires it. So too does the discharge of its responsibilities to the rest of the free world."

767

Baumann, Gerhard. [THEY REMAIN HERE NOT FOR GERMANY ALONE: THE FOREIGN CURRENCY PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO NATO] Sie stehen nicht nur für Deutschland hier. Das Devisenproblem in der NATO. Politische Welt, no. 99, Nov. 1966: 6-9.
D839.P65, 1966

Protests the repercussions American and British foreign currency problems have had on NATO strategy. Washington and London have made the further presence of their troops in Germany dependent on Bonn's purchase of American military hardware and increased imports of British products generally. Yet the problem of American and British forces in Germany cannot simply be reduced to one of foreign currency or trade; for this is in effect tantamount to giving up NATO's strategic doctrine. The continued Soviet military threat to the West does not warrant any such change, nor does the fact that most European allies have not lived up to their NATO obligations. As for the German Federal Republic its current fiscal difficulties hardly allow it to help solve the American and British foreign currency problems.

768

THE FAIRY-TALE FIGURES ON DEFENSE. Business week, no. 1939, Oct. 29, 1966: 182-184.
HC431.B87, 1966

Pentagon decisionmakers and the economists responsible for judging the economic impact of defense spending confront each other across a wide communications gap. Since the raw data required for forecasting the impact of defense spending on the national economy is often incomplete or unavailable, Pentagon officials are free to make reasonable budget assumptions and then when the need arises alter the figures, often upward, to suit their convenience. Economists, lacking this latitude, must base their estimates on educated guesses utilizing Pentagon-supplied figures. The Pentagon's status of funds report, an irregularly issued monthly, is the "Pentagon's household budget," but to economists able to obtain a copy it is good only as a short-term indicator. Month-to-month movements are highly erratic because considerations of economic and even political natures sometimes intrude. Missed months are never covered separately in subsequent cumulations, so economists never know where unpaid obligations stood for these missed time periods. They often must rely on obligation and expenditure tables that cover the missed months, but are also weak. Defense economists usually end by referring to the monthly list of prime contract awards, thus losing sight of what is happening to "current obligations, to current expenditures, and to unpaid obligations." This is not important in periods of stable defense spending, but it is valuable in the present, when expenditures are spiralling upward, and the economy is near boiling point. A Pentagon study of timing factors is in the works but may never be released. In the meantime other sources for raw data must be investigated. One, which reflects hiring and production figures, is the Census Bureau's "defense products" grouping, a monthly survey of defense-oriented manufacturers' orders, shipments, and inventories. The current spending climb can be traced to last fall's climb in procurement contracts, reflecting a 10- or 11-month lag. As long as new contracts run up faster than expenditures, or "as long as unpaid obligations are on the increase defense spending isn't ready to top out." Weak though they are, obligations and expenditures figures, given by the status of funds reports, are the figures smart economists will watch "over the coming months."

769

Gibert, Stephen P. WARS OF LIBERATION AND SOVIET MILITARY AID POLICY. Orbis, v. 10, fall 1966: 839-858.
D839.O68, v. 10

Since the U.S.S.R. is the only power that can seriously challenge the United States in a general war it is imperative to understand Moscow's position on the "wars of liberation" that it aids and abets. For unlike the "general and strategic" and "local-limited" wars that the post-Stalin Soviet peaceful coexistence policy has renounced, the wars of liberation, defined by the Soviets as "conflicts initiated by communists or the national bourgeoisie . . . against a capitalist-colonialist incumbent government," are deemed to be just wars qualifying for Soviet military aid. The factors guiding Soviet decisionmakers in granting military aid are risk of escalation, probability of success, and effect on the international political situation, especially on Western powers and Communist China. The ideal situation for the Soviets would be one in which an aid recipient shows high probability of success in its war of liberation against a Western or U.S.-oriented government. Yet judging from the types and quantities of military aid granted, the Soviet leaders are most wary of encouraging escalating conflicts. In contrast to U.S. military assistance, Soviet arms aid is never extended to hostile governments. The recipients are either Soviet friends or friendly neutrals. As the result Soviet arms diplomacy has scored some interesting successes. In Cuba the U.S.S.R. countered the U.S. forward-base strategy and gained a foothold in Latin America, in Egypt improved the Soviet position in the Middle East, in South Asia kept India nonalined, and in Indonesia advanced Soviet foreign policy objectives at the expense of both the Western powers and Communist China.

770

Gilmore, John S., and Dean C. Coddington. DEFENSE INDUSTRY DIVERSIFICATION, AN ANALYSIS WITH 12 CASE STUDIES. [Prepared by John S. Gilmore and Dean C. Coddington of Denver Research Institute.

Washington] U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency; [for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1966. 334 p. illus., forms, ports. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Publication 30) JX1974.A1U52, no. 30
Bibliography: p. 74-78.

Portrays the various elements in successful diversification of defense firms as follows: commitment among top management; ingenuity both in marketing and in technical matters; employment of personnel with experience in commercial fields, as well as association of the defense firm itself with commercial firms; close control over marketing expenses; careful timing to take into account the lag between the inception of diversification and the breakeven point; realistic expectation of some failure; and an understanding of the conflicting interests of the firm, the present defense customer, the financial and geographic communities, Federal agencies, and the performance of the firm. The analysis includes studies of the 12 cases on which it is based. It is augmented by statistical data and "selected articles which are considered provocative or informative, or both, for anyone concerned with diversification."

771
Gromov, L., and E. Chetyrkin. [CAPITALIST REPRODUCTION AND MILITARIZATION OF THE ECONOMY] Kapitalisticheskoe vosproizvodstvo i militarizatsiia ekonomiki. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 8, 1966: 75-84. illus.
HC10.M5357, 1966

This article, part of the discussion of the problem of economic reproduction and cycles, deals with the place of military production in the system of capitalist economic reproduction. The authors come out against singling out military production as a special third, subdivision of social production. They consider it necessary to deal with the military part inside the first and second subdivisions of production, proposing such an approach to the problem of realization of the social product in simple and expanded reproduction, if there is large military production. The article gives data describing the extent of militarization of certain branches of U.S. industry in connection with direct state purchases of military products and also discusses the growing role of military production in the sharpening of contradictions in the economy of capitalism. (Summary supplied)

772
HIGH COST OF WAR--AND PEACE. Canadian business, v. 39, Sept. 1966: 14-15.
HF1.C22, v. 39

Should the Vietnamese War be concluded in the near future, the United States would be faced with a major economic transition from a "quasi-wartime economy to a peacetime economy." In the absence of escalation of the war and a return to the peace this adjustment would be complicated primarily by the lack of consumer demand characteristic of post-World War II and post-Korean War economic adjustments. The root of the problem resides in the manner in which defense needs are being met for the Vietnamese War, namely "through plant expansion rather than through cutbacks of consumer goods production." After the war ends approximately 600 companies will be affected by cutbacks and order cancellations. One million workers are directly involved in the war effort; 3.1 million men are in the Armed Forces; thousands of other jobs depend on the increased production efforts around the country. When the war ends these people will need jobs. The Government's present program is both fiscal and political. Fiscally money will be made available. "Taxes will be reduced, credit restrictions all but removed, and stimuli, such as investment tax credits and export tax credits, will be added to the present tax structure." Politically urban renewal, aid to education, the anti-poverty effort, and the battle against air and water pollution could be used as part of a "huge domestic spending" scheme to take up much of the manpower potential that will become available "after the doves and the hawks leave the ring."

773
INCREASING WEAPONRY SALES STRUGGLE SEEN. Aviation week & space technology, v. 85, Oct. 24, 1966: 93-94. TL501.A8, v. 85

For both economic and political reasons the Soviet Union will probably compete more vigorously in the sale of weapons to developing countries over the next decade. A report by the Institute for Strategic Studies (London) also shows a trend toward sale of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems. Other than American military assistance there has been virtually no grant aid in developing areas. The commercial value of the arms market in these nations is worth at least $10 billion in the next 10 years. They are showing particular interest in buying jet aircraft and the larger and more specialized military transport aircraft. At present no agreements between supplier nations restrict the flow of armaments. Although the Big Four --Britain, United States, France, and Russia--currently dominate the arms market, Canada, Japan, and Germany are increasing their sales of certain types of weapons, partly because many buyers "prefer to stress non-alignment with the major powers."

774
[INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF THE MEMBER-COUNTRIES OF FORATOM DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1966] Informations concernant les principales activités nucléaires des pays membres de FORATOM au cours du Ier semestre 1966. Foratom informations, no. 27, Oct. 1966: 1-12. Z6941.U5, 1966

Information on the activities of nuclear industries in West Germany, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Switzerland, Italy, and Sweden during the first half of 1966. The net production of electric energy in the nuclear plants of these countries in the period amounted to 12,254 gigawatt hours [GWh]. Of this amount Germany produced 52, France 760, Great Britain 9,789, Italy 1,633 and Sweden 196. For comparison the power production statistics of the principal American nuclear plants during the same period are included. This production amounted to 2,463 GWh.

775
McCarthy, Terence. THE GARRISON ECONOMY. Columbia University forum, v. 9, fall 1966: 27-32.
AS30.C59, v. 9

The war in Vietnam is proving both expensive and inflationary. It is questionable whether an abundance of civilian goods can be maintained in the face of escalating military demands, wages, and purchasing power, and a diminishing supply of skilled industrial labor. Unless imports are encouraged to rise sharply, the short supply of consumer goods combined with the

enormous generation of purchasing power will cause insupportable inflation. Moreover the present demand for capital goods cannot be met unless machinery and equipment exports are decreased and imports increased. Thus the United States is faced with an unenviable choice between aggravating either the balance of payments deficit or domestic inflation. The garrison economy is a permanent economic ordering of the nation-state in response to a perceived foreign threat. The size and character of military spending determine the qualities of the economy as the state moves toward increasing, but not total, control over resource allocation. The interdependence of the military and civilian sectors approaches the point where military appropriations become the most important stabilizing factor in the economy. Military spending domestically becomes a function of foreign economic evolution; to the garrison economy all economic evolution is ultimately judged by its effect on the military capability. Amelioration of economic backwardness abroad is a threat to the nation-state, even if occurring among friendly powers. The garrison economy pursues an aid policy designed to selectively deter change abroad and limit total evolution of foreign economies. It disarms its allies economically by supplying them with the means of war; or the reverse may happen. Upon the civilian sector is thus imposed the obligation to support a growing number of overseas ventures, until the nation approaches, in effect, a permanent state of war--permanent even though military actions are intermittent and local in character. The United States should abandon its militarist stance and take constructive action toward equitable land distribution around the globe, toward technical education and guidance in the underdeveloped nations. The United Nations should levy a tax on the gross national products of developed nations to redistribute goods and capital to meet the needs of all. By progressive stages of $5 billion per year the U.S. arms budget should be reduced to a level calculated to defend the nation's shores, and the money saved channeled into domestic improvements. Finally, to stimulate the civilian economy, each one-percent gain in corporate productivity should be rewarded with a corresponding reduction in corporate income tax.

776
Symposium on Nuclear Materials Management, Vienna, 1965. NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT: PROCEEDINGS. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1966. 888 p. (International Atomic Energy Agency. Proceedings series)
TK9006.S895, 1965

Symposium papers and discussions on topics that included "material control systems, recording and reporting techniques, sampling, analysis and physical measurement, determination of production and consumption of fissile materials in reactors and various considerations of safety and economic management." Attended by 115 participants from 19 nations, the Symposium provided a discussion forum for the special problems generated by industrial nuclear materials and for comparison of "different systems for achieving the necessary economy and safety."

777
Thiemann, Hugo. [MOTIVES FOR EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT] Die Motive europäischer Forschung und Entwicklung. Chemische Rundschau, v. 19, Dec. 22, 1966: 861.
TP1.C3485, v. 19

"Summary of an address by Hugo Thiemann, General Director of the Battelle Memorial Institute Research Center, Geneva [Switzerland], to the Congress of the Swiss Europa-Union, held November 12-13, 1966, in La Chaux-de-Fonds."

The future of industry, its more or less progressive character, depends largely on today's research and development [R&D]. Presently only four economic areas of the world--the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan--contribute to the world's technological progress. Practically, only these four produce the world's total income, the contribution of all other areas being negligible. But the motives behind the effort of the four areas differ. Certainly national security reasons and the resulting arms race figure largely in the Soviet and American endeavors. For the Americans, however, a deeply rooted tradition of resolute pursuit of industrial goals as well as the ability to clearly define these goals plays no smaller part in their performance. Europe has been lagging behind the United States in R&D due to its inadequate setting of goals, its antiquated research organization, and its lack of vision regarding the practical results of that kind of endeavor. Postwar Japan offers an outstanding example of a successful research and development effort that is not motivated by national security reasons and the arms race. But, neither security nor national prestige needs to be the most important motive, nor a motive at all. Visions of profits and advantages 10 to 20 years hence resulting from today's long-range planning should provide sufficient motivation. Europe has enough talent to put its research and development on a basis competitive with that of America.

778
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. WORLDWIDE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Sept. 1966: 44-48. tables.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Excerpt "from a research report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Worldwide Defense Expenditures and Selected Economic Data, 1964, January 1966. It presents the results of a project conducted by the Economics Bureau of the ACDA. The interpretations and conclusions expressed were working hypotheses of the authors intended for intra-agency use."

Using "as complete a tabulation of national defense expenditures as is now possible," this report attempts to make useful comparisons between the nations' defense spending on the one hand and overall economic resources and expenditures on public education, health, and foreign aid on the other. The survey, which covers 120 countries, is expected to be continued annually. Worldwide defense expenditures appeared to increase by about $10 billion between 1962 and 1964, for in 1964 expenditures amounted to over $130 billion. The major alliances accounted for about 85 percent of the total, NATO's share being $73 billion. The United States and the Soviet Union accounted for about 67 percent--nearly $90 billion--of the world total, showing a fundamentally bipolar pattern of expenditures. 1964 defense expenditures for the less developed countries, such as Greece, Spain, Albania, the Far East (excepting Japan) amounted to about $16 billion or 12 percent of the world total. Thus defense expenditures in the less developed countries have risen about 50 percent since 1960, compared to 30 percent for the developed countries. The economic cost of defense can be measured by the relations between military spending and the gross national

product (GNP). In 1964 defense expenditures absorbed approximately 7 percent of the world's GNP. "Among individual countries, the ratio of defense expenditures to GNP ranged from less than one per cent to more than 16 per cent." In low per-capita income countries, the diversion of economic resources to defense needs will no doubt "affect adversely the attainment of economic goals." Domestic investment competes with defense for national economic resources. Rough estimates indicate that about 20 percent of the world's GNP goes to domestic investment. Foreign aid expenditures for 1964 amounted to 6 percent of worldwide defense expenditures. Global public health and education expenditures were $125 billion, quite close to defense expenditures.

779
Weidenbaum, Murray L. THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE OUTLOOK FOR DEFENSE SPENDING. [St. Louis? 1966] 13 l. HC110.D4W38

"A paper to be presented at the Fourteenth Annual Conference on the Economic Outlook, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, November 18, 1966."

Explains the effects of the Vietnam buildup on the American economy. In a detailed analysis, Weidenbaum compares the economy during other periods of military buildup--the Korean War and the cold war--and on this basis attempts to forecast the state of the economy for 1967.

3. Ethical and Social

780
Fair, Stanley D. GAS AND A JUST WAR. Ordnance, v. 51, Nov./Dec. 1966: 272-276. UF1.067, v. 51

Government and public opinion have historically condemned gas warfare on moral grounds, largely for its use against defenseless civilians. Different employment concepts and a new national policy on gas warfare can satisfy the requirements of the just-war doctrine. The primary application of volatile war gases on a modern battlefield must be as an integrated means of firepower, for example as part of the munition warhead. Incapacitating agents can be useful in attack on enemy prisoner-of-war camps, retrieval of hostages, capture of military or political prisoners, and counterguerrilla situations. Ambiguity surrounding current U.S. gas warfare policies detracts from public support. The United States should endorse the condemnation of gas warfare as set forth in the Geneva Protocol as an arms control measure of general acceptance. However, in defending itself and its allies against acts of aggression, the United States should reserve the option to initiate gas warfare when the President deems such use appropriate. Gas warfare is as moral or immoral as all weapons currently employed in war to protect the Nation's security.

781
[NUREMBERG] National Lawyers Guild practitioner, v. 25, summer 1966: 65-110. LL

Bibliography: 104-110.

Several articles exploring the legal and moral issues of the Nuremberg Trials as precedents for the citizens of any country who believe their government is engaged in an illegal or immoral war. The issue discusses the guilt of both nations and individuals. The International Military Tribunal declared: "To initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." Although the judgment clearly states that an individual who commits a crime under international law is responsible and therefore liable to punishment in spite of the fact that he acted under order from a superior, it could not possibly mark the area of responsibility of the average citizen or soldier to disobey state commands, nor could it define the limits of moral choice. Parallels are drawn between the issues at Nuremberg and the recent cases in military courts of young men who objected to service in Vietnam on the grounds that the war is "illegal, unjust, and immoral." The issue suggests works on treaties and international law that lawyers can use in defense of such clients.

782
O'Gara, James. CATHOLICS AND PEACE. Commonweal, v. 85, Nov. 11, 1966: 158. AP2.C6897, v. 85

A Gallup poll's findings that U.S. Roman Catholics support "President Johnson's method of handling the Vietnam war" in disproportionately larger numbers than the Protestants and Jews is attributed to the American Catholic's excessive conditioning to authority and ritualistic anti-communism without regard for whether it is right or wrong. Too many Americans appear to be prone to accept unnecessary violence in wartime like the "obliteration bombing in Europe and Japan." Without the moral restraints reflected in Christian literature and tradition, with which, unfortunately, "the American Catholic is, by and large, totally unfamiliar," a no-holds-barred warfare "can lead to barbarism, and it is this mentality that the Church had always resolutely opposed" as is witnessed by Pope Paul's recent encyclical on peace.

783
Terrell, Burnham. REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. Humanist, v. 27, Jan./Feb. 1967: 5-8. B821.A1H1, v. 27

"War is hell" General Sherman reportedly said. Such a statement is unfair to hell. Hell is sane; there is discrimination between the innocent and the wicked. War is insane; it torments and tortures indiscriminately. War is unjustifiable; to accept it as an instrument of national policy is an act of faith similar to acceptance of suffering and death as the mysterious and wonderful workings of Providence. War, introduced into the world by man, must be considered evil until proven otherwise. The responsibility for justifying it rests with its advocates. Few today find war glorious in its own right, requiring nothing beyond itself for its justification. However its defenders, soberly listing the benefits that war secures, are distracted from the real and immediate price it exacts by war's imagined glories and excitement. Humanists must not accept this luxurious evasion. Those who attempt to justify war characteristically argue to consequences--that war is an instrument for the attainment of benefits. Even assuming the benefits secured by war may be sufficient to justify the indiscriminate sacrifice of "n" persons (which can also be refuted), several important questions remain. Is there, for example, some reasonable expectation that the aims of waging the war which supposedly are its justification will be accomplished?

Furthermore, even if benefits can be expected, at what point is the price of securing them too high? Is there no other means, other than war, by which the aims of war can be accomplished? Can it be assumed that those who decide upon acts of war are of purely objective mind, or do political fortunes and economic advantages color their facts and decisions? The humanist, aware of human limitations, must never justify such a scheme of things.

784

Weber, Theodore R. WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION: THE METHODOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. Worldview, v. 9, June 1966: 7-12; July/Aug.: 15-19.
P&GP RR

A two part article analyzing and comparing papers presented at a meeting of the American Society of Christian Ethics. Weber feels that the primary ethical problem for the United States in regard to wars of national liberation is not war but intervention--whether morally it may exercise power where it has no authority. Such wars, in addition, raise all moral problems of using force up to and including terror, torture, and nuclear weapons. Weber describes the dilemma facing the Christian who is forced to participate in institutions of society that threaten his Christian identity by exacting his allegiance while at the same time recognizing that responsible service to human need must ultimately take some political form.

4. Other

785

Bennecke, Jürgen. [FREEDOM AND BONDAGE OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MODERN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS] Freiheit und Bindung der militärischen Führung unter dem Einfluss von Kernwaffen und neuzeitlichen Führungssystemen. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Oct.-Nov. 1966: 501-506, 564-569. illus.
U3.W396, v. 15

Inquires into the actual and potential impact on warfare of nuclear weapons and new management systems, tactical and operative command systems in particular. As a model for his investigation Bennecke uses a hypothetical war between two highly industrialized nations in Europe. For the purpose of the study he defines freedom as "a free use of weapons by the military leadership," which in his opinion is unrelated to the question of whether the leadership really wishes to employ the chosen arms. The author assumes the subordination of the military to the political leadership, and a constant, most serious military preoccupation with committing its forces to conflict. He deems that preoccupation to be essential to any deterrence. Bennecke's balance sheet of techniques and weapons affecting the military leadership's freedom and constraint assigns to the first category: armies, aircraft fleets, and amounts of munitions smaller than those used in World War II; speedier concentration of forces; and mobile command. The constraint consists among other things, of strict, political control over the use of weapons; uncertainty as to "whether, when, and how" these weapons will be released; and "undesigned and uncontrollable effects" of military decisions. Modern management systems speed up information and enhance the efficiency of the central as well as of the decentralized command. Their value--Bennecke thinks--lies in their potential contribution to the "freedom" of the military leadership.

786

Burnham, James. WHY DO THEY HATE ROBERT STRANGE MCNAMARA? National review, v. 18, Nov. 15, 1966: 1152-1162.
AP2.N3545, v. 18

Discusses the charges and criticisms hurled at U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara from right and left, both domestically and internationally. Burnham maintains that the merits of the technical and strategic issues with which the bulk of the criticism is nominally concerned--antiballistic missiles, the TFX, etc.--have little to do with the position McNamara's critics adopt. Case studies of the TFX, now the F-111, without even attempting to explain whether his decisions were right or wrong, prove only "how natural and indeed inevitable it is that a lot of people and a number of powerful institutions, should get sore at the Secretary of Defense." McNamara is attacked from the left for his business enterprise tactics, which are actually routine methods of modern management, and from the right, for the intensity and vigor of his attempts to change and modernize the military. While war cannot in the end be wholly assimilated into the general political-economic structure, the military establishment will never again act as a "free-wheeling surd." Too much is at stake in human life, power, and money.

787

Ermarth, Fritz W. MOSCOW AND THE CHINESE MISSILE. East Europe, v. 15, Dec. 1966: 2-6. illus.
DR1.N363, v. 15

How much and in what ways will the announcement of China's successful firing of a nuclear-armed missile affect Soviet policy? The Soviets' first task must necessarily be to assess the nature and extent of the threat posed by the Chinese nuclear-weapons program. Presumably they are better able to accomplish this than the United States since they have radar coverage of the Lop Nor missile range and knowledge of the technological base, founded during the days of Sino-Soviet cooperation, upon which the missile program rests. Moreover they must make this assessment sooner than Washington, as China will of course have Russia within firing range first. It is crucial that the Soviets estimate closely what path of weapons development the Chinese will follow. China can take three principal courses: creating a nuclear deterrent that is directed at the United States and the Soviet Union and that consists of a mix of MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM systems; creating a force to support the expulsion of the United States from the Western Pacific, which would require a deterrent plus "sufficient medium-range nuclear power to achieve local superiority in at least some areas on her eastern and southern periphery"; or, in order to gain territory in Soviet Asia, seeking a "maximalist" posture, with "both conventional and nuclear superiority in the border regions and a sufficiently powerful second-strike strategic force to deter a Soviet nuclear attack under dire provocation." Considering a 10- to 20-year period, the first alternative is attractive, despite the fact that it cannot support an aggressive policy; the second would be exceedingly difficult to attain; and the last is almost completely out of the question. In the short run China probably will be able to develop at least a minimum deterrent capability against both the United States and the Soviet Union but for the present will not be able to direct threats of great magnitude against even the Soviet Union. Moscow must ensure that Peking will not use its burgeoning nuclear

force irrationally. Accordingly Kremlin policymakers must keep trouble on the Sino-Soviet border at a minimum. Antiproliferation efforts are also bound to be affected by the Chinese nuclear capability. The nonnuclear powers are already resentful of the way in which, as they see it, the major powers are depriving them of the chance to develop nuclear forces without making any concessions of their own. China's nuclear achievements make perfectly clear the Third World's argument that a nonproliferation treaty is only a first step toward world peace.

788

Gilpatric, Roswell L. 'BANE OF MANKIND': ARE WE ON THE BRINK OF ANOTHER ARMS RACE? New York times magazine, Jan. 15, 1967: 32-33, 81-85. illus. AP2.N6575, 1967

This generation, which has never been free of arms races and which since 1945 has seen two U.S.-Soviet cycles of competition, may be about to witness another. The postwar arms races have been characterized by American emphasis on offensive and Soviet stress on defensive weapons. Having passed through the stages of developing and perfecting nuclear weapons and warheads, manned delivery vehicles, missiles, antibomber defenses, and (on the part of the United States) sophisticated penetration aids, the two world powers have been developing antiballistic missile [ABM] systems. Now apparently the Soviets have decided to deploy theirs. This decision, along with an increase in numbers and invulnerability of ballistics missiles, could begin to reduce the U.S. margin of superiority by 1968. President Johnson is therefore faced with some hard choices among weapons systems. Chief among the President's alternatives are the deployment, either on a full or limited scale, of an ABM system and an extensive fallout shelter network; maintenance of the U.S. second-strike capacity by developing a new generation of ICBM's--the Minuteman II and Poseidon --that will be able to penetrate or saturate Soviet defenses; and, in addition to procurement of the new "Improved Capability Missiles," development of a new generation of manned strategic aircraft. Choosing the first or first and third alternatives would herald the beginning of the new arms race. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara favors the current American posture of an overwhelming second-strike capability, but he is encountering opposition from many quarters. The professional military organization would like to see all three kinds of weapons systems worked on, and their judgment is likely to find strong support in Congress. Political and economic issues, however, must also be considered. The question of protecting American and Soviet allies with ABM's, for example, is crucial. Moreover increased emphasis on new weapons by the superpowers would greatly harm chances of world agreement on the various arms control measures now being considered.

789

Miller, William O. A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE SUBMARINE? In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, Oct. 1966: 96-103. Vl.U8, v. 92

Weighs the implications resulting from the introduction and indiscriminate use of the submarine. The rules of naval warfare, governing both surface ships and submarines, were reaffirmed in the London Protocol of 1936, yet the legal framework regulating submarine activities was violated by all belligerents in World War II. It became apparent that a mere codification of old traditional rules was inadequate to cover the introduction of a new form of naval weapon. With the advent of weapons of mass destruction the concept of limiting war to achievement of specific objectives has received growing support. With this in mind a law of sea warfare could be developed to which a national decisionmaker would adhere strictly or in some instances not at all, depending on the importance he attached to the political objective. In deciding how to use the submarine "the legitimacy of a participant's military objectives, in the general context of the conflict being waged, and the degree of force reasonably considered necessary to attain them, will in large measure determine the lawfulness of particular acts." While not a new international law for the submarine, this principle does present the gist of conclusions drawn from the experiences of the two world wars.

790

Morris, Christopher. THE DAY THEY LOST THE H-BOMB. New York, Coward-McCann [1966] 192 p. illus., chart, map, ports. TL553.5.M59, 1966

Maidstone, Eng., ed. (Angley) has title: The big catch.

Mainly depicts the drama of the ceaseless efforts to reclaim the U.S. H-bomb from the ocean, with additional material on radiation hazards and the U.S. position on proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the midst of the search for the missing thermonuclear weapon President Johnson reiterated the U.S. desire to end the arms race and to persuade the nonnuclear countries that it was not in the best interests of the world for them to embark on nuclear armament. At the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva Russia responded to this statement and to the loss of the American nuclear weapon with the accusation "that America had contaminated the high seas as a result of the nuclear bomber crash." Soviet negotiator Tsarapkin accused the United States of violating the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty. In an apparent effort to reap as much propaganda as possible from the incident, the Soviet Union demanded discontinuance of nuclear-armed bomber flights.

791

Moskalev, Aleksandr D. [OPERATION OF MILITARY UNITS IN A RADIOACTIVE SITUATION] Radiatsionnaia obstanovka i deistviia voisk. Moskva, Voen. izd-vo, 1966. 103 p. UF767.M67

Contents. --1. A brief discussion of ionizing radiation and radioactive contamination. Characteristics of ionizing rays. Sources of radioactive contamination. Deterioration of radioactive substances. Effects of radiation on live organisms. --2. A radioactive situation. Radioactive contamination of terrain. Radioactive contamination of air. Radioactive contamination of water. Radioactive contamination of armaments, installations, and objects. Influence of precipitation and land surface on the character of radioactive contamination of terrain. Consideration of radioactive conditions in the commanding officer's decisions. --3. Sources of information about radioactive conditions. Estimation of probabilities of area radioactivity. Radiation reconnaissance. Exposure control. --4. Military action in contaminated terrain. Movement over terrain contaminated with radioactive substances. Offensive action on terrain contaminated with radioactive substances. Defensive action on terrain contaminated with radioactive substances.

A booklet to aid military personnel in mastering the arts of action on terrain contaminated with radioactive substances. Moskalev discusses the physical bases of radioactive contamination, the means of appraising radioactive conditions, and rules of action on terrain so contaminated.

792
THE NEW ARMS RACE. Economist, v. 221, Dec. 17, 1966: 1212-1213. HG11.E2, v. 221

Moscow's apparent decision to go ahead with an antiballistic missile [ABM] system may well herald the start of a new arms race. President Johnson's response will provide the other half of the decision. His Defense Secretary, Robert S. McNamara, is opposed to answering the Russian challenge in kind. To McNamara a complete American ABM system would not only involve the United States in a spiralling arms race but also would impose prohibitive economic burdens. He proposes as a compromise the deployment of the Poseidon missile, which carries as part of its payload highly sophisticated penetration devices. Others maintain that against ABM defenses even the Poseidon would have a lower penetration capability than currently possible; therefore the Soviet move would shift the nuclear balance of power. Whichever choice the United States makes, the arms race has started again--new weapons, either defense or offensive, will have to be developed to deal with Soviet ABM's. The Kremlin's choice was probably determined by a number of factors including fear of attack by a third power, either a rearmed Germany or a hostile China, and Russia's historical reliance on antiaircraft defense, of which antiballistic missiles are only a logical extension. It is unlikely that McNamara will "be able to keep up his refusal to follow suit." High military officials and the missile industry are currently exerting strong pressure to change his decision. They now claim that the costs of deployment may not be as high as McNamara fears, and besides ABM's could protect against China, which is feared by the United States as much as it is by Russia. ABM's seem destined to become the new mark of membership in the first ranks of the nuclear club, forcing even more heavily upon Washington and Moscow the burden of defending their allies. The new arms race, instituted against everyone's best interests, serves to remind strategists of "the limits of sweet reason in the field of military rivalry."

793
Pavlov, M. PROTECTION AGAINST THERMAL RADIATION. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations, no. 306, Aug. 22, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,154) p. 11-15. P&GP RR
"CSO: 1850-D."
"Translation of an article . . . in the Russian-language newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). Moscow, 7 July 1966, page 3."

The damage from a nuclear burst is caused basically by shock wave, thermal and initial radiation, and radioactive contamination from burst products. About 35 percent of the energy released is in the form of the thermal radiation. In clear atmosphere a 1-megaton burst can inflict second-degree burns on people 18 kilometers away and one of 10 megatons up to 35 km. But use of known physical laws can provide some safety. Atmospheric particles like dust, smoke, or fog--created naturally or artificially--scatter and absorb thermal radiation by deflecting the rays or converting radiant energy to heat and other energy. The color, thickness, and composition of protective surfaces significantly affect their heat-absorption and conductivity. For example metal sheets such as the skin covering an airplane have a heating temperature inversely proportional to the sheet's thickness. Finally, special protective devices for eyes such as graphite goggles are being developed for aircraft pilots and others in exposed situations.

794
Shalaev, I. L. [THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF WATER AND AIR BY URANIUM TOGETHER WITH ITS DAUGHTER PRODUCTS] K voprosu o kontrole radioaktivnogo zagriazneniia vody i vozdukha uranom pri odnovremennom prisustvii ego dochernikh produktov. Gigiena i sanitariia, v. 31, Oct. 1966: 42-46.
RA421.G5, v. 31

On the basis of the calculated maximum permissible concentration of uranium and the actinium row of isotopes, it is demonstrated that in certain cases the radiation hazard of water and air contamination with uranium and its daughter products is actually determined less so by the uranium itself as by its daughter products, such as ionium, polonium, radium (in the air) and RaD, Po, Ra (in the water). The methods of determining the extent of contamination differ depending on the presence or absence of information on the changes in the balance of the uranium row. In the first case it is possible to detect any member of the row, in the second case it is necessary to know the concentration of all the isotopes that determine the value of the maximum permissible concentration of the mixture. In both cases it is possible to control the extent of the contamination by determining the total activity. However, if the shifts in the balance are unknown, such a method may prove to be too "rough." Equations are given for determining the maximum permissible concentration both with and without regard for the type of isotope distribution in the human body. (Abstract supplied)

795
Symposium on Protective Structures for Civilian Populations, Washington, D.C., 1965. PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES FOR CIVILIAN POPULATIONS; PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 19-23, 1965, BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DEFENSE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES--NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. [Washington, National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council, 1965 or 6] 357 p. TH1097.S93, 1965

Papers relating to the "technical feasibility of shelter construction." The nature of the threat posed by nuclear weapons, the construction requirements for shelters, and potential design details are covered. The discussions also included a number of case studies that "provided illustrative examples of protective construction efforts in Europe, Canada, and the United States."

796
$30 BILLION VS. 70 MILLION LIVES: A CHOICE PRESSING IN. U.S. news & world report, v. 61, Nov. 28, 1966: 30-33. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 61

Antimissile defenses could, in the event of attack, save 70 million American lives; yet their cost would be $30 billion. The Nation currently faces this hard choice. Pressure is intensified by reports that the Soviets have already begun to deploy such a system and may even have as much as a 3-year lead. American military experts argue that the lack of an antiballistic missile [ABM] system throws the entire U.S. defense structure out of kilter. They further warn against underestimating bellicose China's nuclear capability. Secretary of Defense McNamara, on the other hand, feels that the Nike-X system, America's development-stage ABM, will not only be "the most expensive weapon the world has ever seen," but also that its effectiveness will not warrant the expense. Congress has seen fit to disagree with Mr. McNamara, based on newly known intelligence estimates of Soviet ABM capabilities. Moscow presumably used its 1961-62 nuclear test series (which broke the U.S.-Soviet test moratorium) to gauge the effectiveness of its antimissile missiles and made the deployment decision in 1964. Thus, assert the experts, the nuclear balance could be weighted in Russia's favor, permitting nuclear blackmail of the United States. The Nike-X, which consists of Nike-Zeus and Sprint missiles and powerful radar, has already cost the United States $20 billion and is only part of a projected nuclear-defense system that would also include extensive fallout shelters. The system's foes fear that its deployment will herald the start of a mammoth U.S.-Soviet arms race; McNamara contends that the overwhelming U.S. offensive superiority is sufficient defense. He also feels that, since China's missiles will be unsophisticated at least until 1975, the decision can be safely put off or modified. His possible compromise would be a "thin" defense against a Chinese threat. This $5 billion system may satisfy Congress--if that body sees it as the first step in providing a complete system.

797

Turner, Nicholas. THE SOVIET STAKE IN VIETNAM. Far Eastern economic review, v. 54, Oct. 20, 1966: 180-182. HC411. F18, v. 54

The Soviet Government and people want good relations with the West and no further entanglement in Vietnam, but certain elements in the Army, the Party, and the Secret Police feel differently. The Army is envious of the live arms and equipment testing and up-to-date combat experience from which the U.S. forces are benefitting in Vietnam and sensitive to criticism levelled at its weapons developers from both its own and foreign government users. Party leaders are also supporting the Army line of argument for the purpose of maintaining the Soviet dominance over the world Communist movement. Although the Soviet Secret Police have not been vociferous since Khrushchev's clampdown on their operations, indications are seen now that the Vietnam developments may provide them with an opportunity to achieve influence again. While Kosygin is undoubtedly under pressure and "may well fear for the security of his tenure of office," he must also share the fear that war between Russia and China is inevitable. Reports suggest that 12 to 20 Soviet divisions are in the Sino-Soviet frontier areas. Recognizing that the average Russian cannot influence Government policy, it is still interesting that the Soviet people are almost "not at all" anti-American and are bored about Vietnam. Diplomats posted in Moscow believe that "Russia is under no illusions about being able to influence Hanoi policy," for China's size and proximity precludes maneuverability. And this may continue as long as the Chinese propaganda keeps iterating that Washington's peace feelers are a trap.

798

U.S. Food and Drug Administration. CIVIL DEFENSE INFORMATION FOR FOOD AND DRUG OFFICIALS. 2d ed., rev. Washington, [U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1965. 227 p. RA1231. R2U515, 1965
Bibliography: p. 224-227.

Outlines for food and drug officials the requisite information "about nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents to enable them better to meet problems that might confront them after an enemy attack." The first part of the handbook deals with the problems of the postattack environment, including salvage, reconditioning, and maintenance. The second explains the nature and uses of radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents, while the third and final part contains a brief and fundamental review of the mathematics, physics, and chemistry necessary to dealing with these problems.

799

Wakaizumi, Kei. NUCLEAR-ARMED COMMUNIST CHINA AND JAPAN'S SECURITY. Contemporary Japan, v. 28, May 1966: 639-642. DS801. J6, v. 28
Extracted from Chuokoron, Feb. 1966. Japan

Confronted with Chinese Communist nuclear weapons tests, Japan faces a policy choice between establishing and maintaining stable, peaceful relations with Communist China, and strengthening its own national defense posture. China claims that its nuclear armament program is in fact "nuclear disarmament," and that "it was undertaken in order to prevent a nuclear war, and to eliminate the world's possession of nuclear weapons." Although China claims to be interested in promoting world disarmament, it is reluctant to participate in any negotiations for this purpose. From the Japanese point of view China's nuclear program would seem to have far-reaching strategic objectives. In fact Peking's technologically-advanced nuclear weapons program is a political weapon in Asia and in the world, and one that is doubtless directed at both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Japanese unanimously protest Chinese nuclear testing, but are divided on what to do about it. Some favor continued security measures similar to those embodied in the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Others urge lessened dependence on the United States while continuing to strengthen Japan's defenses. Optimally, in order to underline its position on nuclear disarmament and arms control, Japan should encourage advanced development of its atomic energy programs for peaceful purposes. This is necessary in order not to become a "backward nation" in the nuclear-defined world of today.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

800
Bracht, Hans W. [IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOVIET DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] Ideologische Grundlagen der sowjetischen Völkerrechtslehre. Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik [1964] 253 p. (Abhandlungen des Bundesinstituts zur Erforschung des Marxismus-Leninismus, Institut für Sowjetologie, Bd. 5) JX1245. B8

Contents. --pt. 1. The development of the Soviet doctrine of international law since 1950. --The 1951-55 discussion on international law which used Stalin's teachings for its basis and superstructure. --Ideological appraisal of peaceful coexistence under the Soviet doctrine of international law. --The ideological development of the Soviet doctrine of international law since the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. --pt. 2. The principle "pacta sunt servanda" [treaties are to be abided by] and nations' right to self-determination: examples of the Soviet school of international law's ideological interpretation of generally recognized principles of international law. --Ideological justification by the Soviet school of international law of the principles "pacta sunt servanda" and "clausula rebus sic stantibus." --The Soviet school of international law on the right of nations to self-determination.

801
Chaudhri, Mohammed Ahsen, ed. THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION. Karachi, Pakistan Pub. House, 1966. 131 p.
JX1952. C454

Contents. --Introduction, by Boutros Bourtros-Ghali. --International arbitration since 1945, by Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri. --Commercial arbitration, by Tadeusz Szurski. --The Permanent Court of Arbitration, by Mohammed Tewfik Hussanein. --Appendixes. --Contributors. --Index.

Arbitration examined by scholars and officials of Egypt, Pakistan, and Poland. Chaudhri surveys the arbitration proceedings of the United Nations, giving particular attention to the attitude of the "new states." The significance of commercial arbitration for East-West relations is discussed by Szurski. Hussanein analyzes the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the crisis the institution faces today. Appendixes give the texts of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague, 1907), Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (United Nations, 1949), Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure (International Law Commission, 1958), and Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958).

802
Larson, Arthur. POWER AND LAW IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Progressive, v. 30, Dec. 1966: 35-37.
AP2. P8655, v. 30

Second of two parts.

As cited in the first article of this series [item 334 in volume 3, no. 1 of this bibliography] attempts at the use of raw power such as the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic or Communist China's subversion in the regimes of many new countries have generally boomeranged. The prime example of this thesis is Vietnam, where, if the policy of force were carried to its logical conclusion as many influential people are demanding, the effect would not be to contain China but to create a vacuum into which the Communists would be drawn by irresistible force. The negative results of the policy of force can be contrasted with the successful resort to law in the handling of the Congo crisis through the United Nations. Although it took U.N. forces two grueling years to restore order to the Congo, no amount of rationalization can dissolve the fact that it did succeed where unilateral force in Vietnam is failing. International law, like domestic law, is a distillation of experience, good sense, and the trials and errors of civilized people learning how to live together successfully. If the principal goal of U.S. foreign policy is the good will, support, and allegiance of the world community, and since America spends billions of dollars in foreign aid and other programs to achieve this, it should not deliberately alienate these same nations by raw military force. The United States should remain mindful that whatever cynics claim, respect for law is a basic human characteristic and one of the most potent and stabilizing elements in world affairs.

803
Levin, David B. [RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW] Otvetstvennost' gosudarstv v sovremennom mezhdunarodnom prave. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1966. 151 p.
JX5481. L4

Contents. --The principle of states' responsibility in international law. --The concept and kinds of international delicts. --Subjects of legal action as the result of their responsibility in international law. --Imputability of a state with international delictum --The most significant aspects of a state's responsibility in international law. --Forms of international responsibility of states.

Presents the Soviet view of the principle of the international responsibility of states in the context of efforts to prevent international law violations. In bourgeois scholarship research into this problem is one-sided, with principal attention directed to the responsibility of a state for damage caused on its territory to the persons or property of foreigners. This question has little significance in terms of safeguarding the peace and security of nations--the principal problem of international law. The central position in international law should be occupied by the problems of states' responsibility for aggression and for violations of and threats to peace. In the light of the recent years' crude acts of aggression perpetrated by the United States and other imperialist powers (as in Vietnam, Egypt, and the Congo), it is especially in this direction that Soviet science invites further research.

804
Mead, Margaret. [WORLD PEACE AND WORLD LAW] Redbook, v. 128, Jan. 1967: 32.
AP2.R28, v. 128

Rather than aiming toward prevention of war, an essentially negative objective, the world must think about a positive end, "a higher level of organization on a world-wide scale and a higher sense of respect among the world's peoples." Throughout history men have developed rules governing and restricting their behavior on the basis of what they consider right and just. "World law, like local law, must be rooted in the ethical agreement of all people who live within its tenets." Equality before the law for all nations large and small might be a first step in this direction. A group of political scientists and international jurists are striving to understand the bases of law in different societies, aiming to find a minimum body of common principles.

805
Pearson, Lester B. TOWARD EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW. American Bar Association journal, v. 52, Nov. 1966: 1017-1020.
LL

Stresses the need for attaining domestic respect for and acceptance of law as a precondition to achieving an international system of law that will substitute for force in maintaining world peace. Nations must seek two goals, Pearson maintains: first, to create a law for all humanity that is based on justice and accepted standards of behavior and that is produced and protected by a world organization; second, to strengthen international law both through a process of evolution that keeps it in harmony with changing society and through imparital and fearless enforcement.

806
Sweitzer, H. B. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SLBM. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, Sept. 1966: 32-41.
Vl.U8, v. 92

Soviet missile submarines pose a serious threat to American security. Yet if world sea lanes are analogous to neighborhood streets, then the law of the sea may provide protection from this threat. Attempts by the United States to persuade other nations to arrive at a formula on the width of territorial seas have only succeeded in defining what constitutes innocent passage in the territorial seas of a national state. Submarines, for instance, are required to pass through on the surface and show their flag. Submerged submarines would be subject to attack, for submergence violates innocent passage. The United States can exercise control of its territorial limits by establishing submarine Defense Identification Zones. To be established by Presidential Proclamation, these zones would be determined on the basis of the known and expected ranges of Soviet submarine-based missiles and their possible U.S. targets. Submerged transit of these zones would be forbidden without specific American permission, and even surfaced submarines would be required to transit through defined corridors. Surface and air transit would be in no way impeded, which would indicate to the world that the United States recognizes these areas as high seas and would reconfirm the American adherence to the 3-mile limit of territorial waters. Russia has already laid claim to large areas of the high seas as sovereign territory. The proposed identification zones, on the other hand, represent a legitimate exercise of national sights.

807
Treviranus, Hans D. [DEMOCRACY BETWEEN STATES] Demokratie zwischen den Staaten. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Dec. 1966: 709-714.
D839.A885, v. 17

Considers the interdependence between a state's democratic system and the development of democracy in interstate relations. Although he admits that interstate democracy is still in its initial stage of development, Treviranus believes that democratic nations will succeed in projecting to an ever-growing degree their democratic principles upon the international order.

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

808
Burhop, E. H. S. [THE FEDERATION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND DISARMAMENT] La Féderation, les armes nucléaires, et le désarmement. Monde scientifique, no. spécial anniversaire, 1966: 20-23.
P&GP RR

Reviews the last two decades' activities of the World Federation of Scientific Workers in war prevention and in combating the use of science for purposes of massive destruction. Only after the use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki did a social conscience about the results of the military application of their work develop among the scientists of many nations. This gave rise to the Pugwash Movement. But the repercussion of its conferences was much weaker than Joliot-Curie and his colleagues expected. Although the Federation took part in all attempts at arms control and disarmament, the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 was the only achievement of recent years.

809
Chamberlain, William H. UN TRAPS FOR U.S. POLICY. Modern age, v. 10, fall 1966: 370-377.
AP2.M628, v. 10

Misled by zeal and idealism, many American diplomats and scholars have disregarded the policy traps and pitfalls that the United Nations poses for the United States. Chief among the illusions concerning the Organization is the notion that it is "an instrument for enforcing world peace through world law, a task for which, as reason and experience both testify, it lacks both the will and the means." The ideological cleavages of the modern world categorically preclude achievement of consensus that is so necessary for effective world law. The United Nations has also repeatedly proved incapable of implementing its own recommended solutions to crises. In Kashmir, for example, all efforts to hold a plebiscite were thwarted by India. The Palestine partition, originally established by the world body, was finally settled only by bloody and bitter warfare--yet even today the United Nations has not been able to bring peace to this area. Despite the impressive evidence of U.N. impotence some Americans have urged placing still more matters of direct American concern in U.N. hands. Yet to give the United Nations responsibility for the defense of Formosa, for example, would be to court a mainland attack on the island. And to direct that the United Nations police nuclear disarmament would be certainly futile if not totally disastrous. Even if the "impotence of the UN in big crises" is acknowledged, its proponents assert that it nevertheless provides an essential forum for thrashing out international differences. But a crucial point is often

overlooked: Given the present composition of U.N. membership "the United States under... UN pressure has found itself dragged into taking official positions which are not necessarily in its best national interest." Lastly remains the question of U.N. membership for Communist China. The United States has not been playing ostrich by its refusal to recognize the mainland government; it is quite apparent to American leaders that Red China exists. What is at issue is the exchange of ambassadors and the acceptance of an intransigent as a full-fledged member of the community of nations. At present China has reached a diplomatic nadir--this is scarcely the time for Washington to reverse a long-standing and well-considered position by dropping its opposition to Red Chinese membership. On this and every other matter pending in the United Nations the United States should display the utmost caution.

810
Dembling, Paul G., and Daniel M. Arons. THE UNITED NATIONS CELESTIAL BODIES CONVENTION. Journal of air law and commerce, v. 32, autumn 1966: 535-550.
LL

Analyzes U.S. and Soviet draft conventions on the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies. From July to September 1966 the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space considered these drafts, and most of the important provisions of the eventual convention, including obligations in the area of arms control, have been agreed upon. Only a few outstanding issues remain to be resolved, including the question of space powers' reporting of their activities on celestial bodies and access to one another's installations there.

811
Gordenker, Leon. U THANT AND THE OFFICE OF U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL. International journal, v. 22, winter 1966/67: 1-16.
D839.I5, v. 22

U Thant, in writing what he expected would be his last report as United Nations Secretary General, outlined some of the basic beliefs that have guided his 5 years in office. While power politics are important in Thant's view, he sees four more fundamental sources of tension in the world: rivalry of political ideologies, economic disparity, unresolved colonial issues, and racial discrimination. Thant implicitly believes that despite the antagonisms and divisions in world politics, a malleable political universe exists that will respond to peaceseeking efforts. The United Nations, he feels, can play an indispensable role within the international system. Thant sees little necessity for changing the structure of the Organization, but rather emphasizes change in the policies of member nations toward it and toward each other. Mankind has common interests, Thant believes, and the United Nations should use this commonality to promote peace. He rejects the concept of the United Nations as a mere forum for debates and maintains it must develop into a really effective instrument for preventing war and advancing the economic and social welfare of the world's people. He feels United Nations peacekeeping has effectively handled several crises, but he is disappointed with the problems raised by financing the operations. While Thant views his office as a center of political activity, not a mere management post, he is also aware of the very limited actual authority and power he possesses and the continuous need to safeguard the independence of his office. Thant has maintained throughout his 5 years in office a faith in the potential of mankind to create a better world. Critics might claim that few of his ideas are novel or penetrating; statesmen, however, are often more effective through patient reiteration of ideas slightly in advance of the conventional than with radical arguments or intellectual originality. The wide acceptability of his views and the tact and delicacy with which he presents them leave the office of Secretary General after Thant's incumbency a respected and strong position.

812
Griswold, Enid (Hall). THE DRIVE FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT MARCHES ON. Daughters of the American Revolution magazine, v. 100, Oct. 1966: 682-684, 720.
E202.5.A12, v. 100

The National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution stands opposed to all forms of world government or partial world government including the Atlantic Union and United World Federalists. The continuation of freedom in the world depends on the survival of the United States as a sovereign nation under constitutional government. Many Americans today support proposals abandoning rights of freedom and sovereignty guaranteed to this Nation by the Treaty of Paris in 1783. A bill introduced in the 89th Congress specifically advocates transformation of NATO into a federation, within the framework of the United Nations, to save citizens from war and enable them to enjoy greater freedom. This is absurd; joined together in a world Socialist state with nations that have little understanding of freedom, the United States would be a hopeless minority, outvoted in the administration of the Federal Union and yet required to be the largest financial contributor. In addition to those promoting federation through NATO there is an assortment of one-world groups which generally favor establishment of world government through strengthening the United Nations. Dissolution of the American constitutional system and merging its people and resources with nations of diverse systems and races denies the basic principles at the foundation of the Government. The advocates of one-worldism are paving the way for complete conquest of the world by the Communists and Socialists.

813
Halasz, Louis. THE U.N. AT TWENTY-ONE. War/peace report, v. 6, Oct. 1966: 4-6.
P&GP RR

The only bright light ahead for the 21st U.N. General Assembly is in the area of "peace building"--the field of economic development. While the United Nations has floundered in peacekeeping operations, in checking the emergence of the African bloc, in achieving arms control and disarmament, and in generally keeping the peace, the U.N. Development Decade has "stimulated the efforts of the United Nations to equip itself with more effective means--the consolidated United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development--of tackling some of the basic problems of development." The dark side of the 21st Assembly was underlined by Secretary General U Thant's announcement that he would not be available for a second term. Frustrated by the lack of positive inroads toward maintaining peace and security, "U Thant has found his hopes unfulfilled." The problem of Communist China's admission to the Organization remains unsolved, with the United States reserving a two-Chinas position. In the area of arms control and disarmament, prospects are less than encouraging for making headway on extending the partial nuclear test ban treaty to

underground nuclear testing and concluding a nonproliferation treaty. From the nonnuclear nations came the most notable suggestions, namely the ideas of a "threshold treaty" banning underground explosions above the 20-kiloton level, verification by challenge, and the "Detection Club." The proposed international treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space seems near fruition. The peacekeeping picture will remain dark while the problems of finance and authority continue as sources of conflict among the major powers. The main issue is the roles to be played by the Security Council and the General Assembly in peacekeeping: whether the former has sole authority or whether the latter has residual control "when the misuse of the veto power frustrates an otherwise desirable United Nations undertaking for the keeping of peace." Africa's racial and independence struggles and the African bloc's seeming irresponsible activities in the United Nations constitute additional sources of tension for the 21st Assembly.

814
Hero, Alfred O. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE UN, 1954-1966. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, Dec. 1966: 436-475. tables.
JX1901.J6, v. 10

Updates Scott and Withey's study of American opinion toward the United Nations during its first 8 years (William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey, The United States and the United Nations: The Public View, New York, 1958). Despite the influx of nonalined members from the developing areas and growing difficulty in achieving U.N. support for American foreign-policy goals, the United Nations is extremely popular with the American public. Surveys indicate that a "clear majority of Americans with any opinion on the matter" even feel that the U.S. Government should be prepared to go along if the U.N. decides to seat Red China. Those opposed to any expansion of the U.N. role constitute a highly conservative minority, drawn from groups that "typically did not vote in either Presidential or Congressional elections."

815
Lall, Betty (Goetz) PUGWASH: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS. War/peace report, v. 6, Nov. 1966: 6-7.
P&GP RR

"Pugwash" is the magic word for East-West exchange on science and world affairs. Pugwash will celebrate its 10th birthday next September at its 17th meeting in Ronneby, Sweden. During the past ten years representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, Eastern and Western Europe, and such other countries as Canada and Israel have met to exchange views on a variety of subjects ranging among the economic betterment of mankind, European problems, and arms control and disarmament. Special groups have also been set up to study chemical and biological warfare and the conflict in Vietnam. The latest meeting, held in Sopot, Poland, Sept. 11-16, 1966, concentrated on tension reduction in Europe, European disarmament, partial arms control measures, and progress toward general and complete disarmament. China's participation in the disarmament negotiations, peacekeeping issues, and the dismantling of foreign bases were also on the agenda. That Pugwash meetings usually follow the same pattern of procedure is made possible by a core of delegates who return each year. Reports are submitted by each working group; while no attempt is made to obtain unanimous, formal consent on the conclusions submitted, consensus is often reached. The uniqueness of Pugwash is its frankness. "There is a premium on trying to understand what the other fellow is saying, and for the most part delegates refrain from deliberately misrepresenting a position or proposal." National positions on agenda issues are at a minimum. And "little time is wasted at these meetings in scoring debating points, which is often an unfortunate characteristic at governmental conferences." Most delegates would welcome Chinese Communist participation. Can the spirit of Pugwash be sustained and its effectiveness increased as a "vibrant force to promote intellectual exchange of views on international problems now exacerbating relations among states"? Additional study groups might be useful, along with papers prepared jointly by representatives from two countries, such as the United States and the U.S.S.R. Although Pugwash papers and reports are not distributed to the general public, delegates often return home urging their governments to investigate positions aired at Pugwash.

816
Malecki, Ignacy. PUGWASH IN POLAND. Poland, no. 150, Feb. 1967: 3-5, 32-33.
DK401.P45, 1967

A short account of the 16th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs (held Sept. 1966 in Sopot, Poland) and responses from seven of the participants to three questions submitted by Poland. The questions concerned the significance of Pugwash for peace, Poland's peace initiatives, and "the role of science in the integration of the contemporary world." Among other things the Conference dealt with the problems of universal and total disarmament, partial disarmament, relaxation of East-West tensions, and European security.

817
Moore, Arthur. ORGANIZED RELIGION AND PEACE: WHAT DOES RELIGION HAVE TO SAY, AND WITH WHAT AUTHORITY? Worldview, v. 9, May 1966: 8-10.
P&GP RR

Peace is a question historically within the Christian church's domain, and one on which it is not only permitted but expected to speak. The vast majority of the statements made by religious groups, however, have little influence on anyone within or outside the church. They are not received with scorn but rather with boredom. A principle reason is that the church says only one basic thing: it is for peace and against war. Who isn't? On a level below this platitude the church cannot reach consensus, and so it makes statements which say very little. Although church leaders presume to speak for their members, the statements made by religious groups have very little authority. Far too often church statements reiterate previous wisdom rather than speaking to the present and exact nature of the moral issue in conflict. Religious groups have an obligation to earn the right to speak on current issues by informing themselves on the background of policy decisions. The goal of the church is not to make policy but to connect the "great ethical insights" it proclaims with current world events. "It is not our role to give the world answers that we already possess but to join with the world in seeking for the answers."

818
NEW LIFE, NEW CRISES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. U.S. news & world report, v. 61, Dec. 19, 1966: 36, 38.
JK1.U65, v. 61

Of late Moscow and Washington both have exhibited a healthy desire to get the United Nations back on its feet as an effectively functioning world organization.

Their cooperation has proved requisite to a viable United Nations, in that when they have clashed the world body has been paralyzed. U.N. Secretary General U Thant, who had planned on resigning at the end of his term, is now evidently enough encouraged over U.N. prospects to take on another stint. The major conflict between U Thant and officials in Washington results from the Vietnam War--the Secretary General badly wants to see peace talks among U.S. and Communist representatives. Apart from Vietnam, however, the United States backs U Thant strongly. The first test of the rejuvenated United Nations may well be in Africa, where brewing racial strife could require U.N. armed intervention. The financial distress of the world organization, caused partly by earlier peacekeeping ventures, may shortly be alleviated by "voluntary" contributions from France and the Soviet Union, both of which had "flatly refused to pay their assigned share of U.N. peacekeeping operations." Still, the path ahead of the United Nations is far from clear.

819
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO REPORT, 1964-1965, by Jesus M. Vargas, Secretary-General. [Bangkok, Thailand] 1965 [i.e. 1966] 28 p.
UA830.S6

A brief review of SEATO programs and activities. Vargas reviews the general situation in Southeast Asia and the problems of Communist infiltration and subversion, particularly in Vietnam, with emphasis on the role of collective defense in preserving national sovereignty. He discusses SEATO's programs of military defense and defense against subversion, its mutual economic assistance and other projects, and its cultural programs.

820
THREE BAN-THE-BOMB CONGRESSES. Japan quarterly, v. 13, Oct./Dec. 1966: 424-428.
DS801.J274, v. 13

The fact that three separate congresses aimed at banning the bomb met in Japan during the summer of 1966 emphasizes the splits and political antagonisms that have plagued the Japanese peace movement for the last 10 years. Since each of the three bodies owes allegiance to different political parties, they engage in international disputes, especially regarding Communist China and the international Communist movement. The 12th World Congress Against the Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, which was attended by 10,000 delegates from throughout the country, followed generally the views of the Japanese Communist Party. Both the Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, sponsored by the Japanese Socialist Party and attracting delegates from 15 nations, and the 12th World Congress gave particular prominence to opposition to the war in Vietnam. Yet in their solutions for ending the conflict the two Congresses differed radically; the Socialists emphasized peaceful settlement and self-determination, and the Communists pleaded for active opposition to American imperialism. The Socialists also favor a nonproliferation treaty, which the Communists oppose. In contrast the National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons, an explicitly anti-Communist group which attracted delegates from 10 Asian countries, emphasized almost exclusively the threat of Communist China. It urged the peoples of Asia to unite and stand firm against Chinese nuclear blackmail. Most Japanese people are becoming highly critical of the way the ban-the-bomb movement is increasingly swayed by party affiliations and conflicting loyalties within the international peace movement. If the movement is to break the present impasse it must set aside ideological disputes and get its leadership "out of the hands of the professional campaigners and back into the hands of the masses."

821
World Congress for Peace, National Independence, and General Disarmament, Helsinki, 1965. WORLD CONGRESS FOR PEACE, INDEPENDENCE, AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT, HELSINKI . . . Organized by the World Council of Peace [n.p.] 1965.
JX1931.W6, 1965

Summarizes proceedings of the preparatory and plenary sessions of the Congress and of its seven commissions dealing with the problems of Vietnam, colonialism, nuclear weapons and disarmament, the German question, economic sovereignty, consequences of the arms race, and the fostering of peace and the reform of the United Nations.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

822
International Consultation on We the People and United Nations Peace-keeping, Haywards Heath, Eng., 1965. "WE THE PEOPLE" AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING; REPORT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATION. [Geneva? 1965 or 6] 85 p.
JX1981.P7I5, 1965c

Texts of the lectures presented at the Consultation, the attendance lists, and the final report and resolutions. In the main the lectures concern themselves with the political, legal, and military problems of U.N. peacekeeping forces. The International Peace Bureau, Geneva, sponsored the Consultation.

823
Lall, Betty (Goetz) PEACEKEEPING AT THE U.N. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Oct. 1966: 43-45.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Most of the controversy surrounding United Nations discussions on peacekeeping centers on the General Assembly's authority to undertake peacekeeping operations when the Security Council fails to act, the methods of financing peacekeeping operations, and the Secretary General's discretionary power in peacekeeping. Clearly more harm than good will result if the United Nations tries to make a priori definitions of General Assembly and Security Council jurisdictions. However there are areas where formal agreements would be useful. One is activation of Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, which provides for member nations to earmark contingents of their armed forces for U.N. use. Such arrangements could be formalized through agreements between the nations and the Security Council specifying the necessary details, including the numbers and kinds of troops to be provided. Commitments from five or six nations would represent a significant step toward creating a U.N. ability to meet crises endangering world peace. The Soviet Union has suggested that the Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent Security Council members, be reactivated. Although the United States has not specifically opposed the proposal, it prefers to rely on the Secretary General to manage peacekeeping operations. Agreements between member nations and the Security Council on the availability of troops for peacekeeping could solve some of the financial uncertainties

of U. N. activities by specifying the financial arrangements under which troops could be used. One possible method, voluntary contributions, was tried in the case of Cyprus and was found to be a very precarious basis for peacekeeping arrangements. Agreement by the parties to the dispute to finance the U. N. operation is a second alternative. A third is for the Security Council to include in its resolution on a particular operation a formula for financing, subject to the concurrence of the General Assembly. Applicable to operations of relatively small cost is the final method, paying peacekeeping expenses out of the regular U. N. budget.

824
Nathanson, Nathaniel L. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: THE PRICE OF PEACE-KEEPING, II. University of Chicago law review, v. 33, winter 1966: 249-313.
LL

Experience in U. N. peacekeeping operations has shown that the generality of the governing resolutions and the inability of the member nations to agree on the specifics of the mandate leave the Secretary General with the unhappy choice of abandoning the operations or deciding on his own the critical requirements of the situation. To partially fill this void former Secretary General Hammarskjold attempted to develop general principles and guidelines for peacekeeping based on the United Nations Emergency Force experience. First he required consent of the host state, one of the essential distinctions between peacekeeping forces and enforcement measures of other types. With this consent the host state must guarantee to the U. N. Force certain rights and conditions essential to its successful operation. From this first principle arises the question of whether the consent, once given, is revocable at any time by the host state, or whether the state is obligated to cooperate until the mission is complete. Another attendant problem is whether the host state should have a veto over inclusion of military units from a particular state in the U. N. Force. Although the Organization tries to take the host's views into account in its decision, on most occasions the exigencies of circumstance require the availability of forces to take precedence. A second guideline set forth by Hammarskjold stresses the importance of freedom of movement within and access to the force's area of operation. Freedom of movement is defined in the broadest possible terms, limited only by the host country's requirements of national defense and internal order. The third guideline concerns the use of armed force and the right of self-defense--whether a U. N. peacekeeping force can ever take the initiative in the use of force to effect its right to free movement. The policy arrived at through experience is that U. N. troops should not shoot first if they can possibly avoid it. On the other hand, they must have the right to use force if necessary to the performance of their duties, or to prevent attack upon those who have committed themselves to U. N. protection. Finally Hammarskjold maintained that the United Nations must be neutral or impartial with regard to political conflicts. Although Hammarskjold warned against U. N. intervention in internal situations, realism required him to acknowledge that in the modern world internal conflicts often cannot be separated from threats to world peace.

825
Piterskii, Nikolai A. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCES [Moscow] Novosti Press Agency Pub. House [1965?] 46 p. (Vital problems of our time)
JX1981. P7P54

Contents. --Rights and duties of the Security Council. --Where do violations of the UN charter lead? --Measures to maintain international peace and security: Taking a decision to create a UN force; Defining the tasks of a UN force; Establishing the composition, organisation and number of troops; Formation of the command; Arms and equipment; Duration of service in the theatre of operations; Finance. --UN forces in the disarmament period. --International security forces in a disarmed world. --Suggestions for the formation and use of international forces.

A brief vehicle in which the author, a retired Rear Admiral of the Soviet Navy now associated with the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, discusses current proposals for peacekeeping in an armed, transitional, and disarmed world.

826
Skern, L. M. K. UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS FROM A DANISH VIEWPOINT. Revue militaire générale, no. 8, Oct. 1966: 353-370.
U2. R48, 1966

According to the U. N. Charter the Security Council identifies any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and decides what measures should be used to preserve peace and security. Unfortunately, because of a lack of unity among the great powers in the Security Council such decisions have often been difficult to achieve. Consequently in 1950, upon a U. S. motion and in the absence of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which transferred peacekeeping responsibility to the General Assembly if the Security Council was deadlocked. The Charter provides for the use of U. N. forces in two types of peacekeeping operations: mediation and enforcement. In the contemporary world the United Nations can undertake only the former. The success of U. N. mediatory military action depends on early arrival of troops and their training, command, and administration. Since the great powers have never taken part in U. N. peacekeeping operations, the smaller countries have generally made military units available. But these units have rarely had the ability to fulfill their mission satisfactorily. Denmark, which contributed 1,000 men to U. N. forces and whose units were used in Israel, the Suez crisis, Congo and Cyprus, has joined in suggesting a new, more successful method--a combined Scandanavian force set aside for U. N. standby. By now a volunteer brigade totalling 4,500 men is being trained and will be available to the United Nations on the Secretary General's request. This method seems most effective and should continue to be used for as long as the United Nations does not possess its own military force.

827
Verrier, Anthony. GUYANA AND CYPRUS: TECHNIQUES OF PEACE-KEEPING. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, Nov. 1966: 298-306.
U1. R8, v. 111

Compares the "peacekeeping cum internal security operations" in Guyana and Cyprus. The two countries, both members of the British Commonwealth, have little in common except endemic insecurity arising from ethnically divided societies and police and military forces that as yet enjoy little public support and understanding. In both cases law and order are still preserved by either British-commanded forces or units operating in a milieu created by the presence of a British military base. Although in Guyana the British-commanded forces have made great progress toward

the characteristically British compromise policy of using minimum force, they are still under pressure from political factions which want them to restore their rule. In Cyprus, however, British soldiers are serving in the U. N. international force, which does not take sides but interposes between hostile Greeks and Turks. Their clear intention is to use force to carry out the basic peacekeeping terms of their mandate. The author feels the particular lesson taught by the Cyprus operation is that U. N. peacekeeping forces do not have the right to restore situations, whether the political forces in the country desire it or not. Instead their function is to prevent civil wars and protect internal security until the local authorities are ready to take over and establish some political stability in the country.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

828
Bulygin, S. [PEACE AND NATIONAL LIBERATION] Mir i natsional'noe osvobozhdenie. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 10, Aug. 1966: 2-4. DSI. S7, v. 10

What is the essence of peaceful coexistence? The author, answering the question, writes that such a policy means rejecting wars as a means of resolving controversial international issues. The Soviet Union regards peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism on an international scale. The principle of peaceful coexistence cannot be applied to relations between oppressor and oppressed, between colonialist and victim of foreign domination. Far from standing in the way of the peoples' liberation movement, peaceful coexistence facilitates it. (Abstract supplied)

829
Boulding, Kenneth E. NOTES ON THE POLITICS OF PEACE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Sept. 1966: 30-32. TK9145. A84, v. 22

Assesses the growing phenomenon of peace politics in the United States and supplies some general guidelines for politicians who choose to face the electorate on the peace side of the peace-war spectrum.

830
Chkhikvadze, Viktor M. A PEACEFUL FUTURE FOR ALL PEOPLES. [Moscow] Novosti Press Agency Pub. House [1965?] 78 p. JX1963. C5613

Contents. --The cherished dream of mankind. --Landmarks on a long road. --The common cause of all peoples. --The truth needs no visas. --Let's unite our efforts for peace. --Peaceful coexistence of states. --General and complete disarmament. --The peaceful settlement of international disputes. --National independence. --We must win the battle for peace, the battle for life.

Essays on how man may attain peace and security. The author is a Soviet professor, Corresponding Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, and President of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences. He has written more than a hundred scientific works on the theory of the state and law, democracy, jurisprudence, and international law.

831
EUROPEAN REVIEW DINNER-DISCUSSION: AN ASSEMBLY FOR ALL-EUROPE? European review, v. 17, winter 1966/67: 20-22, 25-26.
AP4.E78, v. 17

Meeting among British, Dutch, Hungarian, and Rumanian spokesmen to consider ways of increasing contacts between East and West Europe. Discussion centered on a plan by Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, M. P., for a semi-official organization that would include people connected with government, finance, industry, and labor.

832
A FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSION: "HAWKS" AND "DOVES" ON THE FARM, by R. H. War/peace report, v. 6, Dec. 1966: 15.
P&GP RR

Summarizes the recommendations of the Strategy for Peace Conference, held Oct. 27-30 at Airlie House, Va., to discuss questions of arms control and disarmament, East Asia, Europe, peaceful revolution, and the United Nations. Among the group's suggestions were adoption of a nonproliferation treaty, curtailment of U.S. export of sophisticated conventional weapons, and broader U.S. communications with Communist China including trade, diplomatic relations, and support of Peking's U. N. membership.

833
Gardner, Richard N., ed. BLUEPRINT FOR PEACE; BEING THE PROPOSALS OF PROMINENT AMERICANS TO THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. New York, McGraw-Hill [1966] 404 p.
JX1995. G37

Contents. --Preface. --Introduction. --Curbing the arms race. --Keeping the peace. --Developing international law. --Protecting human rights. --Promoting cultural exchange. --Containing the population explosion. --Conserving the world's resources. --Assisting economic development. --Strengthening international finance. --Expanding world trade. --Helping the world's cities. --Exploring outer space. --Using science and technology. --Harnessing the peaceful atom. --"Doing something" about the weather. --Meeting other challenges. --The committees and government consultants.

Proposals on every significant aspect of international cooperation by "several hundred dedicated Americans." Seventeen of the thirty committee reports are presented in the first 15 chapters of the book, and highlights of the remaining reports are given in the final chapter. [For abstracts and annotations of some of these committee reports see vol. 2, no. 3 of this bibliography, items 1322, 1339, 1351-53, 1416-17, 1425, 1459.] These reports represent the views of private citizens, not official U.S. policy.

834
Gorove, Stephen. CONTROLS OVER ATOMS-FOR-PEACE: SOME FACTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. Louisiana law review, v. 27, Dec. 1966: 36-42.
LL

One of the world's most pressing problems is the conclusion of international control agreements to assure that atoms for peaceful uses will not be diverted to military ones. Such controls must permit industrial progress without enhancing the chance of

249-857 O - 67 - 6

proliferation. In addition they should provide experience in creating institutions and practices conducive to eventual establishment of international controls over military activities. A broad variety of possible institutional arrangements exist: the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the Common Market. Control systems over peaceful uses of atomic energy, like those over its military uses, are still very limited in scope and purpose. While the composition of various organs and the degree of control exercised differ, the control methods employed by the various international bodies are similar--examination of the design of installations, maintenance of accounting records, transmission of periodic reports, and on-site inspection. Application and choice of control procedures depends on the nature and amount of material involved, chance of diversion, techniques available, cooperation of authorities, type of installation, and many other factors. Despite revolutionary new devices, no existing system is foolproof. International control over peaceful uses of atomic energy as a method of slowing proliferation admittedly is a temporary solution until a better method is found, yet its acceptance would be a significant wedge in the formerly impregnable wall of national sovereignty. Progress in this sensitive area of control is likely to be made only if the following conditions are met: national security interests are not affected; tangible incentives counterbalance deterrents; limited objectives are set; authority is carefully allocated in a network of checks and balances; and solutions are attempted on a step-by-step basis. Experience with peaceful uses controls may accustom nations to the formerly unpalatable idea of international inspection and provide an invaluable testing ground for techniques and procedures.

835
INTERNATIONAL PREPARATORY CONFERENCE REPORT TO THE TWELFTH WORLD CONFERENCE FOR BANNING ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on international Communist developments, no. 877, Sept. 6, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,439) p. 1-10.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 3801-S."

"Translation of an article . . . in the Japanese-language daily newspaper of the Japanese CP, Akahata (Red Flag), Tokyo, 4 August 1966, page 1."

Summarizes the results of the Preparatory Conference for the Twelfth World Conference for Banning Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, held in Tokyo, July 1966. Participants in the Preparatory Conference included "53 foreign delegates representing seven international organizations and twenty countries where the people are actively fighting against imperialist aggression and new and old colonialism headed by America." First of all the participants condemned the American imperialists' attack on Vietnam, exposed the fraudulent nature of the U.S. attempts for peace negotiations, and pledged ideological and moral support for the Vietnamese people. Stressing the necessity of war prevention, they emphasized the danger involved in the development of nuclear weapons, their use and proliferation. Finally they recommended unity in assistance to the underdeveloped countries fighting against neocolonialism, and in the struggle against the imperialist menace headed by the United States, which is the real source of the danger of a nuclear war. The article includes texts of reports from individual participants.

836
Kuroda, Yasumasa. PEACE-WAR ORIENTATION IN A JAPANESE COMMUNITY. Journal of peace research, v. 3, no. 4, 1966: 380-388.
AS9.J6, v. 3

Examines in detail "three variables positively associated with peace orientation": newspaper reading, ideological orientation, and personal political involvement in community affairs. This limited study suggests to the author that if a community "can realize the goal of a democracy in which everyone is informed and active in community politics, its residents will become peace-oriented even if they are conservative."

837
Lipsky, Mortimer. QUEST FOR PEACE: THE STORY OF THE NOBEL AWARD. South Brunswick [N.J.] A. S. Barnes [1966] 281 p.
AS911.N9L5

Tells the story of the Nobel Peace Prize and uses it as a framework in which to set the recent history of efforts toward world peace. Despite Lipsky's analysis of the often-impressive achievements of the winners of the Peace Prize, he concludes on a rather somber note: "It could be that the only practical thing to do now is to weep."

838
Prokof'ev, Vl. [NORTHERN EUROPE AND PEACE] Severnaia Evropa i mir. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1966. 207 p.
DL87.P76

Directs attention to Soviet relations with countries of northern Europe as showing the advantages of good neighbor policies for world peace. Prokof'ev answers questions as to what role should be played by Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland in the present international struggle for peace.

839
21st Anniversary World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, Hiroshima, 1966. [PARTIAL PROCEEDINGS] Japan Socialist review, no. 116, Sept. 1/15, 1966: 1-102.
HX9.J3, 1966

Reports and statements by delegates from 12 nations and 6 international organizations attending the Conference. The group discussed "the current aspects of nuclear disarmament in the light of the war in Vietnam and the role of peace movements throughout the world in relation to these problems." The final declaration adopted by the delegates called for cessation of all nuclear testing by all countries, adoption by all nations of a no-first-use agreement, conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty, abolition of foreign military bases, establishment of nuclear-free zones, reduction or destruction of nuclear stockpiles, and convocation of a United Nations World Disarmament Conference attended by Communist China.

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

840
Assembly of Captive European Nations. A STUDY OF THE ANATOMY OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 70 p.
D847.A8

At head of title: 89th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Prepared for the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

Studies prepared by prominent political exiles from 10 Eastern and Central European nations describing the manner in which the Communists, working through coalition governments, prepared the way for total takeover.

841
Carlton, David. THE PROBLEM OF CIVIL AVIATION IN BRITISH AIR DISARMAMENT POLICY, 1919-1934. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, Nov. 1966: 307-316.
U1.R8, v. 111

Reviews the British attitude toward disarmament during the 1919-34 period. Right after the First World War, at the Paris Peace Conference, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour expressed the view that a total abolition of the German Air Force would have little sense unless German civil aviation were similarly dealt with. But, paradoxically, when the French proposed extending control to German civil aviation, which could easily be used for war purposes, the British and Americans vigorously opposed such control. This policy remained unchanged in later disarmament negotiations and was extended to the military aviation the British used for police duties in remote countries. The article describes the vain efforts of Lord Robert Cecil, who was the only one to see the growing danger of the German political development, to persuade his Government of the necessity of air disarmament. His effort was finally interrupted by Hitler's withdrawal from both the World Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in 1934.

842
[THE FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY] Les Forces Françaises en Allemagne. Documents politiques, diplomatiques et financiers, v. 47, Oct. 1966: 1-72.
D1.D6, v. 47

A historical account based on documents concerning the French military forces stationed in West Germany, which covers the period from the end of the Second World War to the French withdrawal from NATO. While emphasizing that General de Gaulle rightly foresaw the gradual disengagement of the two great allies from the European defense theater, the author predicts that the reduction of American and British forces in Germany will automatically increase the importance of the French strategic capacity to the benefit of continental Western Europe. Furthermore this development may strenghten the political and diplomatic activity of the French Government throughout the whole of Europe.

843
Holcombe, Arthur N. EDWIN GINN'S COMMITMENT TO WORLD GOVERNMENT. International organization, v. 20, summer 1966: 419-429.
JX1901.I55, v. 20

Discusses the work of Edwin Ginn, founder of the World Peace Foundation, for the cause of world government. Holcombe discusses Ginn's participation in the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration in 1895 and his efforts toward world government in the post-World War II era. If Edwin Ginn were alive today, Holcombe maintains, he would strive to develop the United Nations into a "limited, but adequate and durable, world government."

844
Horelick, Arnold L., and Myron Rush. STRATEGIC POWER AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Chicago, University of Chicago Press [1966] 225 p.
U771.H6

"This study is a contribution to The RAND Corporation's continuing program of research undertaken for the United States Air Force Project RAND."

Analyzes "the interrelation of Soviet strategic military power and foreign policy" in the years when nuclear weapons first promised political potentialities and warned of military dangers. Part 1 reviews the situation in the early period of Soviet nuclear capability. Part 2 examines a bold Soviet attempt at political exploitation of ICBM's. Part 3 reappraises Soviet foreign policy throughout the 1957-61 "missile gap" deception. Part 4 views three directions for Soviet military policy that are open to the post-Khrushchev leadership and predicts their consequences. The authors conclude with consideration of "the role that strategic power may play in the future in relation to other instruments of Soviet foreign policy."

845
Jacobson, Harold K., and Eric Stein. DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press [1966] 538 p. (Michigan legal studies)
JX1974.7.J3

A case study of the nuclear test ban negotiations illustrates quite vividly many of the changes that have taken place in policymaking. The impact of nuclear weapons on American national security policy was the impetus for a whole new phase in U.S. politics and in relations among the concerned cold-war nations. For, although nuclear weapons represented great power, they "enormously increased the vulnerability of the United States." A major part of the change involved

the assimilation of scientists and science policy into the formulation of American security policy. American policy was torn between continuing the development of nuclear weapons and initiating efforts to control them. The latter spanned a period of about 16 years--years that witnessed changes in power structures around the world, in the thrust of U.S. national security policy, and in cold war relationships. The culmination of these efforts came in 1963 with the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow--"the first major formal arms control agreement between the two sides in the Cold War." The negotiations illustrate "how the United States has attempted to resolve the complicated issues relating to the formulation, implementation, and substance of security policy stemming from the emergence of nuclear weapons." They demonstrate refinements made in the "consensus-building model" by the executive branch during both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and also the contributions of the Congress of the United States. "The working of the international political system" was still another integral part of the negotiating process that underwent change and refinement. In the "process of formulating and implementing American security policy" the new role of the scientist in policymaking was of prime importance. Because the scientific requirements of the nuclear test ban issue were easily apparent as such, communication among politicians and scientists was accepted. Those involved concluded: "The first prerequisite to adequately coping with the problems posed by the growth of the role of science in security policy is the development of more 'scientific literacy' among policy-makers, both politicians and diplomats."

846
Ladd, William. A CONGRESS OF NATIONS FOR THE PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT OF ALL INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. World affairs, v. 129, Oct./Dec. 1966: 176-182. JX1901.W7, v. 129

Excerpts from an essay published in World Affairs in 1838 by William Ladd, founder and first president of the American Peace Society. Ladd envisioned an international tribunal of the most eminent men of all nations working in both a legislative and judicial capacity. Its jurisdiction would extend to all international problems, its decrees would be advisory, and its sanctions would be enforced only by moral and peaceful means. Such a Congress of Nations, Ladd asserts, would obviate nearly all occasions of war--sudden bursts of passion; clashing views, customs, and interests; temporary misconceptions; claims for redress unduly delayed; and mutual jealousies, fears, and suspicions.

847
Luce, Clare (Boothe) [HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT] McCall's, v. 94, Nov. 1966: 34, 155. TT500.M2, v. 94

National leaders in this century have devoted more time and attention to disarmament than any other international problem, but to date their efforts show no success. The first attempt to achieve an international disarmament agreement was in 1889 when the Czar of Russia, fearing a general European war because his nation was then technologically inferior, called on all powers to freeze the current levels of military forces and budgets. Ten years later the International Peace Conference was held at the Hague, attended by delegates of 26 states. Although the Conference failed to halt the European arms race, delegates did agree to prohibit dropping explosives from balloons and use of poison gas and "dumdum bullets." A second Hague Conference in 1907 set up a World Court for the settlement of international disputes. Following World War I nations again attempted to moderate or remove the causes of war through the League of Nations. The most successful disarmament effort of the interwar period was the Washington Limitation of Armaments Conference of 1921-22, at which the five largest naval powers agreed to limit the size of their navies. The agreement was secretly violated by Japan, and was finally destroyed by the attack on Pearl Harbor and the advent of World War II. Since World War II the United States has intensified its disarmament efforts, but 863 disarmament meetings covering 17,000 hours of negotiations have accomplished little. The case of China exemplifies the depth of the problem: the Soviet government "has done everything in its power short of preventive war to keep China from building nuclear weapons," but no nation capable of becoming a first-class power has ever voluntarily consented to remain a second-class one. "Disarmament was never more of a will-o'-the-wisp than it is today" but hopefully universal knowledge of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons will deter world war III.

848
Moscow. Akademiia obshchestvennykh nauk. [THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE: THE PRESENT STAGE] Natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia bor'ba narodov na sovremennom etape. [Pod red. A. A. Gubera, IU. N. Chubarova] Moskva, Mysl', 1966. 430 p. F1414.M65

Contents.--Foreword, by A. A. Guber.--Basic characteristics of the contemporary national liberation movement, by V. V. Lezin.--Consolidating the unity of revolutionary forces in Cuba in the process of the national liberation revolution's transition to a Socialist revolution (1959-61), by A. K. Masiagin.--Struggle of the Communist Party of Uruguay to establish a democratic front for national liberation (1955-62), by N. F. Kolobashkin.--Struggle of the Costa Rican people for democracy (1960-64), by IU. S. Zhiliaev.--Basic characteristics of social-economic transformation in Indonesia and Burma, by IU. N. Gavrilov.--U.S. neocolonialism in Africa, by V. I. Nazarov.--Struggle of the progressive forces of the Republic of South Africa to establish and consolidate a united national liberation front, by V. P. Gorodnov.--Economic transformation in Ghana (1957-65), by L. N. Lebedinskaia.

A collection of articles evaluating the progress of the national liberation movement to date and analyzing the principal problems encountered by the liberation struggle in countries of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The authors serve on the faculty of the history of international workers' and the Communist movement, the Academy of Social Sciences, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

849
O'Ballance, Edgar. REQUIRED--A NEW MILITARY PHILOSOPHY? In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 96, Apr./June 1966: 93-100. U1.U5, v. 96

War has become too dangerous, and political and military factors too interwoven for nations to accept Clausewitz' dictum that war is merely the continuation of politics by other means. Through the 1950's the

World War II strategy of total retaliation prevailed, with nuclear in place of conventional forces and mutual suicide the alternative to peace. In 1960 the American second-strike capability came into being when the first Polaris missile was fired from an underwater submarine. Two years later the Soviet Union achieved a similar capability. Doubts about total nuclear retaliation grew, and the new American Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began to speak of "controlled response" and "range of options." This strategy caused considerable misgivings in NATO, and created doubt about the shelter of the American nuclear umbrella. It also gave rise to the fear of "escalation" --fear that conflict might begin with small clashes and build to nuclear war. The value of total nuclear retaliation was diminished even further when other nations acquired nuclear weapons. The determination of a nation to use its nuclear weapons is suspect today, because nuclear war means national suicide. In other words, nations must find an alternative to total nuclear retaliation such as economic enforcement or subversive internal pressure. Economic sanctions and naval blockades, as part of a larger strategy, have been practiced for decades with varying degrees of success. The current struggle between Britain and Rhodesia gives some indication of their present efficacy. The Communists have applied subtle psychological pressures for years, mixed with threats and intimidation. Nonmilitary struggles may well take the place of shooting wars and be just as successful. The world may have seen the last total war between great power blocs.

850
Pop, I. I. [K. IRINYI. F. NAUMANN'S PLAN "MITTELEUROPA" AND HUNGARIAN PUBLIC OPINION. Budapest, 1963] K. Irin'i. Plan "Sredinnoi Evropy" F. Naumana i vengerskoe obshchestvennoe mnenie. Budapesht, 1963. In Akademiia nauk SSSR. Institut slavianovedeniia. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v TSentral'noi i Vostochnoi Evrope i ikh istoriografiia. [Otvetstvennyi redaktor V. D. Koroliuk] Moskva, Nauka, 1966. p. 224-226.
DR37.A6

A review by Pop of Irinyi's book on the Naumann plan for "Mitteleuropa." Pop asserts that bourgeois ideologists today are showing strong interest in the plan in connection with European unification. At the beginning of this century "Mitteleuropa" expressed the aggressive aspirations of German imperialism toward Central Europe. The reviewer feels that Irinyi accurately interprets the positions on "Mitteleuropa" held by various groups in Hungary at the time. He adds that Irinyi draws a vivid picture of the ideological and political struggle that revolved around "Mitteleuropa" during World War I.

851
Raser, John R. DETERRENCE RESEARCH: PAST PROGRESS AND FUTURE NEEDS. Journal of peace research, v. 3, no. 4, 1966: 297-327.
AS9.J6, v. 3
"References": p. 322-327.

It is apparent to those interested in achieving a stable peace that increased understanding of such conflict processes as deterrence is essential. Only by analysis of this current basis of organization among the major powers can steps be taken to change that organizational mode to one more consonant with the aspirations of most of the human race. This paper has three major purposes: (1) To examine the development of thinking about nuclear deterrence from 1945 until about 1957. (2) To propose an analytical framework for the study of deterrence to include sociological and psychological variables and to review the research since 1958 which fits into this framework. (3) To evaluate this research and suggest future directions for study which could lead to a comprehensive theory of deterrence. It is hoped that such an approach might serve as a guide to those interested in past work in the field and as a stimulant to future efforts. (Author's summary)

852
[WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA] Zapadnaia Evropa i SSHA. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenie, no. 11, 1966: 35-47.
HC10.M5357, 1966

"The article sets forth the basic conclusions in the monograph Western Europe and the USA: Essays on Mutual Political Relations, prepared for publication by the staff for the foreign policy of capitalist nations, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Science, USSR."

Significant qualitative changes in the relationship of Western Europe and the United States have been noted in the course of the last decade. They have been brought about by a basic change in the relationship of forces between two systems; by the elimination of the financial dependence of Western European countries on the United States which was so pronounced in the early post-war years; by the collapse of the myth of "Soviet threat", and, finally, by a shift in the aggressive policy of Washington so as to focus on South-East Asia. All this has resulted in a deep "crisis of confidence" among the NATO partners, with the most noticeable manifestation being the exit of France out of the military organisation of that bloc. The ruling circles of the United States are trying to patch up the cracks in NATO by means of bilateral agreements with England and particularly with the Federal German Republic. However, Anglo-American and Washington-Bonn relations are also corroded by sharp contradictions. In view of all this the popularity of the slogans for European security, advanced at the Bucharest session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact powers is gaining in countries of Western Europe. (Abstract supplied)

B. GENERAL ANALYSES

853
Beaton, Leonard. THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. New York, F. A. Praeger [1966] 118 p.
JX1963.B424, 1966a

Contents. --The bomb. --Nuclear delivery. --Central war forces. --Doctrines of war. --Alliance strains. --Crisis management. --China. --The extent of conflict. --Intervention. --United Nations peacekeeping. --Disarmament. --The prospects for peace.

Investigates the purposes, past and future, of armed forces and weapons technology "to see what the system of power in the world now is and to ask what can be expected of it." Despite efforts to achieve disarmament, Beaton observes, only partial measures have been enacted and armaments inventories have remained high. Starting with nuclear armaments the investigation proceeds to the less awesome but more suitable means of force being used in the world today, in hopes of illuminating "the partial and imperfect security system which is working . . . and is still only dimly understood."

854
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., Walter C. Clemens, and Franklyn Griffiths. KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARMS RACE: SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 1954-1964. Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press [c1966] 338 p. illus. (A study from the Arms Control Project, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
JX1974.B48
Bibliography: p. 302-323.

Traces Soviet arms control and disarmament policies during the Khrushchev decade, which, in contrast with Stalin's times, has demonstrated a notable flexibility in relations with the West. The limited nuclear test ban, the hot line, the ban on orbital weapons, and other limited arms control agreements pointed to the possibilities of moderating the arms race between the contending superpowers. Through depth analysis of Soviet military strategy, foreign policy, and domestic political and economic factors, the authors delineate the significant influences on Moscow's attitude toward the arms race, disarmament, the military balance, the Western posture, China, the strain within the Communist bloc, and the uncommitted nations. Further achievement, according to the authors, hinges upon how far Soviet leaders will go "from the atmospherics of détente to concrete arms control measures," a factor Westerners will inevitably find difficult to assess. Yet "the crucial factors explored here will undoubtedly continue to operate. Their relative saliency to Soviet arms control policy may supply useful systematic guides to behavior."

855
Herzfeld, Norma Krause. DISARMAMENT--NOT NOW. Commonweal, v. 85, Dec. 23, 1966: 341-343.
AP2.C6897, v. 85

The United States seems not yet satisfied that a complete nuclear weapons test ban could be achieved by technology alone, as deficiencies still remain in the detection of differences between underground explosions and earthquakes, and there is a lack of information on the effects of decoupling. And the Russians do not want inspection. Only recently they refused participation in a flight to Montana to see the large aperture seismic array [LASA] installation for improved identification of previously undetectable underground disturbances. Fortunately this flight has had good results. Denmark recently established an experimental seismic station on the Greenland Ice Cap to test its suitability for a LASA-type installation. Also some nonnuclear states like Sweden, India, and Poland have formed a "detection club" and agreed to exchange data on underground nuclear explosions. But other of the nonnuclear states' proposals, the cessation of nuclear tests under a "verification by challenge system," and "threshold treaties" limiting underground tests to those below an easily identifiable magnitude, have been found unacceptable. Generally the disarmament agreements reached thus far are limited, self-enforcing, and peripheral. The proposed treaty on outer space exploration is not enforceable by sanctions and might represent a large gap in the future, because on U.S. request it will not cover military installations and personnel. Another outstanding problem is that of nuclear explosions for peaceful use, because they can also be used to develop thermonuclear weapons devices. Russia is still afraid that Germany will get national control of nuclear weapons, and the nonnuclear countries are asking the nuclear powers for some real disarmament while threatening that otherwise they will develop their own nuclear weapons. Efforts to entice China into the disarmament effort have failed. Although Secretary McNamara predicts that China will need a decade to become a real threat, the Chinese seem to be ahead of schedule. Even the conventional arms race has not been slowed down, and with Russia's recent deployment of its ballistic missile defense system the United States is under a great pressure to continue the nuclear arms race. This new arms spiral and the obvious reluctance of any nation to limit its sovereignty by international arms control indicate the arms race might well continue indefinitely. Thus the results of the disarmament discussions can be considered extremely meager.

856
Jack, Homer A. THE 1966 U.N. DISARMAMENT DEBATE. War/peace report, v. 6, Dec. 1966: 12-14.
P&GP RR

The most tangible accomplishment of the 1966 United Nations disarmament sessions was the negotiation of a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space. The prospect of a nonproliferation treaty remains in sight, although no definite action was taken. Three nonproliferation resolutions were adopted, urging nations to refrain from activities conducive to proliferation during treaty negotiations, calling on the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference [ENDC] to give priority to negotiating such a treaty, and establishing a preparatory committee for a conference of nonnuclear states on security guarantees. While the debates on proliferation opened with optimism, the longer nations talked the more complexities appeared. The Soviets feared the possibility of a future NATO multilateral nuclear force, and the Americans wanted a prohibition on peaceful nuclear explosions. Additional problems included demands for a "balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers" and security guarantees. Considerable attention was given to the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in inspecting reactors for production of fissile material. Debate on the comprehensive test ban treaty was less extensive than in past years, centering largely on condemnation of France and China for atmospheric testing and on the problem of verification of small underground tests. Many states concurred with the Soviet assertion that the decision on a comprehensive test ban is more political than technical, noting the pressures on the defense departments of both superpowers to continue testing, particularly for the antiballistic missile. The General Assembly was critical of the ENDC's chronic lack of progress on general and complete disarmament. The subject of a world disarmament conference was purposely omitted from the agenda. The antiballistic missile race was generally deplored. Debates also covered prohibition of gas and bacteriological weapons, limitation of air flights of nuclear weapons outside national frontiers, and elimination of foreign bases. Many delegates expressed frustration at the shortage of progress and length of debate.

857
Powell, Craig. REALISTIC ARMS CONTROL CAN ENHANCE NATIONAL SECURITY. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Dec. 1966: 46, 51, 54.
UB153.A65, v. 13

In a recent interview with Armed Forces Management William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, emphasized that the agency

in no way works at cross purposes with the Defense Department. The stereotyped image of the Agency in military circles as a group of idealists willing to risk national survival for "peace at any price" is absolutely incorrect. The goals of ACDA and the Defense Department are identical and intertwined: "the avoidance of war, particularly nuclear war and the security of the nation." The United States is committed to continuance of its efforts in the arms control area. ACDA is the "think and study group" given primary responsibility for U.S. efforts in this field. In addition to its research and negotiation functions, the Agency is charged with the dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control, and participation in such control systems as may become part of U.S. activities. To perform these responsibilities the Agency has brought together a highly specialized staff from the Nation's experts in the military, political, scientific, and economic fields. The Agency also enjoys the advice and counsel of three prominent and influential groups: the Committee of Principals, the General Advisory Committee, and the Social Science Advisory Board. In an international environment where nations are more inclined to increase than reduce their military resources, ACDA successes in the past "have not been monumental," but Foster feels progress in "pre-disarmament measures" is more likely today than ever before. He emphasizes that, while the Agency is under no illusion that its long-term goal of general disarmament can be obtained overnight, it is assured that collateral measures contribute to a movement in that direction.

858
Silard, John. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A LIABILITY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Sept. 1966: 15-20. TK9145.A84, v. 22

The second half of the 20th century can be characterized by four phases of adjustment to the development of nuclear armaments. "Nuclear anarchy" spanned the years 1945-1959 and focussed primarily on the uncontrolled arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the years 1959-1966 the world passed through the second phase--nuclear arms limitation--during which the bomb began to appear of "doubtful and diminishing value." The nuclear test moratorium, the ban on weapons in outer space, the partial nuclear test ban treaty, and the Cuban missile withdrawal represent the most tangible evidence that both the United States and the Soviet Union were interested in inhibiting the arms race. Further attempts at limitation included the demise of the multilateral nuclear force [MLF] and proposals for a nonproliferation treaty and the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. The MLF proposal offered no additional increment of security to NATO and in fact threatened to undermine the trend toward nuclear arms limitation. The death of the MLF cleared the way for active interest in nuclear nonproliferation. The third phase--nuclear arms control--will probably span the years 1966-1980. Its main focus will be "the establishment of international controls and guarantees--particularly among the nuclear powers--to reduce the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used or threatened in local conflict situations." An international nonproliferation treaty will be the next arms control agreement. In addition to a nondissemination pledge from the nuclear powers and a pledge from the nonnuclear nations not to embark on nuclear development, this treaty will have to include guarantees from such countries as China not to attack nonnuclear nations. Only under such conditions will the potential nuclear countries such as India, Japan, Israel, or Egypt agree to the proposed treaty. The "no attack" pledge thus becomes the distinguishing element between arms limitation and arms control. The final stage will be nuclear disarmament wherein nations will believe that "nuclear weapons are bad, and cannot be used for tactical purposes."

859
SOVIET PRESS MATERIALS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, no. 7. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 61 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 38,880) P&GP RR

"CSO: R-7000-D."

Contents.--The arms race and prospects for disarmament, by Andro Gabelic.--Role of economics in military defense, Red Star.--U.S. prevents European solution to security, by G. Anatol'ev.--East-West political contact and European security, by Spartak Beglov.--Analysis of Chancellor Erhard's visit to Washington, by E. Evgeniev.--New link in "Axis," by Viktor Glazunov.--Erhard US talks advance nuclear ambitions, by E. Grigor'ev.--Disarmament negotiations and nuclear problems, by S. Bogatov.--Geneva disarmament committee talks, by A. Alekseev.--International atomic energy agency meeting, Pravda.--Atomic energy conference concludes in Vienna.--Sixteenth Pugwash conference, by M. Millionshchikov.--United States blamed for increased tension, Pravda.

One Yugoslav and 12 Soviet articles on arms control, national and international security, and related subjects.

860
Wilson, Andrew. PUBLIC OPINION AND DISARMAMENT. Disarmament, no. 11, Sept. 1966: 8-10. JX1918.P7D5, 1966

While the subject of disarmament is of interest to students of international relations, it has ceased to vitally concern the voters who comprise public opinion. One possible reason is that knowledge of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons no longer dominates men's thoughts. Nuclear testing in the 1950's and early 1960's tended to keep the threat before the public, but since the cessation of atmospheric testing in 1963 the weapons have been more and more forgotten. Another reason for public apathy is the complex involvement of many disarmament groups with innumerable other issues. This and their identification with the political left have generally worked against the cause of disarmament. The most serious public disenchantment comes from the many thoughtful people who are aware of the dangers of the arms race but who reject disarmament as a means of removing them. The idea that military deterrence affords the best guarantee of national security and peace is strongly entrenched in the public mind. A workable nonproliferation treaty or an agreement on outer space might revive some public interest in disarmament but would not revive the widespread aspiration toward comprehensive disarmament that followed World War II. Most people see arms control as an international barometer, rising and falling in response to changes in international tension. Perhaps keeping disarmament out of the limelight for a time would enable the powers to communicate with one another on basic problems free of the stances necessary to international gamesmanship. While on some issues the

force of public opinion pressures governments to accept popular measures, disarmament negotiations might be more productive if carried out less publicly.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

861
DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF CONFERENCE OF EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 3, Oct. 1966: 18-20.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 3

Text of a report from the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament for the period January 27 to August 25, 1966, as submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly. The report acknowledges failure to reach any specific agreement but expresses the hope that "the useful discussions and exchange of views during the period covered by the report will facilitate agreement in the further work of the Committee."

862
Jack, Homer A. A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. Disarmament, no. 11, Sept. 1966: 11-15.
JX1918.P7D5, 1966

In the 1950's the concept of a world disarmament conference was a repeated theme of Communist governments and peace organizations. The first non-Communist proposal was offered by a conference of nonalined countries held in Belgrade in 1961, which urged a U.N. General Assembly session devoted to disarmament or a world disarmament conference under U.N. auspices. This proposal is distinct from Communist China's repeated calls for a world conference of heads of governments with a limited agenda--"to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." A world disarmament conference was discussed by the First Committee of the 20th General Assembly in fall 1965. As brought out in the discussion a world conference could bring militarily significant states such as Communist China into the disarmament talks and also give the negotiations new impetus. Many nations questioned whether Peking would attend the conference and most recognized that for Chinese attendance it would have to be disassociated from the United Nations. Some were wary of undue optimism, suggesting the many perils involved in the proposal. They felt a world conference might impair negotiations within the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference and might through its polemics exaggerate differences among nations rather than reconcile them. Communist China had given no indication of serious interest in halting the arms race, yet without the participation of militarily significant countries little purpose would be served. The General Assembly First Committee approved a resolution favoring a world disarmament conference and Secretary-General U Thant endorsed the plan. When Communist China, after a long silence, finally commented on the U.N. action, it condemned the proposals as having ulterior motives and claimed that to discuss disarmament with the United States was a mockery. The conference, Peking insisted, was a smokescreen for U.S. aggression in Vietnam and a tactic to restrict China and other peaceloving nations from developing weapons for self-defense. When approached by officials of nonalined nations, China gave no indication of interest in the conference, and the topic has been dropped from the agenda of the 21st General Assembly.

863
Stepanov, L. OPERATING THE TASHKENT DECLARATION. New times, no. 3, Jan. 18, 1967: 3-4.
D839.N483, 1967

One year has elapsed since the ending of the India-Pakistan War by the Tashkent Declaration. A partial balance sheet can show the following steps taken by the former belligerents toward implementing the peace agreement. Normal operations of their respective diplomatic missions were resumed and bilateral negotiations initiated at various levels. Armed forces were withdrawn to the preconflict line. War prisoners were repatriated. Agreement was reached on notifying the other side concerning troop movements. Civil air flights over each other's territory were resumed and postal and telegraph communications were partially opened. However, despite official statements by Indian and Pakistani leaders on the necessity for establishing good-neighbor attitudes, many differences between the two nations have not been removed, and the full spirit of Tashkent may take a long time to implement.

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

2. Conventional Arms Transfers

864
Sutton, John L., and Geoffrey Kemp. ARMS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1945-1965. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966. 45 p. illus. (Adelphi papers, no. 28) P&GP RR

Quantifies the distribution since 1945 of major items of military equipment--combat aircraft, warships, tanks, and guided missiles--by the industrial nations to developing areas. The authors assess some of the factors that have determined the rate of flow of military equipment into these areas and analyze supply and demand patterns where discernible. Ironically, they note, the same major powers that have argued consistently for controls on the dissemination of nuclear weapons have pursued extensive programs of military aid and sales of conventional weapons, even in areas where active or potential local disputes exist. The present structure of the international arms market is a serious barrier to future arms control arrangements.

3. Nuclear Proliferation

865
AIMING AT THE ARMS MARKET OVERSEAS: TECHNOLOGY AND LUCRATIVE LICENSING ABROAD PUT U.S. AHEAD IN WEAPON SALES. Business week, no. 1944, Dec. 3, 1966: 66-67, 70, 72.
HC431.B87, 1966

The soaring cost of maintaining a full-fledged defense industry has caused many nations to turn to foreign suppliers such as the United States to acquire the weapons they need. U.S. arms sales have been rising since 1961 when Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara decided to emphasize cash and credit purchases rather than military-assistance giveaways. Pentagon officials expect arms orders to average about $1.5 billion for at least the next decade as developing nations switch from arms grants to purchases and industrial nations update weapons bought in recent years. Superior technology and vigorous salesmanship lie behind the success of the U.S. military export program. Henry J. Kuss, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations, believes the sales program promotes the military strength of U.S. allies and friends, encourages standardization of equipment and cooperative logistics, and helps to offset the balance-of-payments deficit caused by U.S. military activities overseas. Many observers criticize the military export program, objecting particularly to the sale of arms to developing nations that might better spend their money on internal economic improvement. Others note that arms sales promote regional conflict by making arms available to rival nations. Kuss argues that it is better for the United States to provide arms under careful restraints than to leave a vacuum into which Russia or China could move. In the future the United States will probably buy more equipment abroad to reciprocate for heavy purchases in this country. Kuss and McNamara are trying to promote a "defense common market" in which each nation would turn out the item it produces most efficiently. Recognizing that it cannot always make one-way arms sales, the United States is permitting Great Britain to enter competitive bids for military contracts in this country and is spending $75 million on antitank guns from West Germany.

866
American Assembly. A WORLD OF NUCLEAR POWERS? [Edited by Alastair Buchan] Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall [1966] 176 p.
UF767.A46

Contents. --Introduction, by Alastair Buchan. --Capabilities of non-nuclear powers, by Leonard Beaton. --The objectives of Germany, by Theo Sommer. --The Indian dilemma, by Sisir Gupta. --The Swedish experience, by Karl Birnbaum. --The problem for Japan, by Kei Wakaizumi. --Nuclear proliferation and world politics, by Stanley Hoffmann. --Alternatives to proliferation: inhibition by agreement, by Lord Chalfont. --Inhibition through policy: the role of the non-nuclear powers, by Urs Schwarz. --Index.

Background readings for the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, held in Scarborough, Canada, June 1966. In his introduction, Alastair Buchan summarizes the thoughts and findings of the contributors. He posits that the proliferation gap between the fifth and the sixth nuclear powers will be of long duration, but that after the sixth the incidence of proliferation will be rapid. In addition the spread of nuclear weapons will move from East to West. Leonard Beaton assesses the potentialities of the nonnuclear countries for weapons development and the costs to them of both weapons and delivery systems. Dr. Sommer "disposes of the myth of a German 'nuclear appetite,' a myth fostered by a mixture of malice and ineptitude." Sisir Gupta points out that India is not near a decision on "going nuclear," and that it would be several years before India could have an operational nuclear capability. Dr. Birnbaum discusses the debate that took place in Sweden several years ago. In his opinion "Sweden is definitely more concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, particularly in Europe, than about the emergence of possible nuclear threats to her security from the super powers." Professor Wakaizumi weighs Japan's alternatives. Stanley Hoffmann analyzes the effect a nuclear-armed world would have on the existing international system and world order. A nonproliferation agreement is only one part of the disarmament process, says Lord Chalfont, as he probes the problems encountered in negotiating such an agreement. Urs Schwarz suggests other means that might be taken by the nonnuclear powers to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. He feels that as a group these countries have the potential to exert great political power.

867
Anderson, Edith. WAR GAMES AND NEO-NAZIS: W. GERMANY SET FOR ATOMIC ARMS. National guardian, v. 19, Nov. 26, 1966: 1, 8.
AP2.N244, v. 19

"Fallex 66", supposedly a NATO maneuver but in truth initiated by the Bundeswehr staff, was an exercise in the operation of not yet passed emergency laws designed to empower the military dictatorship. For five days the "Emergency Parliament" played war against East Germany, passing laws to paralyze all opposition to the "war" but protesting they would resort to atomic rockets only if the civilian population was endangered. Can atomic weapons be far behind? From evidence available to this writer, it is hard to believe that West Germany does not already have atomic capability. The nation has an atomic reactor in Karlsruhe producing enough plutonium for 6-13 Nagasaki-type bombs per year; 20 other reactors that are being expanded; a process for separating uranium-235 by high-speed centrifuges; stockpiles of nuclear materials; nuclear research partnerships with South Africa, Israel, Holland, and other countries; rocket production facilities; Starfighter planes equipped to carry atomic weapons; and access through its own strategically placed NATO generals to NATO's nuclear arsenal. Germany is obligated under the Paris agreements of 1954 not to produce atomic, bacteriological, or chemical weapons on its territory, but it has refused to admit international inspectors. The U.S. Government has, of course, repeatedly given assurances that it will not permit West Germany to obtain nuclear weapons, but what is it doing to stop them?

868
ANOTHER DEAL BETWEEN THE TWO NUCLEAR OVERLORDS, THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION, by Observer. Peking review, v. 9, Nov. 18, 1966: 34-35.
DS701.P42, v. 9
From Jen min jih pao (Peking), Nov. 15, 1966.

The proposed treaty on nuclear nonproliferation represents an attempt by the two nuclear overlords, the United States and the Soviet Union, to deprive other nations of their right to self-defense. The treaty is a monstrous fraud, for the United States is "the worst nuclear proliferator in the world." The United States would not agree to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons when it had a monopoly, nor will it agree when only a few nations possess them. The only answer is to break the U.S. nuclear monopoly completely. The Soviet Union feigns concern that nonnuclear nations will impoverish themselves developing bombs. What

rubbish! That is for each nation to decide for itself--no one can deprive another of the right to have nuclear weapons. Those without the bomb should not humble themselves to pay homage to nuclear protectors. Such protection violates the sovereignty and interests of the nonnuclear countries and reduces their people to nuclear slaves. The sinister bargaining between the Soviet Union and the United States indicates a monstrous conspiracy against China. China's sole purpose in developing nuclear weapons is to oppose the nuclear monopoly and blackmail of these two nations. China will never consider itself entitled to special privilege because of its nuclear weapons and will continue to advocate the equality of all nations, big or small, nuclear or nonnuclear.

869
Beaton, Leonard. MUST THE BOMB SPREAD? [Harmondsworth, Eng.] Penguin Books [1966] 146 p. (Penguin special, A791) UF767.B395
Bibliography: p. 145-[147]

An interpretation of the "human, political, industrial, and financial forces which are working for and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons." Beaton feels that there is nothing inevitable about proliferation, and that a determined world could prevent it. Many powers do not want to produce nuclear weapons, providing they can find a reasonable alternative. Beaton thus suggests that present nuclear powers accept long-term security obligations toward nonnuclear nations in exchange for their renunciation of nuclear development.

870
Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron. CAN WE MAKE THE WORLD DROP THE BOMB? Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 190, Sept. 1966: 34-37.
AP4.R2164, 1966

"An exclusive interview by Jean-Claude Lamy with Lord Chalfont, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Britain's delegate to the Geneva disarmament conference."

A nuclear war is not likely to occur at present mainly because the nuclear powers, except for China, appreciate the dangers concomitant with the use of nuclear weapons and understand the rules of nuclear diplomacy. China's attitudes with regard to nuclear weapons are as yet unpredictable. The future danger, however, lies with the potential nuclear countries, for with several more nuclear triggers cocked the probability of nuclear war will increase. India needs only provocation from China to embark on nuclear weapons production. Several more countries might develop nuclear weapons for the security and prestige involved in having them. Many view the bomb as "a very powerful political weapon." A nonproliferation treaty seems to be the best means to insure that the military balance is maintained and that the nuclear club is restricted to its present members. Such a treaty should include guarantees that the nuclear countries would not supply nuclear armaments to nonnuclear countries or groups thereof, and that nonnuclear countries would not make or receive nuclear weapons. Control problems could be handled, for example through widened International Atomic Energy Agency functions. The more important aspect of a proposed treaty is that both the nuclear and nonnuclear countries would express their intention of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. A withdrawal clause would be included in the treaty. Hopefully the U.N. 21st General Assembly will adjourn with a treaty signed or at least ready for signature. The Soviet Union and the United States cannot come to agreement on a treaty even though both countries appreciate the need for halting the arms race. The stumbling bloc is NATO and the problem of nuclear decisionmaking. The United States does not want any restrictions on its freedom of action in this area, while the Soviet Union fears that such freedom will enable West Germany to either possess or share nuclear weapons. NATO must be consolidated, for "either the East-West division is permanent and the West remains locked in a stalemate, or it takes the initiative and tries to break down the division between the two blocs by using a strong NATO primarily as a negotiating instrument rather than a military alliance against a military threat." The neutral nations have some doubts about the West's position regarding NATO; they find the Soviet position more clearly defined.

871
Donnelly, H. C. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. Vital speeches of the day, v. 33, Jan. 1, 1967: 166-169.
PN6121.V52, v. 33

Control of the sources of fissionable material is the most important aspect of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A nuclear reactor producing plutonium as a by-product is the most likely source of such material. The International Atomic Energy Agency is working to devise an international control system to prevent the diversion of fissionable materials from peaceful uses to weapons development. The United States, in addition to transferring control over many of its reactors to the Agency, also keeps tight accounts of materials used domestically or exported. In addition the United States has proposed arms control measures designed to prevent proliferation: the nonproliferation treaty, the comprehensive test ban, a verified halt in the production of fissionable material, transfer of such material to peaceful uses, and a verified freeze in the production of offensive and defensive strategic delivery vehicles.

872
Dutt, D. Som. INDIA AND THE BOMB. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966. 9 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 30) P&GP RR

The strongest argument against an Indian nuclear weapons program is the almost prohibitive cost, not of developing warheads, but of acquiring the necessary delivery vehicles and achieving the level of hardening required to assure a second-strike capability. In view of the inevitable great power disapproval, such a program would have to be undertaken entirely out of Indian resources. This step, moreover, would bring a loss of moral stature among nonnuclear nations and nearly certain loss of support and assistance, if not open antagonism, from the superpowers. It might also invite the very results India hopes to prevent, in the form of preemptive war by China or nuclear acquisition by Pakistan. Those arguing for Indian nuclear weapons cite the importance of national security at a time when India is faced with not potential but very real enemies. They distrust the guarantees of the superpowers and consider self-reliance the only alternative. India's place in Asia and its role in maintaining peace, stability, and economic growth have important bearing on the debate. If India were certain China had developed nuclear potential in order to expand its territory or influence in Asia rather than to deter attack by the superpowers, and if India were the only country confronting China, then a case might be made for nuclear acquisition. However for the time being China can

still be checkmated by the superpowers; its real threat to Asian security lies in fomenting political unrest. This threat calls for an active working partnership among free Asian powers to prevent subversion and minor conflict in Asia and to work toward political and economic cooperation. Deterrence can be left to the superpowers unless they prove manifestly inadequate.

873
Gelbe-Haussen, Eberhard. [EUROPE AND A TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Atomwaffensperrvertrag und Europa. Politische Welt, no. 98, Oct. 1966: 11-17; no. 99, Nov.: 10-13.
D839.P65, 1966

Although afraid to be drawn into a direct military confrontation with the United States, the Soviets would not mind China's debasement by America in Vietnam provided it did not lead to Sino-American war. Certainly the latter eventuality would launch the Soviet Union on a war against the United States, despite all the Sino-Soviet differences. For now the Soviet Union is ready to play the mediator's role in Vietnam in return for an American guarantee on the preservation of the status quo in Europe--a price the United States is inclined to pay, although it hesitates to say so publicly. Through the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference the Soviet Union has exerted a considerable influence on American and NATO policy. On the matter of East-West rapprochement in general the American policy differs from the French in its suppression of the German issue. The American draft treaty on nonproliferation would permanently deprive nonnuclear states of the possession of nuclear weapons and--for all practical purposes--the codetermination of their use. The U.S. draft treaty generally converges with the Soviet proposal. However the divergence between the two on the definition of the nuclear and nonnuclear state has proved to be an unsurmountable obstacle, because both sides are pursuing different ends. For political reasons the United States wants its allies to feel that they codetermine the use of nuclear weapons. By blocking this the Soviet Union hopes to enhance the feeling of insecurity among the European NATO members. The position of the uncommitted nations is difficult to reconcile with those of the United States and the Soviet Union. The uncommitted powers want the nonproliferation treaty to charge all nuclear nations, China and France included, with stopping their nuclear arms race and gradually destroying both their nuclear stockpiles and delivery vehicles. They view a unilateral pledge from a nuclear power as an unreliable guarantee of their security. A bilateral agreement would not solve this problem either, because it necessarily would render a nonalined nation alined, and would thus reduce the freedom of choice regarding alliance in the world. Furthermore antiballistic missiles will certainly perforate and make totally impractical any nuclear umbrella. Existing nuclear powers will definitely not give atomic weapons to nonnuclear states. It is quite possible, however, that within the next 20 years 15 to 20 industrial, nonnuclear states will "go nuclear." The German Federal Republic, as the only industrially advanced nation that has renounced nuclear arms, is especially qualified to call upon all potentially nuclear states to do likewise. In that respect Bonn has shown unfortunately little initiative thus far.

874
Green, Harold P. THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUE: THE MIDDLE EAST IS ONE OF THE MAIN LOCALES OF A WORLDWIDE PROBLEM. Issues, v. 20, winter 1966/67: 35-40.
E838.I8, v. 20

The United States and the Soviet Union thoroughly agree that prevention of nuclear proliferation is in their common interests. The two nations have learned to live with each other as political antagonists who are sufficiently cautious that the risk of major war between them is relatively manageable. Nuclear acquisition by other nations would disrupt this equilibrium and substantially decrease international political stability. For instance a small nation involved in a local conflict would be tempted to use its nuclear weapons before its opponent acquired a similar capability; and a great power would be less likely to intervene to maintain peace in local areas where one of the antagonists possessed nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation would make the consummation of arms control and disarmament agreements even more difficult than it currently is. A basic requirement for development of nuclear weapons is the appropriate nuclear materials--uranium 235 or plutonium. The latter can be acquired as a by-product of nuclear reactors and is thus more readily available to small nations. Control of this ominous consequence of peaceful atomic-energy uses is among the most crucial prerequisites for preventing proliferation. As far as is known, neither the United States, nor Britain, nor the Soviet Union has assisted any nonnuclear nation in developing nuclear weapons, although all three have aided in peaceful applications. To prevent proliferation safeguards must be imposed bilaterally by nations giving assistance. While the United States has attempted to do this, most nations haven't. Canada, for example, built a large reactor for India fueled with India's own uranium, and no safeguards were established except the Indian Government's promise to use it only for peaceful purposes. Israel's dependence on foreign uranium provides an opportunity for the exporting nation to attach safeguards, but France, the most probable supplier, is not expected to do so. The nations most likely to develop nuclear weapons and to create a situation both embarrassing and detrimental to American interests are, paradoxically, nations that have benefited most from American largesse in peaceful uses programs.

875
Kissinger, Henry. SHOULD GERMANY BE ALLOWED TO BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER? Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 189, Aug. 1966: 13-15.
AP4.R2164, 1966

"Réalités reporter François Schlosser interviews Henry Kissinger, professor of political science at Harvard University."

The U.S. multilateral nuclear force proposal produced the adverse effect of encouraging West German nuclear ambitions. West Germany wants equal rights in the Atlantic alliance in both strategic decisionmaking and co-ownership of nuclear weapons. Inspired in part by the example of French independence, many West Germans now demand greater independence in nuclear affairs. While they do not doubt U.S. nuclear guarantees, they no longer feel secure regarding "diplomacy that would precede war" in Europe. Through the creation of the Special Nuclear Committee (the McNamara Committee) in 1965 West Germany acquired the right of consultation in strategic matters that concern NATO and nuclear defense. Going beyond this the United States has included in its draft nonproliferation treaty "the right to grant possession of nuclear weapons to Germany within a multilateral framework." Soviet-U.S. disagreement on nonproliferation rests on this point. It seems that the question of German co-ownership is "insoluble." If present arrangements for nuclear consultation for Germany do not meet its demands, West German policy could become extremely

nationalistic, a Gaullist tendency that would be undesirable. If Germany were in a position to play East against West, Europe would be fraught with insecurity, and German political life would degenerate. Although some inhibitions regarding world nuclear proliferation already exist, the United States is risking a clash with West Germany over the issue because it "must try at least to delay the moment of decision until such time as political tension decreases in regions where the proliferation of nuclear weapons presents the biggest threat." While the United States opposes the creation of national nuclear forces, it does seek cooperative efforts where such forces already exist. Perhaps the "European" solution to the problem of nuclear weapons could be the creation of an autonomous force for Europe. It is important that Europeans have independence and self-determination with regard to their own security and defense.

876
MORE NUCLEAR POWERS? FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Disarmament, no. 11, Sept. 1966: 17-20. JX1918. P7D5, 1966

Participants in the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, meeting near Toronto from June 23-26, 1966, were generally agreed on the following conclusions: Nations currently using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes are well able to embark on weapons programs. The major consideration prompting this action would be concern for national security, although desire for prestige and for greater national autonomy are also factors. However the civil nuclear powers have good reasons for not undertaking military programs: much of the technology involved has limited value for nonmilitary programs or for advancing the nation's economy; and, once the decision to acquire a nuclear military force is made, the country embarks on a rising scale of costs and risks. In certain troubled areas such as Europe or the Middle East nuclear acquisition might indefinitely postpone the prospects of political settlement. Military nuclear powers certainly should make a positive effort to give civil nuclear powers a realistic estimate of costs of nuclear weapons programs, even if this involves relaxing some of the secrecy surrounding their military planning. Although they could restrict some types of information to restrain the civil nuclear powers, much information is already in the public domain. In addition such restrictions could engender the kind of friction that would encourage nations toward nuclear development. The best solution to the problem is a nonproliferation treaty signed by nuclear and nonnuclear powers. The most difficult part of such a treaty is the issue of safeguards and of distinguishing explosions for peaceful uses from military ones. One aspect on which Assembly participants were adamant was that there be some "equality of obligations" on the part of both the nuclear and nonnuclear powers. Even if nonproliferation proves beyond their grasp, nations should consider other important initiatives such as nuclear-free zones, extension of the safeguards and inspection functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all nations, and negotiation of an underground nuclear test ban.

877
Sherman, Michael. GUARANTEES AND NUCLEAR SPREAD. International journal, v. 21, autumn 1966: 484-490. D839. I5, v. 21

Security guarantees as a means of controlling nuclear proliferation were under serious consideration 2 years ago when President Johnson, seeking to reassure the international community following the first Chinese nuclear detonation, pledged: "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it." The President has not elaborated further on his proposal, and other nations have shown little interest in it. Critics of proposed guarantees insist that their utility is minimal; that they do almost nothing either to contain the spread of nuclear weapons or to disrupt plans for nuclear sharing. Others argue that the alliances created during the late 1940's and 1950's are playing an important part in discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. "Nuclear guarantee" refers to any commitment made by a nuclear state to a nonnuclear state, to specific pledges of nuclear retaliation by the guarantor, or to guarantees in exchange for retention of nonnuclear status by the client state. The term is often misinterpreted as a promise to respond under agreed circumstances with nuclear weapons. This is not even the case in NATO. In the wake of nuclear threats or attacks against client states the United States reserves the option to counterattack below the nuclear threshold. In the case of the United States a major point of controversy is how far down the scale of conflict such commitments should extend. To cover only nuclear aggression leaves the guaranteed state unable to deter conventional attack with nuclear weapons, but to defend the client state against actions below the nuclear threshhold involves the Nation in many local conflicts. The most acceptable guarantee from the standpoint of preventing proliferation requires that the nonnuclear state remain so to preserve the agreement. The main question nagging potential recipients of American guarantees is the certainty of response, especially in the face of nuclear threat. Yet uncertainty should not obviate the usefulness of guarantees; even if dubious the client state might feel more confident of the U.S. ability to deter attack and to respond if deterrence failed than it would of its own response.

878
Singh, Bishwanath. NATIONAL DEFENCE IN NUCLEAR AGE: DILEMMA OF INDIA. Political scientist, v. 2, Jan./June 1966: 1-17. JA26. P66, v. 2

Presently nations advanced in science and technology are engaged in a fierce competition which culminates in the development of atomic weapons and the balance of terror. In this situation India, which is threatened by a nascent nuclear power, faces a real dilemma in its defense policy. Up to now India has practiced a policy of building up conventional arms under the framework of nonalinement, under which it attempts to obtain a joint guarantee from the nuclear powers and abstains from the manufacture of nuclear weapons in adherence to the nonproliferation effort and the Moscow test ban treaty. Now three alternatives to this policy have been advocated in India. The first recommends continuation of the present policy. This seems impractical because nonalinement has proved to be an error: India will never match China in nonconventional power; the joint guarantee of the nuclear powers is difficult to achieve except in the case of Russia's complete break with China; and the lack of nuclear weapons deprives India of prestige and demoralizes its Army. The second alternative proposes India's alinement with the West, particularly with the United States. But, although the United States is likely to protect India against nuclear blackmail, China probably will use

guerrilla warfare against which the American nuclear might will have little relevance. Besides the American policy is in a state of reappraisal, it might be changed, and the United States might return to isolation. The third alternative visualizes India's acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent. Certainly India has the resources to do so, and the cost is not beyond its reach. But the international political repercussions would be tremendous. No nuclear power wants to allow other countries to develop nuclear weapons. And India needs the economic assistance of these powers. Thus the only solution appears to be a limited combination of the three alternatives. The building up of conventional forces to the strength of one million should be supplemented by the development of tactical nuclear weapons for use in guerrilla warfare. To meet an escalation from the Chinese side a limited defense arrangement with the United States should be made, with the possibility of Russia's joining later in the arrangement. The big powers will probably protest the development of nuclear weapons, but they will reconcile themselves to it in view of India's security and their reluctance to allow China's expansion in Asia.

879
Trivedi, V. C. INDIA AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. Disarmament, no. 11, Sept. 1966: 1-4.
JX1918. P7D5, 1966

As suggested by two memoranda submitted by the eight nonalined delegates to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, a nonproliferation agreement should both halt the arms race and form the basis for eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The instability created by additional nuclear powers pales in comparison to the capability of the two superpowers to destroy the world many times over. Two major reasons nations give for nuclear acquisition are political power and prestige and national security. Thus to prevent proliferation no distinction should be made between countries possessing nuclear weapons and those that do not. The problem of security must likewise be met with measures other than increased numbers of weapons and military alliances; the three nations that have developed independent nuclear weapons programs were members of alliances. Nations must instead build the social, economic, political, and physical strength of their societies. The U.S. and Soviet draft nonproliferation treaties do not envisage sufficient obligations and responsibilities on the part of nuclear powers. The ideal treaty should contain three main provisions: first nuclear powers must not disseminate nor nonnuclear powers receive information on weapons and weapons technology, second production of nuclear weapons must be prohibited to both nuclear and nonnuclear powers, and third the treaty must provide for the eventual elimination of nuclear stockpiles.

880
Vohra, H. R. AN INDIAN VIEW: CLOUD OVER GENEVA. Progressive, v. 31, Jan. 1967: 35-37.
AP2. P8655, v. 31

Optimistic predictions that the United States and the Soviet Union are close to agreement on a nonproliferation treaty are misleading. Actually those two nations are on the same side of the bargaining table and must reach agreement with the nonnuclear powers that have nuclear potential--India, Sweden, United Arab Republic, Israel, and Japan. Discussions in the American press have propagated the mistaken belief that if the two superpowers agree on a treaty, nonnuclear powers will "queue up to sign it." But the latter powers take a clearly defined position on proliferation that cannot be ignored. They demand the treaty begin by renunciation of internal proliferation--the building of more nuclear weapons--by the nuclear powers themselves. The superpowers expect the nonnuclear nations to relinquish their right to nuclear weapons but resist comparable restrictions upon themselves. Nonnuclear powers agree that any additions to the nuclear club increase general world insecurity, but insist that a nonproliferation treaty must embody mutual responsibilities and obligations. Any other kind of treaty is unacceptable.

881
WHY THE BOMBS HAVEN'T PROLIFERATED. Economist, v. 221, Dec. 10, 1966: 1112-1113.
HG11. E2, v. 221

Nuclear weapons can be built exceedingly easily, provided one has got the necessary quantities of enriched uranium. Plutonium, of the quality turned out by any nuclear power reactor, will also explode, and the number of nations capable of thus making elementary atomic weapons is staggering. But enriched uranium is absolutely essential for a bomb that will rank in the same class as the superpowers', and it is extremely difficult to obtain. Communist China apparently has obtained it, although in countries where the technology is known it is shrouded in the utmost secrecy. Moreover the technology itself is astoundingly complex. A "small" gaseous diffusion plant may be three-quarters of a mile long, with hundreds of miles of pipe and thousands of moving parts. Theoretically all that is required is uranium in gas form, a cylinder with porous barriers, "a compressor to force the gas against one side of the barrier," and a vacuum pump to force out contaminating air. The gaseous uranium is filtered through the porous material over and over, until eventually the uranium has been separated into its lighter, more fissionable, and its heavier, less fissionable, components. But it is nothing like this easy, and "the puzzle remains how the Chinese mastered the art--for it is an art--of building their separation plant." The achievement is impressive, to say the least.

882
Zuckerman, Solly, Alva Myrdal, and Lester B. Pearson. THE CONTROL OF PROLIFERATION: THREE VIEWS. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966. 26 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 29)
P&GP RR

Contents.--Technical aspects of proliferation, by Solly Zuckerman.--Political aspects of non-proliferation, by Alva Myrdal.--The broader view, by Lester B. Pearson.

Three papers presented at the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons (Toronto, 1966). Zuckerman discusses the impact a nonproliferation treaty would have on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in terms of controlling both the use of fissile material produced in civil reactors and the application of reactor technology to weapons development. He warns that in the effort to prevent proliferation nuclear nations must not deny the world the benefits of nuclear energy. There are no significant technical problems in controlling the diversion of fissile material to military use for which safeguards cannot be developed. Mrs. Myrdal discusses issues to be considered by the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference: nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,

regional political and military arrangements, and, in the future, proposals for a U.N. role in controlling local conflicts and for the encouragement of peace and disarmament through economic development. Nonproliferation, she states, must go with agreements to cut off the production of weapons-quality fissile material and a comprehensive test ban, both of which must apply to the great powers. Pearson briefly states his views on the dangers of nuclear proliferation and on possible measures to reduce them--nonproliferation agreements, security guarantees to nonnuclear nations, and nuclear-free zones.

4. Other (Accidental War, Command and Control of Weapons, etc.)

883
Coffey, Joseph I. AN OVER-ALL FREEZE ON STRATEGIC FORCES. Disarmament, no. 11, Sept. 1966: 5-7, 21. JX1918.P7D5, 1966

Both the United States and the Soviet Union proposed limiting the technical upgrading and deployment of strategic offensive and defensive vehicles, but negotiations at Geneva reached an impasse while each side sought concessions and strategic advantages in their proposals. Nonetheless a freeze is a logical means of precluding further arms buildup and of limiting possible antiballistic missile deployment. A mutually acceptable proposal might restrict the total number of offensive and defensive aircraft and missiles, regardless of type, by weight. Within each weight category replacements could be made freely within numerical limits. The freeze might apply initially only to weapons of intercontinental delivery capability, and extend gradually to smaller weapons. In exchange for Soviet acceptance, the United States might agree to cut back its missiles and bombers and promise further reductions after a period of successful implementation of the freeze. The nub of the problem is verification of the agreement, since the Soviets are unlikely to be any more willing to accept extensive inspections now than they have in the past; hopefully both the United States and the Soviet Union will make some concessions on this subject. If agreed upon a freeze will maintain the present American numerical advantage in long-range strategic strike-forces but will also continue the Soviet superiority in medium-range bombers. Both nations will be able to adjust their postures to changing technology without upsetting the strategic balance by upgrading or substituting weapons within the overall numerical limits of each category. Authorization of technological upgrading facilitates verification and makes clandestine production less fruitful. Admittedly this type of freeze might intensify a qualitative arms race, but it would be a small price to pay for an effective ceiling on the number of vehicles. By coupling a freeze on weapons with timed proposals for cutbacks in numbers, the freeze may gain acceptability in both the United States and Soviet Union.

884
Falk, Richard A., Robert C. Tucker, and Oran R. Young. ON MINIMIZING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. [Princeton, N.J.] Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1966. 145 p. (Princeton University. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International Studies. Research mongraph no. 23)
JX1974.7.F3

Robert C. Tucker's essay appears in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Oct. 1966) under the title "Proliferation and Soviet-American Relations."
TK9145.A84

Contents.--On minimizing the use of nuclear weapons: a comparison of revolutionary and reformist perspectives, by Richard A. Falk.--Nuclear weapons and Soviet-American relations, by Robert C. Tucker.--On the nuclearization of international politics, by Oran R. Young.

Inquires into the broad spectrum of the effect of nuclear weapons on the international system. The authors focus on minimizing the uses--both political and physical--of nuclear weapons and present a view more comprehensive than that limited to securing international no-first-use agreements. Possible uses of nuclear weapons range from the physical--"tactical uses, symbolic attacks, limited strategic attacks, and all-out warfare"--to the purely political implications inherent in the mere possession and deployment of nuclear power. Both their actual physical use and all other forms of use must be minimized. Minimization also includes the avoidance of physical use and "efforts to restrict, insofar as possible, the extent to which nuclear weapons are used following a first use." The other half of the problem involves the stability of the international system and ways in which the system might be changed. Falk's essay is the most pessimistic, for he asserts that "drastic changes in the structure of international society are essential for the attainment of longer-run security." Yet these are politically unfeasible at least "until after another world war." Tucker tries to find feasible ways to change international society, such as a reduction of the international "violence-potential" and extension of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in the war-peace area. Young's paper is the most reassuring. He acknowledges the safety factors built into the international system and asserts that major nuclear war can be avoided without major reforms.

885
Goldberg, Arthur J., and William C. Foster. UNITED STATES REVIEWS POSITION ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 55, Dec. 12, 1966: 896-902. JX232.A33, v. 55

Statements delivered in the General Assembly's Political and Security Committee by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that urge the adoption of a nonproliferation treaty. Ambassador Goldberg urges further disarmament measures such as a verified cutoff of fissionable-materials production, reduction of nuclear stockpiles, a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles and antiballistic missile systems, and a comprehensive test ban. Mr. Foster clarifies the nuclear status of West Germany, which is "the only country that has forsworn, by treaty, the production of nuclear weapons." The text of a General Assembly resolution appealing for an antiproliferation pact is appended.

C. REGIONAL

1. Tension Areas

886
ASIA: BORDERING ON MADNESS. Time, v. 88, Dec. 2, 1966: 38. AP2.T37, v. 88

While the West is not displeased over the falling-out of the two Communist superstates, the rising tension along the Sino-Soviet border should be regarded warily. Russia and China have disputed parts of their common 4,100-mile-long frontier since at least the 1680's, but serious troubles in recent times began to occur only with the deterioration of their relations in 1956. Some 12 to 15 Russian divisions have faced China for some time. Recently, in response to the Chinese Red Guards' unrestrained disturbances across the Chinese mainland, 2 to 4 Russian mechanized divisions were added. The Soviets, Kremlinologist Richard Loewenthal believes, "regard the extremists--the Mao-Lin Piao faction--as very actively anti-Soviet, and they have recently lost hope that in the struggle inside China the extremists can be defeated." The Russians are aware that thousands of square miles of their land is marked on Chinese maps as Chinese territory. They are also acquainted with Chinese guerrilla infiltration capabilities.

887
Boxer, Charles. GERMAN CHRISTIANS AND GERMANY'S BOUNDARIES. New Blackfriars, v. 48, Nov. 1966: 60-73. BX801.N35, v. 48
Bibliographical footnotes.

Inquires into the relevance to the cause of peace in Europe of the German Evangelical Church's and the German Roman-Catholic episcopate's stands on the causes, and the ways of eliminating, the deep mutual resentment between the Polish and the German people. Boxer, an English Dominican and theologian, examines from the spiritual and, where necessary, political viewpoints the background, the contents, and the impact on the German people of the following: (1) the October 1965 Memorandum by the German Evangelical Church on "the situation of expellees and the relationship between the German People and their Eastern neighbors," (2) the November 1965 letter from the Polish Roman Catholic episcopate to that of Germany on the need for Polish-German reconciliation, and (3) the German Roman Catholic hierarchy's answer of December 1965. The author argues that messages of this kind should express Christian repentence for suffering inflicted by one people upon another. Instead the German Roman Catholic answer and the Polish letter reflect, respectively, an infatuation with "political Catholicism" and with "Catholic nationalism." Only the German Evangelical Church "demonstrated convincingly" that political activity aimed at healing resentment between nations "must include the Christian concepts of reconciliation and confession of guilt." The Evangelical memorandum asked Germans to reconcile themselves to the loss of former territories (now belonging to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union) as a moral consequence of German wartime deeds.

888
[KOSYGIN AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM] Kossyguine et le problème Israélo-Arabe. Observateur du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique, v. 10, Dec. 9, 1966: 11. DS41.O2, v. 10

Ponders whether the Arab-Israeli problem was discussed during Premier Kosygin's visit in Paris. The Soviet Prime Minister himself gave an answer to this question at a lunch offered by the foreign press. Asked if, in his opinion, a "Tashkent Conference" could be devoted to the problem, he said that such a conference was not discussed during his talks with the French leaders for the simple reason that a Tashkent-type solution requires a consensus of the two rival parties, and this is not presently the case in the Arab-Israeli problem. A high French official commented laconically that Kosygin said nothing the French did not say before, namely that the situation in the Middle East is not ripe for this type of initiative.

889
Kubdayeh, Salah. OUR ARMED FORCES IN THE AGE OF MISSILES. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on the Near East, no. 26, Sept. 13, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,572) p. 94-99.
P&GP RR
"Translation of an article . . . in the Arab-language daily Al-Akhbar (The News), Cairo, July 11, 1966, p. 7" Nr East

Asserts that the United Arab Republic is presently producing missiles launched from the ground, air, and sea and also a rocket that does not show on the radar screen and can be discovered only an instant prior to its descent to the target. The possession of a missile research center in Cairo and a plant somewhere in the desert will certainly enable the country to double its missile production in time of need. Furthermore the Republic can protect the whole Arab area against any attack, as every unit of its growing force is armed with missiles. The author describes various types of missiles and their uses as well as how Egyptian pilots are trained in launching them.

890
Kuznetsov, IUrii. APPEAL FOR COMMON SENSE: IS EUROPEAN SECURITY POSSIBLE AND WHO IMPERILS IT? Culture and life [English ed.] no. 10, 1966: 38-39. DK1.C8, 1966

Argues that, although the Vietnamese War is a threat to world peace, another, equally important threat arises from the policies pursued by the United States and the German Federal Republic in Europe. Bonn cannot reconcile itself to the results of the Second World War, and the United States is attempting to poison relations between Eastern and Western Europe. Behind the scenes reactionary forces in both countries purposefully aggravate world tension. Presently Europeans no longer believe in Soviet aggression, and there is no reason to protect them. They agree that General de Gaulle was right when he stated that "after 20 years the old concept of NATO is completely out of date." This problem has been discussed by representatives of member-states at the Conference of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee. This body urged that if all social forces that stand for peace would join together, irrespective of their ideologies and religious or other beliefs, they could easily solve the problem of European security.

891
Meyer-Ranke, Peter. [NEW CRISIS ZONE: RED SEA AND PERSIAN GULF] Neue Krisenzone: Rotes Meer und Persischer Golf. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Nov. 1966: 650-659. D839.A885, v. 17

Considers the imminent termination of French rule over Somaliland and the British presence in Aden as fraught with danger for the entire area between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Meyer-Ranke cites the arms races between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who each aspire to succeed France and Great Britain respectively. The world

powers' competing interests in the area, along with local differences, religious and otherwise, enhance the danger of conflict.

892
Nassar, Fuad. [THE ARAB PEOPLES' ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE] Antiimperialisticheskaia bor'ba arabskikh narodov. Problemy mira i sotsializma, v. 9, Sept. 1966: 29-38. HX8.P72, v. 9

Discusses the development of the Arab national liberation movement since World War II. The Arab peoples' victories are still incomplete because of the continuing control by international capital of many Arab economic resources, and serious contradictions existing among the Arabs on the one hand and the imperialist powers on the other. Nevertheless the attainment of political independence by the majority of Arab countries is a significant revolutionary factor. Although the bourgeoisie which has little regard for social progress, are in control they have at least eliminated the feudal and semifeudal conditions of life of such nations as Syria, Egypt, the Sudan, and Algeria. In the next stage of development the indigenous proletariat within the Arab States will have achieved the strength to move from the bourgeois revolution to the Socialist revolution, thereby uplifting the working class and fulfilling the national liberation movement.

893
Oren, Mordecai. WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR AN ATOM-FREE MIDDLE EAST? In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on the Near East, no. 19 (Israel) Aug. 24, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,197) p. 22-29. P&GP RR
"CSO: 3560-D."
"Translation of an article . . . in the Hebrew-language newspaper Al Hamishmar, Tel-Aviv, 15 July 1966, page 3." Hebr

Prior to World War II the accepted unit of measuring casualties was one human life; today "mega-death units"--equivalent to one million lives--measure casualties. An atomic attack against a country Israel's size would totally destroy it; Egypt, although it would be irreparably damaged, could survive. Prevention of nuclear confrontation is therefore a life and death matter for Israel. Proponents of nuclear armament point out the United States and the Soviet Union, who deter one another with their huge stockpiles of weapons. Mutual deterrence, they argue, would be as effective in the Middle East as in the rest of the world. But despite the radical ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union neither has ever declared that the peace of the world depends on the complete destruction of the other side. The Arab nations, on the other hand, insist continually that peace can be preserved only by the total physical destruction of Israel. Introduction of nuclear arms into the region would be a fatal mistake, for the theory of mutual deterrence and the practice of self-restraint that seem to be effective for the great powers would not work here. The Government of Israel has agreed not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, but it is unwilling to take the initiative in a formal ban. In fact present official policy neither welcomes nor shirks the "need for nuclear weapons if no other course is open." It would be far easier to reach an agreement not to introduce weapons than to attempt to eliminate them once they are present. Israel's efforts to reach such an agreement may fail, but they will "improve our political and moral stature in international circles as well as in some parts of the Arab world."

894
Rassinier, Paul. [SHALL WE EXPERIENCE A THIRD WORLD WAR?] Peut-on connaître une troisième guerre mondiale? Charivari, Dec. 1966: 32-33. P&GP RR

War starts when there is no longer a possibility of compromise. Then, because the victory is a matter of life and death, the belligerents cannot be deterred by the fear of destroying mankind. This happened in 1939. If we consider the Vietnamese War in the light of this theory we see that it is not likely tc degenerate into a world war. In reality the real danger of world war is in the Near East, and its cause is oil. There the United States buys oil from the Arabs, who own the strategically important and economically indispensable oil fields. Fearing that the Arabs might one day change their mind and refuse oil to the Western Powers, the United States tries to control the oil fields. As it is well aware that the Soviet Union cannot, for strategic reasons, tolerate American control, the United States tries to act through an intermediary, Israel. This explains the American assistance and the Russian hostility to the Jewish State. Because the control of the oil fields is considered vital by both the Soviet Union and the United States, war will be inevitable if Israel, acting for the West, were to seize control. The situation should be studied thoroughly before it becomes critical.

895
Sergeev, L. [OF THE SO-CALLED "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN CHINA] O tak nazyvaemoi "kul'turnoi revoliutsii" v Kitae. Agitator, v. 34, no. 20, 1966: 53-55. Slav Rm

Underscores the fact that the cultural revolution in China which flared up last summer is now in full blaze. The Chinese press repeatedly emphasizes that Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Community Party Central Committee [CCPCC] summoned the "revolution"; and that it proceeds under Mao's personal supervision. Chinese official documents seek to convince that the revolution's purpose is to "arm the whole nation with the great ideas of Mao and attain the state where Mao's ideas command everything, for to tear one away from Mao's ideas would make it impossible to perform any job well." Facts, however, evidence something else. Soviet Communist Party Central Committee documents published on September 1 state that "the decisions of the 11th plenum of the CCPCC authorizing the launching of the 'cultural revolution' . . . have officially confirmed the intention of the CCP . . . henceforth to implement its unusual course in contraposition to the Marxist-Leninist line jointly worked out by the fraternal parties at the Congresses of 1957 and 1960." Citing the Communist Party newspapers of a number of countries that reflect broad dissatisfaction with the policies and events in China the author concludes: "condemning the actions of the Chinese leadership, which have given birth to the so-called 'cultural revolution' the Communist and workers' parties unanimously continue their consistent, principled, and indefatigable struggle for the unity of the international Communist and workers movement."

896
Zabirov, B. [HIS MAJESTY THE CAVE IMAM] Ego velichestvo peshchernyi imam. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 10, Aug. 1966: 32-33. DS1.S7, v. 10

Trampled and burned crops, wells filled up with sand, people from the valleys seeking refuge in the hills, thousands of orphans roaming the roads of the country with outstretched hands: this is the picture of Yemen today, hurled into the throes of civil war by the powers of international imperialism and their agent, Muhammed el-Badr, who heads the reactionary forces of Yemen. B. Zabirov, an expert on Arab countries, speaks of the Imam's perfidious role in the destinies of the people of Yemen. (Abstract supplied)

2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.

897
Barnes, Peter. LATIN AMERICA: THE FIRST NUCLEAR FREE ZONE? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Dec. 1966: 37-40.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Latin American nations, hoping to establish the first nuclear-free zone in the world, created in November 1964 a permanent Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, Copredal. When it reconvenes in January 1967 Copredal hopes to find some compromise between the draft treaties proposed by Mexico and Brazil. Many Latins realize their long-term security would be enhanced by excluding nuclear weapons and an atomic arms race would be economically ruinous. The United States, in favor of the principle of nuclear-free zones but concerned about Cuba, has specified that all nations in the geographical area must be included, adequate verification must exist, and the military balance in the region must remain unchanged before it will support the proposal. Cuba also favors the nuclear-free zone in principle, but insists on inclusion of the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and U.S. restoration of the Guantanamo Naval Base to Cuba. Although invited Cuba has refused to attend the Commission's meetings. Latin nations are thus placed in the still-unresolved dilemma of whether to await a change in the Cuban government or to proceed with a treaty lacking support from the major powers. Meanwhile the committees of the Commission have continued to function and in April 1966 presented a preliminary draft treaty. While agreeing on a remarkable number of issues, Latins differed strongly on the number of nations required for the treaty to enter into force. The possible failure of nations as well suited to forming a nuclear-free zone as Latin America is a bad omen for the rest of the world. A compromise measure must be found between Brazil's demand for complete adherence of all nations to a treaty and Mexico's contention that two nations can create a bona fide denuclearized zone. An indication that the United States will support such a compromise might help in gaining its approval.

898
Guéron, Henri M. REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Sept. 1966: 32-33. TK9145.A84, v. 22

If the nations of the world could agree on a definition of national security and its identification with their national interests, it might be possible to construct a plan for insuring international security. Initially the major antagonists would "define their foreign policy in accordance with their conception of national security." These countries, along with the rest of the world, would then seek insurance against two major threats to national security: the existence of armed forces and nuclear weapons and the world acceptance of aggression. Cuba for example, poses no threat to U.S. security in the absence of foreign military troops. Based on these assumptions, a proposal for international security "would consist of the agreement among the major powers not to station troops outside of their own borders." Under such an arrangement nations would not be required to make any reductions in forces or armaments and thus could retain the deterrent value of their military establishments as a guarantee against threat. The settlement of border disputes would be necessarily concomitant to the agreement. It is assumed that converging national interests would discourage border transgressions. If a nation wanted more tangible insurance against a neighbor's forces, "it could request the stationing of neutral U.N. troops just within its borders, their mission being exclusively to detect and report border violations." Germany would present a problem unless it could be induced to accept "an operative control of its denuclearized status." The plan might result in the reunification of Germany and better East-West relations. Formosa presents another problem. Given the incentive of the removal of foreign troops from Formosa, Peking might be induced to grant some autonomy to the island. One advantage that might accrue from this proposal is that civil wars--which will continue in the developing countries--would be restricted to the internal forces of a country. Knowing that foreign troops would not be available to interfere, countries could conduct their civil wars with minimum risk to themselves and the world. Such wars would neither be a threat to world peace "nor threaten the national security of the nuclear powers." This new framework of international relations could be a step in the direction of controlled disarmament.

899
Laptev, Y., and N. Nikolaev. WHERE DOES AGGRESSION START? FOREIGN MILITARY BASES. International affairs (Moscow) Oct. 1966: 27-32.
D839.I465, 1966

Across the world imperialist powers are building and improving military, air, and naval bases, suppressing independence and national liberation movements, trampling sovereign rights by interfering in the internal affairs of nations, causing tensions, and planting the seeds of conflict. The 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union urged that military bases on foreign territory be dismantled and foreign troops withdrawn. Chairman L. I. Brezhnev declared, "We shall continue to pursue a policy aimed at achieving this purpose in the interests of strengthening world peace and security." The Soviet Union closed its sole foreign base at Porkkala-Udd, Finland, in January 1956, but the United States and others have increased their bases abroad. Washington justifies its policy through a doctrine under which America's "security zone" extends from one corner of the globe to the other. U.S. "security" ends nowhere, and its network of military bases stretched across the world is the manifestation of this political doctrine. American rulers pretend that these bases are defense against a Soviet menace, but life has long since exploded that myth--even the imperialists must admit that the Soviet Union "has no intention of attacking anyone, and is threatening no nation." More and more nations are realizing foreign bases are incompatible with national sovereignty. But the base network is still preserved in Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, and Oceania. U.S. ruling circles are convinced that the Western Hemisphere is theirs. The attacks on Cuba, interference in the Dominican Republic and Panama suggest

to what purposes Latin American military facilities are used. The Soviet Union has been consistently working for the closing of foreign military bases, and the abrogation of treaties that infringe on the sovereignty of independent states and contradict the principles of the U.N. Charter.

900
Robles, Alfonso G. THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Nov. 5, 1966: 8-10.
D839.R4, v. 17

The republics of Latin America have completed six steps toward a regional denuclearization treaty. On April 29, 1963, five Latin American heads of state announced their willingness to sign an agreement "not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices." United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1911 (adopted Nov. 23, 1963) indicated the support of the world community for the initiative taken by the five states. Preliminary meetings in Mexico (Nov. 23-27, 1964) set up a Preparatory Commission to prepare a draft treaty for Latin American denuclearization. The Commission's first session (Mexico, March 15-22, 1965) set up working groups, and the second session (Aug. 23-Sept. 2, 1965) adopted a comprehensive declaration of principles; transmitted draft articles on verification, inspection, and control to member states; and urged a commitment from the nuclear powers to the denuclearization of Latin America. The third and most productive session (Mexico, April 19-May 9, 1966) adopted unanimously "Proposals for the Preparation of the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America," which may form the basis for the treaty itself. Ninety percent of the treaty's contents have been agreed upon; the remaining 10 percent offer serious but not insurmountable difficulties. One of the main questions remaining is whether the nuclear powers will abstain from action contrary to the provisions of the treaty. Success of disarmament in Latin America will not only benefit the states in that region, but may have "a catalytic effect on other initiatives for denuclearization, for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and for other measures of disarmament."

D. OUTER SPACE

901
Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S. PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAILS U.N. ACCORD ON TREATY GOVERNING EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 55, Dec. 26, 1966: 952-955. JX232.A33, v. 55

Lauds the U.N. outer space agreement as "the most important arms control development since the limited test ban treaty of 1963." The full text of the "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" is appended.

902
Lall, Betty (Goetz) COOPERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Nov. 1966: 34-37.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Discusses the articles of the "Treaty on the Exploration of Outer Space, the Moon and other Celestial Bodies," which were still in contention in 1966: open access, reporting, equal conditions, settlement of disputes, despository agencies, and signatories. Mrs. Lall also covers articles on which agreement had been reached: exploration for the benefit of all parties, arms control in outer space, nonappropriation, promotion of international security, rendering assistance to astronauts, liability, responsibility for private and international organizations, contamination and interference, and jurisdiction and ownership.

903
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee on NASA Oversight. FUTURE NATIONAL SPACE OBJECTIVES. 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 439 p. TL789.8.U5A52, 1966
"Serial O"

Partial contents.--Department of Defense space program planning.--Appendix E. Study by Department of Defense on space system planning for Hon. Olin E. Teague.

Reports future national space objectives. Appendix E "discusses the basic philosophy of the advanced planning process, the management and organization concepts involved, the allocation of resources, and current as well as future DOD space programs." NASA/DOD coordinated programs are singled out as well. Current military projects include the manned orbiting laboratory, a maneuverable reentry spacecraft, space power systems, and launch vehicles. In addition to work in navigation, geodesy, meteorology, and communications, projections for the 1970's and early 1980's include specific goals such as antisatellite systems, early warning systems, reusable spacecraft and launch vehicles, and multipurpose satellites.

904
U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. SPACE TREATY PROPOSALS BY THE UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R.: STAFF REPORT. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 52 p.
JX5810.U5

Prepared for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate.

Contains the texts of the U.S. and Soviet draft treaties on use and exploration of outer space and other background documents pertinent to its peaceful utilization. Of particular interest is a table comparing the two treaties article by article and analyzing the differences between them.

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation, Inspection, Verification

905
Beaton, Leonard. SAFEGUARDS ON PLUTONIUM. Nature (London) v. 212, Dec. 31, 1966: 1517-1519.
Q1.N2, v. 212

Nuclear reactors, which are much in demand throughout the world for their promise of cheap power, will increasingly produce plutonium suitable for use in weapons. For the foreseeable future only 15 of the world's nations will be able to build large power reactors; other nations desiring them will have to rely on foreign assistance. At present nuclear assistance policies, particularly those of France, Great Britain, and Canada

are irresponsible and should be revised. Under existing conditions the industrial powers both build plutonium reactors and separate and return to the nonindustrial nations the resultant plutonium. Safeguards agreements, which can be applied either bilaterally or through the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], are generally bilateral. How can mere bilateral safeguards firmly inhibit a decision to use part of a plutonium stockpile for weapons? A nation determined on such a course of action is hardly likely to allow an agreement negotiated many years previously to stand in its way. IAEA inspection, which might prove somewhat more durable, would be only slightly more inhibiting, for the essential materials are indisputably owned by and located on the soil of the nonnuclear nations in question. Should the 15 industrial nations then deny the other 115 the benefits of cheap and abundant power for the sake of world peace? Not necessarily--if they can provide power without providing plutonium. Three obvious ways are available by which it can be done: via Article XII of the IAEA Safeguards Convention, which "gives the agency the right to deposit safeguarded materials in a place of its own choosing," thus enabling national ownership but not physical possession of plutonium; via "the agreement of the receiving country to sell all plutonium produced to the I.A.E.A. or some other international agency"; or via the receiver's agreement to sell the plutonium produced back to the country providing the reactor. Since ownership traditionally entails control, and since owning plutonium gives the owner an option on nuclear weapons, the first of these alternatives would be strongly resisted by receiver countries. A compulsory repurchase clause, on the other hand, negates the argument that the receiver has paid for plutonium as well as power. The only nonmilitary reason for desiring a plutonium stockpile is that it will be an important fuel in future reactors. If a repurchase clause guaranteed the right to buy the same amount of plutonium for peaceful purposes at the original price this potential objections could be met. The only valid objection to compulsory repurchase provisions, then, is the loss of the bomb option. A nation would be most reluctant to sacrifice cheap nuclear power "in the interest of bombs which it has not in any case decided that it wants." Some problems, of course, would not be solved by a compulsory buy-back clause. Those nations that possess an independent capacity to produce nuclear weapons can only be dissuaded by political means. Because the spread of reactors promotes the ability to produce plutonium self-sufficiently, and because national nuclear establishments even in the currently nonindustrial nations grow ever more capable of doing so without outside aid, indiscriminate diffusion of power reactors must be discouraged. Nuclear power, after all, is still less economical than current alternative power production systems.

906
Breitling, W. J., R. A. Kupferman, and G. J. Gassmann. TRAVELING IONOSPHERIC DISTURBANCES ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR DETONATIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 72, Jan. 1, 1967: 307-315. QC811.J6, v. 72

The analysis of ionospheric data taken from 54 ionosonde observatories throughout the world indicates the presence of several traveling ionospheric disturbances originating from the five high-altitude nuclear tests conducted over Johnston Island in 1962. These disturbances were propagated over large distances and were observed as changes in the F_2-layer critical frequency. They are interpreted as a series of waves that are propagated at various velocities. Travel time curves are presented indicating dispersion and a range of velocities from 50-900 m/sec. (Authors' abstract)

907
Feely, Herbert W., Celso Barrientos, and David Katzman. RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS INJECTED INTO THE STRATOSPHERE BY THE CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST OF MAY 9, 1966. Nature (London) v. 212, Dec. 17, 1966: 1303-1304. Q1.N2, v. 212

Presents an analysis of materials collected by an American RB-57F aircraft as part of the Defense Atomic Support Agency's Project Stardust. The radioactive debris from the nuclear blast thus obtained shows that "barium-140 is enriched by a factor of about 5," while strontium-89 is enriched "by a factor of about 7.5 relative to zirconium-95." These samples indicated, then, that "the debris from the Chinese test was strongly fractionated, and that the portion of it found in the stratosphere is enriched in those components which are volatile or had volatile precursors which were present in the fireball as it cooled and as condensation occurred."

908
HOSMER WARNS OF "CHEAT" TESTING PERIL. Technology week, v. 20, Jan. 9, 1967: 16. UG630.M54, v. 20

Gives the reaction of Rep. Craig Hosmer (R.-Calif.) to Project Sterling. Data from the decoupling experiment, according to Mr. Hosmer, "establish the 'very distinct possibilities' for undetected 'cheat testing' of low-yield (below 20 KT) devices in violation of any test ban extending to the underground environment." He requested that President Johnson withdraw the U.S. offer to extend the present partial test-ban treaty.

909
NUCLEAR TEST BLAST UNDER GRAND TATUM SALT DOME PROVES THAT SOME EXPLOSIONS CAN BE MUFFLED. Business week, no. 1949, Jan. 7, 1967: 100. HC431.B87, 1967

Project Sterling, jointly conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Advanced Research Projects Agency, set off a sneak underground nuclear blast in a Mississippi salt dome. While the results of seismograph readings remain secret, it can be stated that a properly decoupled underground explosion will be detected only by highly sensitive and strategically placed monitors. Observers of the test, standing 2 miles away, saw or felt nothing, which indicates that on-site inspections after a test may be worthless. To resolve doubts the AEC wants to conduct a 5-kiloton test. Called Project Payette, the test will be conducted in a smoothly mined hole rather than in one previously used for tests.

910
Power, Dean V. A SURVEY OF COMPLAINTS OF SEISMIC-RELATED DAMAGE TO SURFACE STRUCTURES FOLLOWING THE SALMON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR DETONATION. In Seismological Society of America, Baltimore. Bulletin, v. 56, Dec. 1966: 1413-1428. QE531.S3, v. 56

Following Salmon, the underground nuclear experiment in Mississippi, numerous unexpected complaints

of damage were received from residents living 15 to 40 km away. The claimed damage is mostly cracks in plaster, stucco, and masonry. Ground motion at these ranges was within the predicted safe limits, with peak surface-particle velocities roughly on order of magnitude below the 5 to 10 cm/sec previously accepted as the threshold for damage. It is shown that a 5 cm/sec damage threshold is not descriptive of this area, and revised damage criteria need to be formulated that take into consideration geology, frequency spectrum, and other factors in addition to surface particle velocity. The claimed damage is similar to that normally found in Mississippi homes where it is attributed to poor foundation soils. The triggering by Salmon of naturally occurring settlement cracks is suspected, but the physics of the process is not yet fully understood. Further complications in the survey are introduced by local sociology and psychology and public relations factors. (Abstract supplied)

911
PROJECT STERLING REVEALS HIGH "DECOUPLING" POTENTIAL. Technology week, v. 20, Jan. 16, 1967: 15-16. UG630.M54, v. 20

Results from underground nuclear decoupling experiments such as Project Sterling will have important implications for U.S. moves toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. "Because of the implications for clandestine underground testing, the fall-out from this shot extends well beyond the Mississippi test site to the Dept. of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Congress, DOD and the armed forces." The test, which took place Dec. 3 near Hattiesburg, Miss., involved a 350-ton-equivalent nuclear device, exploded while suspended in a 110-foot-diameter cavity 2,700 feet deep in a salt dome. Preliminary results of Project Sterling indicate that the decoupling factor of small nuclear explosions "was above 200 at 1cps and lower frequencies, and decreased to about 100 at 10cps." In other words, these explosions can be muffled by a factor of 300 or higher. Some congressional reaction is a protest against any extension of the partial nuclear test ban treaty on the grounds that clandestine underground blasts would be very difficult to verify. Defense and State Department officials caution that much work still has to be done before the real validity of decoupling techniques can be determined. "The questions revolve primarily around the engineering ability to excavate very-large-diameter holes deep underground that will not collapse, the cost of doing so, the ability to keep hidden not only the explosion but also the excavation and site preparation work, the assessment of how large a device can realistically be exploded in these cavities, and whether that size is of sufficient technical interest to weapons designers to warrant the large expense." An AEC feasibility study called Project Payette is expected to involve a salt cavity "able to fully decouple a 5-kiloton nuclear explosion." While 5-kt. tests will provide some information, they can be muffled in alluvium or soft-earth cavities. It is more important to know whether 10-kt. tests can be successfully muffled, for weapons of this size can give scientists and weapons designers information on actual payloads.

912
Spaak, Fernand. EURATOM SAFEGUARDS. Euratom bulletin, v. 5, Dec. 1966: 106-108. P&GP RR

Safeguards systems represent methods of keeping a check on the utilization of nuclear materials--natural or depleted uranium, enriched uranium, uranium 233, plutonium, and thorium. The United States, because of its considerable lead in the nuclear field, was the first to set up safeguards, which were gradually extended to the nations with which Washington later signed cooperative agreements. In 1958 the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom] set up the first multinational safeguards system, enabling the organization to guarantee that materials supplied it by other nations would be used solely for peaceful purposes. The treaty specifies methods of checking and measuring amounts of material used, output capacity, and major intended uses. Operating records must periodically be sent to the organization giving specific details concerning the nuclear materials used, produced, or transported. Inspectors recruited from all of the six member countries have free access at all times to all nuclear facilities and any items of information they may require. Sanctions against violators have been established, which range from warning to the withdrawal of materials. Euratom is willing to share with other nations or international control bodies the experiences gained and techniques developed during its 6 years of inspection operations.

2. Enforcement

913
DR. SARABHAI'S STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE. Nuclear India, v. 5, Oct. 1966: 1-3. TK9103.A3, v. 5

In a speech at the 10th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (held in Vienna Sept. 21-28, 1966) Dr. Vikram A. Sarabhai, head of the delegation from India, discussed the Agency's role in deterring the diversion of nuclear energy programs to military uses and stemming proliferation of nuclear weapons. IAEA safeguards, in his view, must be kept out of the realm of politics. He cited as a negative example the extension of safeguards to reprocessing plants, asserting that it was done "at a pace which left insufficient time for members to formulate considered opinion." The national security and political prestige involved in nuclear proliferation and the escalating arms race must be dealt with by political bodies. One such step would be an agreement by the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee that "emphasizes an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers." Dr. Sarabhai also urged that the Agency render any possible support to proposals to create a nuclear-free zone in South America and to extend the test ban treaty to underground testing. He went on to discuss IAEA's financing, which, he asserted, should come largely from voluntary contributions. In view of meager funds, he recommended that four of the Agency's activities be given top priority: dissemination of knowledge, provision of fellowships, support "strictly on a non-continuing basis" for international atomic energy cooperation, and the administration of safeguards, "on request, on bilateral or multilateral bases." He placed particular stress on the value and importance of international collaboration in peaceful nuclear research.

914
Fischerhof, H. [ATOMIC ENERGY LAW 1966--AN ANNUAL REVIEW] Atomenergierecht 1966--ein Jahresrückblick. Atomwirtschaft--Atomtechnik, v. 11, Dec. 1966: 591-594. TK9001.A97, v. 11

The overall impression of a continuous legal development and realisation in the sphere of atomic energy and of an effort generally to assimilate them holds good also for 1966 although obstacles and delays were more strongly in evidence. In the German Federal Republic an action was pending to set aside the licensing of the erection of an atomic power station; this was, however, withdrawn. No decision has yet been taken concerning the continuance of uranium prospecting in Menzenschwand. Various objections had been raised against this. In the field of energy production the German law to secure the use of hard coal in the electricity industry caused misgivings in respect of its possible deterrence to the building of atomic power stations. Uncertainties of a political origin increased in the international field. It was questioned whether the European Liability Conventions, which have still not come into force, should not be given up in favour of a new interpretation of the liability risks of atomic energy. New laws concerning atomic liability and radiation protection were passed in Belgium, France, Great Britain and Holland. A bill was announced in the Federal Republic to ratify the Liability Conventions and amend the German Atomic Law. Various Bills were also proposed in the USA for changing and extending the scope of the US Atomic Energy Act. Business in atomic insurance increased further in Europe and, particularly, in the Federal Republic. In the USA the Atomic Insurance Pool increased the maximum amount of liability insurance. The question of security control against the misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes played a large part in the business of the IAEA. Euratom continued to be involved in the political crisis of the European Communities. All in all atomic energy law has continued to prove useful in so far as it has kept pace fairly well with technological development and scientific knowledge. Fortunately it has so far been mainly a question of transport and radiation protection. No accidents involving outsiders were reported in 1966. (Abstract supplied)

915
PLUTONIUM IN HAYSTACKS [editorial] Nature (London) v. 212, Nov. 5, 1966: 551.
Q1. N2, v. 212

When the Inspector-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency visited Britain's Bradwell nuclear power station recently he found nothing amiss; what he would have done had he discovered that those in charge were "salting away fissile material" is problematical. Although the IAEA can deny offenders the privileges of membership potential bomb-makers are not likely to be worried. The Agency's safeguards system is voluntary--only two power reactors have been opened for inspection, and the research reactors on IAEA books are for the most part those that were involved in bilateral agreements. The Agency has fallen far short of expectations, but this is not surprising, considering the importance many nations place on unbridled sovereignty and the accusations of the non-nuclear nations that they are being blackballed from the nuclear club. The Inspector-General is currently demonstrating the feasibility and efficiency of inspections; what he has not shown is whether IAEA safeguards are sufficient to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The nonnuclear nations will never agree to international controls unless the already-nuclear powers make some concessions, at the very least a "verified cessation of production of fissile material for military purposes."

916
Pretsch, J. [WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR CONTROL THROUGH THE IAEA?] Weltweite nukleare Sicherheitskontrolle durch die IAEO? Atomwirtschaft--Atomtechnik, v. 11, Dec. 1966: 601-604.
TK9001. A97, v. 11

Security control of nuclear fuels and reactors to prevent their misuse for military purposes emerged as the central theme of the 10th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Organisation which was held in Vienna from 21-27. 9. 66. The revised and extended system of controls which also covered large power reactors had been unanimously adopted at the 1965 General Conference in Tokyo. In practice, of course, only a limited start has been made through the IAEA with these controls: there are only 6 power station reactors (2 each in Japan, Great Britain and the USA) among the 54 reactors which are under IAEA control in 24 countries. It is an open question whether the controls should actually cover the greatest number of nuclear energy installations or whether the mutual confidence of many countries can be strengthened and the mistrust of a few overcome by a limited control. Some tension was discernible under the peaceful surface of the Jubilee Conference. This originated in particular from the different standpoints of the various countries, whether they were members of the "atomic bomb club", highly industrialised countries, countries which obtained nuclear supplies under bilateral agreements or whether they were countries which would only attain this status in another decade. The problems of regional controls outside the IAEA (e. g. Euratom) were also discussed. The German Federal Republic stood at the centre of the declarations of the East European States that they would place their nuclear energy installations under IAEA control if the Federal Republic, which is still subject to Euratom control, did also. Numerous proposals for the administration of IAEA controls were made at the General Conference to cover a transitional phase of undefined duration. (Abstract supplied)

917
Ungerer, Werner. [CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NONPROLIFERATION] Kernenergie-Kontrolle und Non-Proliferation. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Nov. 1966: 660-669. D839. A885, v. 17

The question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is closely related to the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The same fuels, uranium 235 and plutonium 239, are used for nuclear power plants and bombs. Any government commanding a full production cycle of nuclear energy--uranium ores, processing plants, nuclear reactors, and devices for separating plutonium and isotopes--can easily produce nuclear bombs. An ideal solution to the problem of proliferation would be subjection of all phases of each complete and incomplete nuclear production cycle in the world to supranational supervision--a provision originally contained in the Baruch Plan of 1946. But precisely because of that stipulation the plan was rejected by the Soviet Union, which at the time was striving to break the United States nuclear monopoly. Today enormous American and Soviet nuclear stockpiles would make the application of the Baruch Plan impractical. In the absence of a universal control system some alternates were introduced by bilateral and multilateral agreements following the U.S. announcement in 1953 of its "Atoms-for-Peace" program. Under this program the United States helps about 40 nations in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Since the United States

kept the property title to the nuclear fuels it supplied, U.S. contractual control did not appear to encroach on the recipient nation's sovereignty. Similar agreements have been made between a number of recipient nations and two other supplying countries, Canada and Great Britain. Multilateral security arrangements with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy have been made separately by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom], and an agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Nuclear Energy Agency [ENEA]. ENEA's control system is limited to its own nuclear establishments; Euratom's extends to all nuclear fuels on its territory; and IAEA's occupies a position in between that of the other two. Since control by an international organization inspires greater confidence in the countries concerned than control by another nation, the United States transferred to IAEA a part of its control rights from bilateral agreements, made within its Atoms-for-Peace program. Along with Great Britain it also transferred to IAEA some of its reactors. For the time being the idea of a universal supranational control system seems to be utopian. More realistic by far would be a gradual extension and improvement of the existing IAEA system and establishment and development of regional control systems, such as Euratom, which has proven to be effective in securing the peaceful use of the nuclear energy under its jurisdiction. Since only a nation or a group of nations commanding a full production cycle of nuclear energy is able to produce the weapons, effective control over any essential link in the cycle would adequately prevent the misuse of nuclear establishment for military purposes.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

918
Lall, Betty (Goetz) ARMS REDUCTION IMPACT. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Sept. 1966: 41-44. TK9145.A84, v. 22

Reviews a series of studies undertaken by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Defense Department on the economic effects of defense reductions. One outcome of the studies is that "government cannot take a laissez faire attitude toward adjustments of communities, companies, and workers to decreased defense spending." The Federal Government, especially the Defense Department, must provide the "direction, leadership, and planning" to encourage communities and companies to diversify and plan for defense reductions. "Obviously if the government in Washington does not give the impression that disarmament is an active goal it cannot expect the economic recipient of defense spending to view disarmament plans seriously." The following studies are reviewed: Adjustments to Reduced National Defense Expenditures in New Mexico (Kirschner Associates, Albuquerque, N. Mex., 1965); Community Readjustment to Reduced Defense Spending (National Planning Association, Washington, D. C., 1965); Defense Industry Diversification: An Analysis with 12 Case Studies (Denver Research Institute, Denver, Colo., 1966); The Dyna-Soar Contract Cancellation (The State of Washington Employment Security Department, Olympia, Wash., 1965); The Implications of Reduced Defense Demand for the Electronics Industry (Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio, 1965); Industrial Conversion Potential in the Shipbuilding Industry (Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, Mo., 1966); The Transferability of Defense Job Skills to Non-Defense Occupations (New York State Department of Labor, Albany, N. Y., 1965); Transferability of Research and Development Skills in the Aerospace Industry (Analytic Services Inc., Falls Church, Va., 1965)

919
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. DISARMAMENT AND JOBS. [London, United Nations Association, 1965?] 32 p.
HC260.D4U55

Bibliography: p. 30

Contents.--Defence and the British economy, by Eric Lubbock.--The disarmament plans, by Edward Dommen.--A union view on disarmament, by J. E. Mortimer.--An employment policy for disarmament, by Janet Blackman.--Appendix 1. Industry and defence expenditure, by John Bates and John Hewitt.--Appendix 2. Reallocation of defence expenditure.

A look into the possible effects of disarmament on jobs in Great Britain. Lubbock, Member of Parliament for Orpington, discusses how well-rooted defense is in the British economy and suggests that machinery now being created to deal with economic crisis could be "adapted to cope with the transitional problems of disarmament." Dommen explains the American and Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament [GCD] in terms of their economic implications, and Mortimer sets forth the labor-union view of disarmament. A feasible employment policy in the face of GCD is the concern of Janet Blackman. In the two appendices figures show both the industrial implications of defense spending in Great Britain and possible alternatives thereto.

920
Vilmar, Fritz. [ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT IN THE LATE STAGE OF CAPITALISM; MATERIALS AND ANALYSES] Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus. Materialien und Analysen. [Frankfurt am Main] Europäische Verlagsanstalt [1965] 318 p. diagrs., tables. (Sammlung "res novae," Bd. 38)
HC65.V8

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Preface, by Ossip K. Flechtheim.--The importance of the armaments-based economy in 20th century capitalism.--The armaments-based economy in the German Federal Republic.--Bankruptcy of military policy.--Disarmament--necessity and chances.--Inversion of the armaments-based economy: 1. theoretical possibilities.--Inversion of the armaments-based economy: 2. social opposition.--Social-political prerequisites for a successful disarmament policy.

Considers armaments an essential trait of the economy of the late-phase capitalism that began "in the last third of the 19th century." Vilmar analyses the impact of armaments on the contemporary capitalist economy, especially in Germany, and points out the growing insecurity caused by armaments after they reached an optimal point. The author discusses the problem of the possible transition of the armaments-based economy into a full-scale peace economy and its impact on social and political life, particularly on the role of economic classes, welfare spending, and employment. However, the road to disarmament that he points to is economic socialism accomplished through institutional changes in the capitalist society itself.

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

921
Azancot, Leopoldo. THE DAY H-BOMBS FELL ON PALOMARES. Saturday review, v. 50, Jan. 28, 1967: 21-27, 55. Z1219.S25, v. 50

Narrative presenting the reactions of residents of the village of Palomares and surrounding communities to the crash of an American B-52 carrying nuclear bombs. Their immediate near panic, Azancot notes, eventually gave way to economic preoccupation with the matter of compensation. Azancot gives considerable attention to the precautions and tests used by the Army to measure the danger of radioactive contamination.

922
Lall, Betty (Goetz) ARMS CONTROL IN CONGRESS, 1966. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Dec. 1966: 35-37. TK9145.A84, v. 22

While the 89th Congress was not deeply involved in arms control issues per se, its foreign policy decisions will profoundly affect arms control progress. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is still not popular with important Congressional committees, particularly in the Senate. Senator John McClellan (D-Ark.), for example, is critical of ACDA on grounds that it has failed to insist on inspection rights before entering arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and may have duplicated Pentagon functions. The most substantial arms control activity in the 89th Congress was the Senate's passage of Resolution 179 endorsing current efforts to achieve an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Although several House members introduced similar resolutions, the House failed "to muster sufficient interest in nonproliferation to pass a resolution." Few other Congressional discussions of disarmament measures took place except for an occasional speech or "spatter of controversy" stirred up by Representative Craig Hosmer (R-Calif.), an outspoken critic of disarmament. However recent Congressional activities in the field of foreign relations are important to arms control. The military assistance amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill for fiscal 1967 may affect regional arms control agreements. The act provides that sale or exchange of defense services and materials shall be administered in a manner that will "encourage regional arms control and disarmament agreements and . . . discourage arms races." With the Nation's current balance-of-payments trouble and the need for manpower in Vietnam Congress showed signs of approving previously rejected proposals for U.S.-Soviet troop reductions in Europe. Apparently "it is easier for government leaders to accept reductions in military strength resulting from current contingencies than from negotiated international agreements." In both the House and the Senate resolutions designed to show U.S. interest in establishing a permanent U.N. peacekeeping force were offered. Many in Congress expressed undiminished support for the capacity of a strengthened United Nations to maintain peace. No major attacks on the United Nations or its activities took place in the 89th Congress.

923
Van Voorst, L. Bruce. [CRISIS MANAGEMENT BETWEEN THEORY AND REALITY] Crisis Management zwischen Theorie und Wirklichkeit. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Dec. 1966: 734-740. D839.A885, v. 17

Criticizes American crisis-management doctrine and practice. Van Voorst points out inconsistencies in American crisis-management policy, citing as evidence Washington's handling of the Cuban and Dominican crises. The author thinks the United States has thus far conducted its extensive research on improving international crisis management in vain, because whenever emergency has arisen U.S. Presidents have resorted to lay opinion rather than expertise.

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